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ABSTRACT 
 Military officers and psychologists have argued that the human experience of killing in combat is 
directly related to physical proximity between combatants. With the advent of remote controlled weapons 
and advanced optics, that argument has proven untrue. This thesis, through analysis of contemporary war 
literature and film, proposes that a better paradigm for understanding and anticipating the human 
experience of killing in combat is the view the soldier maintains of him/herself and of the other as 
similarly human. The contemporary soldier may view both the enemy and him/herself as human, 
subhuman, or inhuman; this view is closely tied to constructed narratives. Unfortunately, the 
contemporary warrior narrative encourages a dehumanization of the enemy and the “numbing” of the 
soldier, simultaneously hindering the soldier’s ability to process traumatic experiences in war and opening 
the door to unethical action. Today, technologies greatly influence the soldier’s perception of the enemy 
and are commonly the mediums through which the enemy is encountered, but the technologies are 
ambivalent to the soldier’s mindset and experience. This thesis argues that soldiers must be intentional 
about the narratives they construct in order to see both themselves and the enemy as similarly human. 
This approach, while acknowledging that war will always be traumatic, encourages an ethical and moral 
execution of war and simultaneously aims to limit moral injury inflicted by a “betrayal of what’s right” or 
“soul wound.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
A “HUMAN ENDEAVOR”: KILLING IN CONTEMPORARY U.S. COMBAT NARRATIVES 
 
War is a human endeavor—a fundamentally human clash of wills often fought among 
populations. It is not a mechanical process that can be controlled precisely, or even 
mostly, by machines, statistics, or laws that cover operations in carefully controlled and 
predictable environments. Fundamentally, all war is about changing human behavior. It is 
both a contest of wills and a contest of intellect between two or more sides in a conflict, 
with each trying to alter the behavior of the other side. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0 (2) 
 
With the fighting over, the marines were suddenly not so buoyant anymore. They had 
taken off their war paint and they were no longer joking. “It’s a little sobering,” Captain 
Sal Aguilar told me, looking at the field full of dead Iraqis. “When you’re training for 
this, you joke about it, you can’t wait for the real thing. Then when you see it, when you 
see the real thing, you never want to see it again.” Dexter Filkins, The Forever War (93) 
 
You have heard that it was said, ‘You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But 
I say to you, love your enemies.” Matthew 5:43-44 
 
In March 2003, America invaded Iraq; that summer I entered West Point. Over the next four 
years, I watched that war and, to a lesser extent, the war in Afghanistan as well with great interest. War 
loomed on the horizon. I wondered what it would be like. Would I have what it took to be a soldier and – 
more importantly – a leader in combat?1 I spent a lot of time thinking about those questions. At the time, 
relatively few people talked about what it was like to kill in combat, perhaps because it had been more 
than ten years since the Gulf War, perhaps because those who had been to Afghanistan were only slowly 
rotating out of the units with which they had deployed, and perhaps mostly because it’s a difficult subject 
and therefore largely avoided.2 Plenty of people talked about combat, but not killing. One of the few 
contemporary voices on the topic was Dave Grossman, who in 1995 published On Killing: The 
                                                          
1 Throughout this study, I will use the term “soldier” to encompass all service members, recognizing that it denotes a 
land-based, army service member. This is not done in prejudice, but out of convenience – “service member” is a 
bulky term which at times distracts attention unnecessarily from my argument. When distinctions are made in the 
texts I will distinguish as well between “Marine” or “Airman” and “Soldier.” 
2 Dave Grossman labels this avoidance the “taboo of killing” which prevents soldiers from talking openly about it 
(On Killing xxxi). Edward Tick comments that more widely “we do not even know how to think about war” (War 
and the Soul 3). 
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Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society. That Grossman was both an Army Ranger and 
a West Point psychology professor lent his theories significant credibility. His book was displayed 
prominently in the Army Post Exchanges, and I – along with hundreds of others – read it in individual 
preparation for combat. Yet it was ultimately just that – individual preparation, not a fundamental element 
of education or training. So much of military training is focused on the unit, on rehearsals, on battle drills 
and collective tasks that attending to the psychological and intellectual preparation of the individual is 
easily overlooked.3 Preparing my soldiers to deploy to Iraq in 2008 as a young infantry platoon leader, I 
did not know what to think about killing, much less how to talk about it to soldiers. So we did not talk 
about it maturely. Instead, bravado and pop culture portrayals of killing filled that vacuum where open 
and thoughtful dialogue ought to have been. This was nothing new; images of John Wayne killing without 
emotion have shaped multiple generations’ ideas of war (Tick, War and the Soul 154). Needless to say, 
we could have done better. As a platoon leader, I should have done better. Today, four combat tours later, 
I am returning to my alma mater to teach literature, and this study is primarily meant to help me think 
about how to help my students – those next leaders of America’s youth – prepare themselves to think and 
talk about killing. 
But why literature? Soldiers asked that of me often as I left company command in an infantry unit 
for graduate school. I believe literature offers a widely available conduit through which soldiers can talk 
about the complexities of the human experience of killing in combat, and today a growing body of 
acclaimed literature is emerging from veterans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While one might 
prefer to wait several generations to allow these texts to “stand the test of time,” frankly, soldiers 
returning from and preparing to deploy to combat do not have that kind of time available. Whereas young 
cadets and soldiers might be hesitant to discuss their own anxieties and fears, or returning veterans 
reluctant to share their burdens in public, war literature written by veteran authors provides a credible 
medium through which both cohorts can engage in dialogue with others openly. It is no small wonder that 
                                                          
3 Karl Marlantes, author of What It Is Like To Go To War, in fact, insists that this aspect of preparation for war must 
be individually undertaken (xii). 
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in the last few years so many new literary projects and journals have emerged for veterans across the 
country.4 Storytelling – through poetry, fiction and nonfiction – continues to be an indispensable part of 
how we conceive of and cope with warfare and our humanity. This project, then, through the study of 
contemporary war literature, aims to equip military leaders to think and speak in an informed manner on 
the “taboo” topic of killing in today’s combat, to advocate for an ethical approach to it, and ultimately to 
illuminate the incorrect ways in which we have spoken about the experience of killing in the past.  
Throughout this thesis, I will argue that the soldier’s perception of shared humanity with the 
enemy is the most crucial factor in the soldier’s experience of contemporary killing in combat. As this 
chapter’s epitaph demonstrates, the Army itself declares that war is a “human endeavor […] not a 
mechanical process” but a “fundamentally human clash of wills” (ADP 3-0, 2). Yet today the technology, 
training, metaphors and language employed for war all too often elide that warfare is fundamentally 
human. To the contrary, we describe war as inhuman. This failure of representation hinders the soldier’s 
ability to prepare for and recover from killing. We claim war and killing is “indescribable” or “beastly,” 
for example, or advise the soldier to become “numb.” None of these approaches prepares the soldier to 
make sense of his or her experiences of killing, yet all of them can become self-fulfilling prophecies. So, 
this thesis reintroduces the soldier to the human aspect of war. The contemporary soldier may view both 
the enemy and him/herself as human, subhuman, or inhuman; this view of the other stems greatly from 
the soldier’s perception of self-likeness in that other. Today, technologies greatly influence that 
perception and are commonly the media through which the enemy is encountered. Further, I will argue 
that perceived risk presented by the enemy to the soldier and others is also instrumental in the perception 
of the other and self. Finally, the narratives soldiers create about war and killing – along with the 
                                                          
4 The D.C.-based Veterans Writing Project for example launched in May of 2012 and publishes O-Dark-Thirty. 
Likewise, the Veterans Writing Workshop in New York began in 2010. Proud to Be has been published annually by 
Southeast Missouri State University Press since 2012. Since 2015, The Military Writers’ Society of America has 
quarterly published Dispatches. Line of Advance began online publishing in 2015. Military Experience and the Arts 
publishes several journals for veterans and War, Literature and the Arts, though older, continues annually to publish 
veteran poetry and prose in Colorado Springs. The Warrior Writers has published four book compilations. Lastly, 
Words After War, The Telling Project, and numerous other blogs have been established to feature veteran writing. 
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language and metaphors used – also greatly affect the experience of combat and killing. These factors and 
others combine to form the soldier’s view of him/herself and the enemy.  
Soldiers are at risk of moral injury when they kill in battle without an ethical narrative approach 
to the event.5 Moral injury is a term commonly used among psychiatrists when treating war related post-
traumatic stress disorder; it is most commonly conceived of as an injury to one’s moral conscience 
through an act of moral transgression. My particular use of the term is primarily influenced by two 
psychiatrists: Jonathan Shay, author of Achilles in Vietnam (1994), and Edward Tick, author of War and 
the Soul (2005) and Warrior’s Return (2014). According to Shay, the psychological moral injury is more 
difficult to recover from than the experience of horror, fear, and grief, which is to say that Shay 
distinguishes between a simply traumatic war experience and one that also violates “what’s right” and 
therefore results in moral injury (20). I will insist on this distinction as well throughout this study. For 
Shay, the “betrayal of what’s right” and the ensuing moral injury can lead the soldier to go “berserk” and 
lose “human restraint” (84). Thus Shay reads Homer’s Iliad as the tragedy of Achilles’ moral undoing, 
not his glorification as a bold warrior. Tick’s work centers on the existence of the “soul,” which he 
broadly defines in part as “the awareness of oneself as a discrete entity moving through space and time” 
(War and the Soul 17). Thus Tick prefers to call moral injury a “soul wound” (Warrior’s Return 151). For 
Tick, “wound” also implies that the damage is inflicted and not accidental (Warrior’s Return 152). 
Throughout this study I will reference Tick’s extensive work on the warrior’s “soul.” 
When presented with a requirement to kill, soldiers weigh the cost of action against that of 
inaction. One can never be sure which will be worse: to kill and shoulder the moral burden of having 
killed, or not to kill and perhaps then be responsible for the death of others and military failure. Either 
way trauma and/or moral injury threatens. Yet Vietnam veteran and author Karl Marlantes explains that 
the “basic psychology of the warrior” is to believe oneself to be a protector (150), which necessitates 
                                                          
5 For example, in Matt Martin’s memoir Predator, he kills an insurgent who had killed countless soldiers and Iraqi 
civilians. Unfortunately, he also injured or killed an elderly man. Writing about the event, he says: “The Rocket Man 
had it coming. The old man did not” (54). 
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killing rather than inaction. To avoid the risk of trauma and/or moral injury, many soldiers create a mental 
narrative in which one or both of the combatants are not human. As Marlantes explains, “killing someone 
without splitting oneself from the feelings that the act engenders requires an effort of supreme 
consciousness that, quite frankly, is beyond most humans” (26). Thus, very few soldiers create a mental 
narrative in which both combatants are equally human.6 Even so, I advocate that all soldiers should strive 
towards this “effort of supreme consciousness” to respect the humanity of both themselves and the 
enemy. As will be shown, most soldiers either intentionally or passively fashion themselves and/or the 
enemy into something other than fully human (machines, savages, beasts, animals, deviants, various racial 
slurs, and other dehumanizing terms will often surface in this study). This view, however, only defers the 
trauma and/or moral injury until after the fact when such a construct is no longer tenable.7 As Marlantes 
writes forty years after his experience, “I now think of what was ‘the enemy’ as human beings” (41). Thus 
the soldier’s dilemma: military training equips one to kill, but not to think about it.  
My call for a more reflective soldier might be met by the criticism that such a soldier will 
decrease military effectiveness by being less willing to kill in combat. How can such a soldier kill? This is 
a valid concern, which I will address by four counterarguments. First, Americans who are unwilling to 
kill under any circumstance should not be in military positions which require killing in the first place – 
the classification conscientious objector exists for a good reason.8 I am advocating for a soldier who is 
reluctant to kill but ultimately willing to do so, which is not to say a soldier who hesitates to kill when 
necessary, but simply one who is not eager to kill. Second, regardless of the soldier’s view of killing, 
once moral injury leads to post-traumatic stress disorder in a soldier, then military effectiveness is already 
hampered because that soldier must be treated and healed, which often leads to medical discharge. The 
                                                          
6 WWII veteran and philosopher Glenn Gray in fact will note that this “image” of the enemy creates a “deep 
contradiction” for the soldier and makes it “nearly impossible for a combat soldier to prepare himself 
psychologically for bloody combat with a will to victory” (The Warriors 160). 
7 Obviously, some humans will be racist or otherwise prejudiced for perhaps all their lives and always view some 
subset of humanity as inferior to themselves, but for everyone else, psychiatrist Edward Tick explains that there is a 
“rehumanization” process after war (Warrior’s Return 227).  
8 Mel Gibson’s 2016 movie Hacksaw Ridge explores just this very issue. 
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high rate of post-traumatic stress disorder among soldiers and veterans today is already reducing our 
military’s effectiveness – early studies place the rate of PTSD in returning Army combat soldiers between 
14 and 18.5 percent (Love 4). Far worse, in 2012, military suicides outpaced combat deaths (Strobel). 
Recognizing this problem, the Army created the “Ready and Resilient” campaign to teach “resiliency.” 
Yet in the Army’s December 2016 Leaders’ Guide to Building Personal Readiness and Resilience, the 
word “kill” is mentioned only four times and always in relation to killing oneself – never the enemy.9 
Preventing, limiting, and/or recovering from the experience of killing others is thus a component of long-
term military readiness and effectiveness which is institutionally overlooked. Third, in asymmetric or 
counterinsurgency warfare, more killing does not equate to more military success. Modern warfare is a 
contest of ideas and ideals. If the U.S. is to win such a war, then it will be because what our soldiers 
represent and how they represent it are more attractive than what the enemy represents, not because we 
have killed our way to victory. The reflective soldier, who dearly acknowledges people’s humanity – even 
those he or she kills – is far more likely to engender respect than the “numb” soldier. Lastly, ask soldiers 
why they risked their lives and fought in battle and the answer is overwhelmingly “for the man/woman 
standing next to me.” So how can a reflexive soldier kill? If we simply replace “fight” with “kill” in the 
question above then we arrive at the following: soldiers kill not out of hatred of the enemy, but love of 
comrades. They kill because the cost of inaction is greater than the cost of action. They kill to accomplish 
military objectives, not out of hatred. Strong, well-led, cohesive units exemplify this, yet this is not the 
typical narrative presented about killing. 
Of great importance to this study is the way in which new technologies change the human 
experience of war and in particular of killing. Previous thinkers such as Glenn Gray and Grossman have 
conceived of the difficulty of killing as directly related to the physical proximity of the combatants. Gray 
writes that “with every foot of distance there is a corresponding decrease in reality” (178). Yet today 
powerful optics and remote cameras and weapons (including drones) often render distance less of a factor, 
                                                          
9 Killing is not mentioned at all in Army Regulation 350-53: Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness, the 
regulation which governs the Ready and Resilient program. 
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and in fact may produce a sense of intimacy or proximity for the soldier which makes killing more 
difficult, not less. Conversely, thermal and infrared optics, which distort or blur the image of the human 
enemy, along with the technology of training, often distance or detach the soldier from a nearby enemy as 
the neural links between perception and psychology are being rewired. Physical distance, or “range,” is no 
longer an accurate framework for predicting the psychological effects of killing in combat. This study, in 
fact, suggests that it never was. 
Instead, contemporary war literature reveals that the perceived shared humanity of the enemy is 
the single most important factor in killing today. The soldier must weigh his or her own humanity against 
that of the human other, and, in so doing, frequently problematizes the concept of “human,” revealing 
how fluidly soldiers conceive of their human status. I use “shared humanity” because soldiers regularly 
conceive of the enemy as subhuman if not entirely inhuman – at the very least, as a different kind of 
human from themselves. It is no small wonder that soldiers are more likely to attribute humanness to 
themselves and their comrades over the enemy when all humans “commonly attribute greater humanness 
to their in-groups than to out-groups” (Haslam et al 937). In war this is amplified: an enemy attempting to 
kill you is the ultimate out-group. The use of racial and religious slurs against an enemy in war is nothing 
new: both serve to dehumanize the enemy into a lesser, more killable other. Taken further, soldiers may 
animalize or demonize the enemy – all of this, I argue, constitutes active dehumanization, which leaders 
must address if they wish their units to wage war ethically. Even without active dehumanization, soldiers 
tend not to individuate the enemy; that is, soldiers view the enemy as an abstract, faceless object rather 
than a fully human individual. This passive dehumanization is a far better approach to combat than active 
dehumanization but still can be problematic in its own right. Often it reduces the soldier him-or-herself to 
a “machine-like” or “numb” being. In other words, it produces a kind of self-dehumanization. Both forms 
of dehumanization serve to break the shared humanity between the two combatants and render the other 
as less human, creating space for unethical action and long-term difficulty in processing the event. 
Today the view of the self and other is complicated by asymmetric warfare in which the 
“battlefield” is indistinguishable from “civilian spaces” and the “enemy” is indistinguishable from 
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“civilians.” While the soldier endeavors to “win hearts and minds” he or she must all the while prepare to 
kill an enemy indistinguishable from the civilian population.10 This dichotomy of intentionally 
humanizing the civilian population while also intentionally or subconsciously dehumanizing the (often 
unidentifiable) enemy within the same population problematizes the soldier’s effort to prepare for and 
recover from killing. It presents a deep contradiction. For the soldier, preserving his or her own “heart and 
mind” can be the most complex battle of all. 
Perceived risk or threat to the soldier also appears time and again in the literary texts I examine as 
an influential factor in the decision to humanize or dehumanize the other. It forms an essential part of the 
soldier’s efforts to make a post-killing narrative with which s/he can be at peace – which both Shay and 
Tick identify as an essential process in both the prevention and treatment of moral injury. Fundamentally, 
the nature of an enemy threat in a counterinsurgency or asymmetric war is different than in “linear” or 
conventional wars. In World War II, for example, an enemy unit could be defeated without killing every 
enemy soldier. For instance, communication nodes, supply depots, bridges or even equipment could be 
destroyed and render a unit incapable of meaningful resistance. In such a scenario, the individual soldier 
may have felt no imperative to kill a particular other, as that enemy might not have presented a perceived 
threat. Armies clashed against armies, not necessarily individuals against each other.11 Not so in 
counterinsurgency: “personality charts” map the individuals within insurgent cells (the infamous “deck of 
cards” in Iraq is but one example) to be killed or captured. When previously unknown enemies present 
themselves within the civilian populace, it is usually because they are attacking – and not attacking along 
a battlefront, but attacking a particular small unit. The soldiers in that small unit understand the attack to 
be a particular threat from particular individuals to which they must respond. In counterinsurgency, 
individuals are the enemy, not large military units. Individuals present the threat, not armies. In 
counterinsurgency, too, just as quickly as an enemy presents a threat, that enemy may blend back into the 
                                                          
10 General Mattis, now Secretary of Defense, once famously was quoted by journalist and author Tom Richs as 
saying “Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everyone you meet” (Fiasco 313). 
11 Though one might note that island fighting in the Pacific had a very different character than fighting in the 
European theater. 
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civilian population. Soldiers know that waiting to kill an enemy is a dangerous gamble: it risks the lives 
of everyone in the unit, not just the soldier’s. Thus killing in an asymmetric war is different than killing in 
conventional war in part because the threat or risk to individuals is manifested differently. In my view, the 
decision to kill appears to be more personal in counterinsurgency than in total war. Yet I am not sure we 
have made an effort to think about that killing as distinct. 
Grossman’s study On Killing (1995) is a sweeping analysis of the psychology and physiology of 
killing in combat. In the book, and in his more recent book On Combat (2005), he advances two 
revisionist claims about the nature of conflict: first, that humans are innately resistant to killing other 
humans, and, second, that modern militaries condition their soldiers through training so that they might 
overcome this psychological resistance (On Killing 2, 18). Grossman labels modern military training 
“operant conditioning,” akin to Pavlovian behaviorism, which is required in order to “program” soldiers 
to overcome their resistance to killing (On Killing 35; On Combat 209). Grossman considers the literature 
and history which indicate that humans are not reluctant to kill in war a “conspiracy of silence” which is a 
“cultural conspiracy of forgetfulness, distortion, and lies that has been going on for thousands of years” 
(On Killing 36). The truth according to Grossman is humans resist killing one another, even in battle. 
Grossman’s study is founded upon the controversial work of Army historian S. L. A. Marshall, who 
claimed that only fifteen to twenty percent of American soldiers in World War II fired their weapons at 
the enemy (Marshall 54). Although it appears Marshall made up this statistic, Grossman uses it as the 
basis of his theory and agrees with Marshall that as a result of a change in training methodology, that 
trend reversed in Korea to a firing rate of 55 percent and finally over 90 percent in Vietnam (On Killing 
35).12 He concludes that American military training after World War II has been designed to condition 
                                                          
12 Marshall’s findings from WWII and the Korean War have been often criticized as unscientific and rejected as not 
credible – some scholars directly question Grossman’s use of the statistics (Engen 121; Chambers 113). Glenn 
Russel even writes in his introduction to the 2000 edition of Marshall’s book Men Against Fire that “evidence 
indicates that [Marshall] invented his ratio-of-fire values” and that the “most influential element of his many 
writings appears to be a fabrication” (4). Recently, Robert Engen actually uncovered Canadian WWII data which 
directly contradicts Marshall’s findings (126). Grossman himself writes that “Marshall’s findings have been largely 
ignored by academia and the fields of psychology and psychiatry” (35). Despite this, Marshall’s findings are the 
foundation of Grossman’s study and theories. 
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soldiers to shoot reflexively at pop-up targets shaped like people so that they will overcome this resistance 
to killing and kill in combat when given the same “conditioned stimulus” (On Killing 254). Despite his 
argument’s reliance on questionable data, Grossman’s work remains widely influential in the military and 
police forces: he now travels the country teaching the “Bulletproof Mind.” 
Grossman further argues that the physical distance between combatants is directly linked to a 
soldier’s resistance to killing: the farther apart two combatants are, the easier both will find it to kill the 
other. In 1995 Grossman claimed that “there is a direct relationship between the empathic and physical 
proximity of the victim, and the resultant difficulty and trauma of the kill” (On Killing 97). Thus, 
Grossman evaluates killing from nine different ranges: “Sexual Range” as the closest proximity and “Max 
Range” (bombers and artillery) as the farthest combatants can be apart, presenting resistance to killing in 
a much cited graph of a descending curve as combatants move from close together to far apart (On Killing 
98). Yet, in his analysis of killing at “Bayonet Range,” Grossman concedes that bayoneting is easier done 
from behind, and thus that “the essence of the whole physical distance spectrum may simply revolve 
around the degree to which the killer can see the face of the victim” (On Killing 128). Despite this 
apparent self-criticism, in 2005 Grossman strongly reaffirmed his distance theory: “simply stated, the 
farther away you are the easier it is to kill” (On Combat 203).  
Grossman inadvertently invokes the ethics of ethical philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in his 
reference to the capacity to see the face of the “victim.” Levinas proposes an ethics which derives from 
face-to-face human encounters. For Levinas, the face-to-face encounter creates an ethical “call” to which 
the human is answerable and responsible, yet which “exceeds the confines of understanding” (Entre Nos 
4). This responsibility demands the “taking upon oneself of the fate of the other. That is the ‘vision’ of the 
Face” (Entre Nos 103). Levinasian ethics emphasizes a welcoming demeanor toward the other, as the face 
of the other compels a responsibility for the other’s welfare (Totality and Infinity 82). Most importantly 
for this study, the face of the other reveals the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” (Entre Nos 104). 
Levinas places the encounter with the face before symbolic language, prioritizing it over logic, 
philosophy and representation, and states that it is the beginning of ethics. This study will examine ways 
  
11 
 
in which soldiers must address the “call” of the face and confront the “commandment” not to kill – and 
how training, language and technologies can alter the encounter with the other’s face, often occluding or 
distorting the face of the other. Yet it will also complicate Levinas’ claims in that, when targeting a 
particular individual with a known face, the face of the enemy often compels the soldier to harm, not 
preserve the other’s welfare. 
The competing “commands” of the other’s face – to protect and to kill – highlight the 
humanizing/dehumanizing dichotomy of asymmetric warfare. How can a soldier kill given such a 
dilemma? My personal experience and study of contemporary war literature corroborate Grossman’s 
emphasis on training as something that “kicks in” during intense combat (Klay 30). Over and over, the 
literary texts in this study reinforce the notion that soldiers do what they have been trained to do, at times 
performing like “war machines.” Yet, the texts in this study do not corroborate Grossman’s claim that 
humans are innately resistant to killing other humans, even in war. Instead they clearly demonstrate that if 
such resistance exists, it only occurs when there is perceived shared humanity, or likeness.13 This adds to 
Grossman’s own criticism of his distance theory regarding the face of the victim: the texts reveal it is not 
physical distance or “range” that matters, but the degree to which one perceives the other as similarly 
human – and that likeness is often contained in the face. This aligns more closely with Levinas’ claims 
about ethics than Grossman’s claims about distance, even though I will disagree with Levinas by insisting 
that linguistic representation, or narratives, at times override the “call” of the face. With modern 
technology soldiers often find it easier to view the other’s face from afar than up close. Therefore 
Grossman is right to correlate the ability “to perceive the extent of wounds inflicted or the sounds and 
facial expressions” of the enemy as influential to the human experience of killing, but wrong to presume 
that it is directly correlated to physical distance (On Killing 110). This study will de-link empathic 
proximity and physical proximity in contemporary killing. While it is not my goal to discredit Grossman 
                                                          
13 Robert Engen convincingly critiques Grossman’s claim of innate, or biological, resistance in his 2008 essay 
“Killing for their Country: a New Look at ‘Killology’.” 
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– he deserves much credit for advancing the conversation on this topic – I agree with Robert Engen that 
Grossman presents a “flawed understanding of how and why soldiers can kill” (127). 
Hugh Gusterson also criticizes Grossman’s distance model in his book Drone: Remote Control 
Warfare (2016), which analyzes the human experience of drone warfare and concludes that technology 
has “respatialized” war. He writes that in addition to landmines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
“drones have disarticulated the spatial relationship between weapon and warrior” (45). For Gusterson, 
drones and other technologies have “scrambled the relationship of distance” and as a result “in this 
process of respatialization […] the clear boundary between the battlefield and civilian space […] is in 
danger of erasure” (48).14 While drone pilots watch a suspected enemy from 8,000 miles away, Gusterson 
notes that many experience a sense of proximity with the human other, a “remote intimacy” (72). He also 
develops the idea of “remote narrativization” in which observers “create mental stories” and make 
“interpretive leaps, fill in informational gaps” in order to help “make sense of the people they watch” 
(66). Gusterson notes that the “remote intimacy of drone operations plays havoc with Grossman’s model” 
by taking “the straight line in Grossman’s graph and twisting it into a Mobius strip where beginning and 
end, although still separate, cross” (72). He concludes that when drone pilots kill, it can be “more 
psychologically proximate than that of other soldiers, who are physically closer to the enemy” (73). If this 
is the case, then “narrativization” can create empathic proximity where physical proximity is missing. 
Contemporary war literature and film corroborate Gusterson’s criticism of Grossman’s model; 
however, these texts also inform us that “narrativization” is not limited to remote observers. Indeed, 
soldiers engaged in close proximity fighting still must make “interpretive leaps” concerning the enemy 
and civilians with whom they interact. In fact, any human interaction entails some level of such 
interpretation. As Samina Najmi explains in her essay on Brian Turner’s poetry, it is nearly impossible for 
an armed American soldier in Iraq to have a fully inter-relational experience with an Iraqi civilian (63). In 
such circumstances, when a soldier kills, these interpretive leaps justifiably become more highly 
                                                          
14 One might argue that this happened long before the advent of drones, as whole cities were bombarded in World 
War II and, to a more limited extent, World War I. 
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scrutinized. Soldiers must “create mental stories” afterwards which, within their own personal moral 
framework, either do or do not validate their actions. These stories are largely based on “unconscious 
cultural assumptions,” as will be shown (Gusterson 66). Whereas Gusterson imagines this aspect of drone 
warfare to be different from on the ground fighting, in actuality the two are more similar than one might 
think.  
Paul Virilio enhances our understanding of not only the texts I will cover but also both 
Grossman’s and Gusterson’s distance analyses by explaining that, because of technology, we experience 
distance differently. First, Virilio explains that humans build a mental image of an event not “on the basis 
of what they are immediately given to see, but on the basis of their memories, by themselves filling in the 
blanks and their minds with images created retrospectively, as in childhood” (emphasis original, Vision 
Machine 3). Thus both the drone pilot and the soldier on the ground create narratives for what they see 
and do by “filling in the blanks.” For Gusterson, this is the interpretive leap of narrativization; for Virilio, 
it is simply how humans make sense of images – processing visual information demands it. Secondly, 
across several books, Virilio advances an argument that technology has “obliterated distance” in society 
and war in deference to “instantaneous time” (Vision Machine 4). For Virilio “the very notion of ‘physical 
proximity’ is in danger of finding itself radically changed” (Open Sky 43). Because weapons are capable 
of striking anywhere in the world, the moment an enemy is seen, that enemy may be engaged – so, since 
the Gulf War, warfare for Virilio has been teletopological, or centered on the ability to “see” the enemy 
first and strike instantly (Vision Machine 6). In this environment, one’s geographic location loses 
importance; “real space” gives way to “real time” while “instantaneity makes up for loss of geophysical 
distance” (Open Sky 9, 63). When destroying an enemy is a matter of seeing first and acting instantly, 
“the image prevails over the object” (Vision Machine 73). In my view, this advent of an instantaneous 
military technological temporality conflicts with the soldier’s moral and ethical temporality, as the soldier 
is pressured to act instantly but cannot similarly formulate moral judgments. The two temporalities 
compete for control of the soldier’s psyche. Technology’s effect, however, is not limited to warfare; 
societal interactions with computer and television screens have similarly “obliterated distance” and 
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proximity and created a “square horizon” in which the real and virtual become indistinguishable (Open 
Sky 45). Thus humans are now predisposed to think about distance and “what is real” differently than 
Grossman claims. I will add that if the image prevails over the object, then no matter where the soldier is, 
the way in which technology presents an enemy prevails over that enemy’s physical body (and 
humanness) unless the soldier intentionally seeks the object beyond the image. Ultimately, the observer 
chooses what to “see” but this requires an act of will. Not only operationally, but also personally, warfare 
should not be thought of as a mechanical process, but as a contest of wills. This, of course, critiques 
Levinasian ethics as well as I argue that at times soldiers interpret faces rather than simply being 
mechanically commanded by them. 
Glenn Gray wrote at length about “images of the enemy” and his experiences during World War 
II in The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle (1959). In it, he explains that the “typical image of the 
enemy is conditioned by the need to hate him without limits” and is, in part, a “synthetic product of the 
mass media” (133). Further, these “moral absolutisms of warfare develop through the medium of 
language” – the metaphors and verbiage we employ (134). For instance, when hatred of an abstract enemy 
becomes personal, the enemy becomes my enemy (138). The word “enemy” alone usually yields to 
something more visceral and highly charged. Thus, Gray proposes that soldiers will either view the 
enemy abstractly or concretely. For those who view the enemy abstractly, “morally, [the enemy] has no 
human status whatever” (144). Professional soldiers, for instance, conceive of the enemy as a “human 
obstacle to be overcome on the way to a clearly defined objective” (142). Likewise, soldiers may also 
view only the enemy’s ideology with “utter disregard for the individuality of the foe” (154). Conversely, a 
soldier may take a concrete view of the enemy. Soldiers who take this view will either hate immensely 
“my enemy” or see the enemy as human like themselves, despite the “deep contradictions” of doing so 
(160). Of this mindset, Gray writes: “it is nearly impossible for a combat soldier to prepare himself 
psychologically for bloody combat with a will to victory while holding such an image of his foe” (160). 
Even so, such soldiers, because they have learned to think concretely, “will not hate abstractly” (166). 
This is the image of the enemy for which Gray advocates. 
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As I have already discussed, today’s soldier in asymmetric war is positioned in this paradox of 
“deep contradictions” concerning his view of the enemy amidst the civilian population. Gray wrote and 
thought about total war – the enemy for him was the German state. In counterinsurgency, that is not the 
case, and many of Gray’s “images” of the enemy thus seem inapplicable for a soldier fighting for both the 
American and the Iraqi or Afghan states. Thus I will use Gray’s notion of an abstract or concrete image of 
the enemy, but I will also complicate it by including the “humanizing – dehumanizing dichotomy” of 
asymmetric warfare. Ultimately, Gray’s abstract view of the enemy places the enemy within the sub or 
inhuman category as either objects or types, not individuated persons. I will advocate with Gray that the 
image of the enemy as a human like oneself is the only image which “holds large hope for the future” 
(166), especially when one considers that many military thinkers believe that most future wars will be 
“small wars” which are characterized by an intermingling of civilians and combatants (Goldstein 6). 
Holding this view is difficult but doable, especially in asymmetric war. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters based on the perceived bodily risk of the characters in 
the texts: high personal risk, moderate to low personal risk, and no personal risk. I argue that this degree 
of perceived risk affects whether or not there is an assumed imperative to kill the human other – which is 
critical to the soldier’s emotional reconciliation or “narrativization” of the event. Within that framework, 
in each chapter I analyze the perception of the self and others as human and how that affects the soldier’s 
experience of killing in combat. Furthermore, each chapter explores how modern technologies and 
narratives influence the perception of the self and others. Throughout the entirety, I close read 
contemporary war literature written by veteran authors to see how they inform our understanding of 
combat killing and the critical theories I have just summarized. In doing this, I extract lessons for military 
leaders from these texts and the accounts of killing they develop. 
In the first chapter, I cover killing during high perceived personal risk to the characters – mostly 
soldiers “on patrol” or “out of the wire” or in “direct contact.” First, I examine a selection of Brian Turner 
poems from Here, Bullet. These will demonstrate that “remote intimacy” and “narrativization” occur not 
just for drone operators, but also for soldiers on the ground. Then I explore two short stories from the 
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collection Redeployment by Phil Klay, which won the National Book Award in 2014. These stories 
present the distancing effects of training and advanced optics, revealing that physical distance or range is 
no longer a sufficient way to think about killing, if it ever was. These stories also demonstrate the 
importance of narrative to the soldier: the stories soldiers tell themselves about themselves and their 
enemy shape their experience in war. Lastly, I examine Kevin Powers’ novel Yellow Birds, which was a 
National Book Award Finalist in 2012. Yellow Birds portrays the effects of leadership and narratives on 
the soldier’s views of the enemy and how, when those views change for the worse, so too does the 
soldier’s conduct. Powers viscerally displays what happens to the soldier when he or she kills 
unnecessarily under such conditions. Ultimately, Yellow Birds reveals that the image of the self and the 
other that the soldier takes to battle, not modern technology, is what most affects the soldier’s ethical 
conduct during war and chances for recovery after war. 
In the second chapter I look at moderate risk scenarios – soldiers deployed to forward operating 
bases (FOBs) or combat outposts (COPs). These soldiers are still at risk of mortar or Improvised 
Explosive Devise (IED) attack (or being overrun), but not at as great a perceived risk as the soldier 
“outside the wire.” I begin the chapter by examining three killing events portrayed in Pulitzer Prize-
winning journalist David Finkel’s 2009 book The Good Soldiers. In these events, the soldiers are inside 
the operations center coordinating attacks but also view the attacks through digital screens. When killing 
the enemy, the soldiers are elated by the presentation of death on the screens, dehumanizing the other. 
However, when the same screen presents the death of comrades, the soldiers are haunted by the images, 
revealing that mediated experiences can be intimate. This analysis clearly demonstrates that technology 
does not determine the experience, the mindset of the soldier does. Then I explore another short story by 
Klay: “10 Kliks South.” In this story, an artillery crew engages enemy which they cannot see. The crew 
discusses group absolution and individual responsibility, but the narrator eventually searches for the 
bodies of the slain. In so doing, I argue, he seeks to establish the humanity of the dead and to feel 
responsible for his actions. While I do not advocate that soldiers go in search of bodies, I do believe that 
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soldiers likewise should seek to understand the effects of their actions. As Marlantes writes, one “can’t be 
a warrior and not be deeply involved with suffering and responsibility” (44).  
In the third and final chapter, I examine two very different film portrayals of drone warfare. The 
first film, Good Kill, is an exploration of moral injury and narrative failure in the character of Major Tom 
Egan. The film presents eleven scenes of violence with little to no back story, making drone strikes 
appear senseless and unjust to both the viewer and the characters. Because he is not exposed to risk, Egan 
feels like a coward, and struggles to make sense of what he is doing, especially when he is directed to kill 
what appear to be civilians in addition to the enemy. This is a “betrayal of what’s right” for Egan, and 
leads him ultimately to disobey orders and commit a different war crime which he feels is “the right thing 
to do.” The second film, Eye in the Sky is much more concerned with relaying all the information 
surrounding a single drone strike in which a civilian will likely also die. Both the viewer and the 
characters are well-informed – yet ultimately the drone strike is authorized. This strike is still traumatic, 
though the film does not present it as likely to result in moral injury for those involved because the 
narrative surrounding the event is humanely and sufficiently constructed; the characters and viewers can 
make sense of the violence. This is a fundamental and important difference for military officers to grasp. 
Ultimately what follows is a call for a new warrior narrative: not one which advocates hate 
towards the enemy or internal numbness, but one which advocates a reflective warrior who sees the 
enemy as human and approaches killing well aware of the burden it is. It agrees with Marlantes’ claim 
that the “ideal response to killing in war should be […] sadness mingled with respect” (42). In order for 
that to happen, one must view oneself and the enemy as both human. This thesis not only informs our 
understanding of what the experience of killing can be like, but also how military leaders can help 
influence that experience by approaching the topic aware of the ethical traps of dehumanization. If 
warfare both now and in the future is going to be different than in the past, then how we think and talk 
about killing must also be different. Actively dehumanizing the enemy is enticing because it renders the 
enemy “more killable” and thus protects the soldier against immediate trauma and/or moral injury. But it 
can also dehumanize the soldier and opens the door for unethical action, or a “betrayal of what’s right,” 
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which psychiatrist Jonathan Shay strongly associates with PTSD. Further, the prolonged passive self-
dehumanization of “acting like a machine” or becoming “numb” likewise only delays the confrontation 
with the realities of one’s actions. It suppresses dialogue which is essential to processing war and healing. 
Leaders must be attuned to this truth. If a soldier is momentarily “machine-like” or “numb” during a 
particular event, then the military leader must encourage that soldier’s “rehumanization” afterwards.15 
These texts largely demonstrate this through negative examples – what happens when leaders do not 
encourage communication in their units. While this study suggests that such “machine-likeness” or 
“numbness” may be unavoidable at times for most soldiers during intense combat, there is nothing to 
suggest that such a sense of detachment must be prolonged or celebrated as a warrior-like quality. To the 
contrary, striving to uphold the enemy’s humanity and the soldier’s own humanity – while difficult to 
accomplish – is the task set before young military leaders. This is particularly the case in asymmetric 
warfare and the greater “global war on terror,” where more killing does not equate to more success and 
unnecessary killing most often results in strategic setbacks. Indeed, a view of the enemy as human like 
oneself is urgently required. 
  
                                                          
15 Psychiatrist Edward Tick uses this “rehumanization” approach upon redeployment (Warrior’s Return 227). 
  
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
HIGH PERCEIVED THREAT TO SELF 
 
He’s a soldier. All he is is a soldier. He’s an instrument of war, and he’s looking for that 
fight, and that’s why I think he is somewhat frustrated in the fact that he’s not in a clean 
war, where he can be the leader up front—‘Follow me, men’—because this war doesn’t 
dictate it. This war dictates drinking chai, handshaking, being political. David Finkel, The 
Good Soldiers (30) 
 
The way I talked about personal preparation for killing in combat changed dramatically from my 
first to my fourth deployment. Before my first deployment in 2008, as a twenty-three year old infantry 
lieutenant fresh out of Ranger School, there was an unknowability on the topic which led me to largely 
avoid the subject altogether. Instead, we focused on things that I did know and understood, things like 
patrolling, battle drills, and marksmanship. We trained collective activities and individual skills but spent 
little time on reflective anticipation of the psychological aspects of war. By my fourth deployment in 
2012, we spent a lot more time focused on mental preparation in addition to the collective drills inherent 
in unit warfare. Now, a few years removed, I wonder if part of the reason so many soldiers have a hard 
time adjusting to life after war is in fact because we do not spent enough time before war anticipating the 
realities of killing. Just as we prepare the body to react properly to combat scenarios, so too ought we 
prepare the mind. Yet for a lieutenant fresh out of college or a military academy – how can you speak 
with authority on something you have not experienced? This problem troubled me as a company 
commander as I endeavored to mentor my young lieutenants. In addition to sharing my experiences, I had 
my lieutenants read war literature by veterans to try and help them prepare. What follows is written in 
hopes that our next young military leaders might be able to prepare themselves and their soldiers their 
first time around, not their fourth. 
Authors, historians, psychologists, philosophers, and soldiers approach killing in combat 
differently. Most students of military history recognize a trend across many centuries of militaries 
protecting their own forces by developing technologies that engage enemy forces at increasingly farther 
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distances. From the hand-to-hand combat of antiquity to the introduction of gunpowder, rifles and 
cannons, to the advent of precision-guided missiles and drones, generally the argument is made that 
greater physical distance allows for a less “personal experience” of killing – that it makes killing “easier” 
(Gusterson 71). This thinking was codified in the work of Dave Grossman, founder of “killology,” who 
writes in his 2005 book On Combat that: “simply stated, the farther away you are the easier it is to kill” 
(203). Yet the contemporary war literature offers a different perspective. In part this is because the on-the-
ground soldiers are out among the civilian population, intermingled with the enemy. Additionally, new, 
advanced technologies are mediating the act of killing in unanticipated ways. As discussed in the 
introduction, Hugh Gusterson critiques Grossman through his study of drone warfare, stating that the 
relationship of distance is now “scrambled” or “respatialized” as drone pilots experience “remote 
intimacy” with the people they kill (48, 72). For Gusterson, this often is the result of “narrativization,” but 
for Paul Virilio such “filling in the blanks” is simply how humans build mental images of events (Vision 
Machine 3). Thus this chapter adds to Gusterson’s criticism of Grossman, but it also complicates 
Gusterson as well by not limiting narrativization to drone pilots. The literature makes clear that physical 
proximity between combatants is not the primary variable in the experience of killing. Instead, I posit that 
contemporary fiction prioritizes the degree of perceived shared humanity over physical distance as more 
influential in the soldier’s experience of combat killing. I argue that in contemporary combat, the 
perceived human status of the other and the self is influenced by perceived threat, the technology of 
training, the technology of optics, and constructed narratives. 
This chapter reveals that soldiers regularly conceive of the enemy as subhuman if not entirely 
inhuman – certainly a different kind of human than themselves. The use of racial and religious slurs in 
war is not new: both dehumanize the enemy into a lesser, more killable other. As explained in the 
introduction, Glen Gray writes that the “moral absolutisms of warfare develop through the medium of 
language” (134). Some of the characters in this chapter also animalize and demonize the enemy – all of 
this, I argue, constitutes active dehumanization. Yet, dehumanizing the other regularly results in the 
dehumanization of the self: characters in this chapter become “numb” and, worse, “savage” and 
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“deviant.” Even without active dehumanization, soldiers tend not to individuate the human other; that is, 
soldiers view the other as an abstract object rather than an individual. Thermal and infrared optics 
technologies, along with the technology of training in this chapter present the other as abstract: they blur 
and distort the figure of the human enemy into a faceless object or form. This passive form of 
dehumanization can be problematic too: it often reduces the soldier to a “machine-like” or “numb” being 
as well. Both forms of dehumanization serve to break the “shared humanity” between the two combatants 
and render the other as less human, creating space for killing but also for unethical action.  
In this chapter I examine three contemporary war authors to see how training, technologies and 
narratives influence the soldier’s perception of the humanity of the other in scenarios where the soldier is 
at great perceived risk. By close-reading a selection of Brian Turner poems including “Here, Bullet” and 
parts of his three “observation poems,” I will demonstrate that advanced optics technologies can create 
emotional proximity or “remote intimacy” for on-the-ground soldiers, not just drone pilots. In the 
observation poems, the optics of war create a sense of proximity for the somewhat removed observer who 
then makes the “interpretive leap” of “narrativization” which results in “remote intimacy.” I will then 
show that technology can conversely create emotional detachment despite physical nearness by close-
reading excerpts of Phil Klay’s short stories “Psychological Operations” and “After Action Report.” In 
these stories, both the technology of training, or – to borrow Grossman’s term – conditioning (On Killing 
253), and the technology of optics distance the soldiers from their human enemies despite physical 
proximity. Likewise, the soldiers’ employment of bravado and dehumanizing narratives of the enemy 
creates emotional distance. These texts will show that, in the experience of killing in combat, physical 
proximity is at best an influencing factor in the perceived humanity and threat of the other.  
In examining the perceived humanity of the enemy, I will invoke Gray’s “abstract or concrete” 
paradigm (166). I will argue that technology can make the enemy both more abstract and more concrete, 
at times making the enemy easier to kill and at other times harder. As will be shown, the human other is 
frequently reduced to a form, an object, or an abstraction. While Turner’s optics allow his speakers to 
humanize (make concrete) those they observe, the technologies and narratives in Klay’s short stories 
  
22 
 
allow the soldiers to deny the enemy a human status. Yet in both “Here, Bullet” and “After Action 
Report” the soldiers themselves experience a movement towards a machine-like experience during 
combat as training “kicks in” and suppresses self-awareness and awareness of others beyond their form or 
silhouette. This metamorphosis into war-machine, I argue, enables the soldiers to be temporarily 
indifferent to the humanity of the enemy, but simultaneously dehumanizes the soldiers themselves.  
To conclude the chapter, I discuss Private John Bartle’s transformation in Kevin Powers’ novel 
Yellow Birds. Bartle, I argue, begins the war viewing the enemy and himself as similar, concrete humans, 
but ultimately takes on the characteristics of his team leader and abstractly dehumanizes others. In so 
doing, he dehumanizes himself also. This last section demonstrates that the technology of war is 
ambivalent towards the human experience and that the attitude the soldier brings to the technology and 
the human other is greatly influenced by his or her unit and leadership. Thus, in addition to battle drills 
and “pop up” marksmanship training which prepare soldiers to succeed and survive in combat, shaping 
the attitude towards others and the self also must be a primary goal of military leaders in preparing 
soldiers and units for combat – especially counterinsurgency combat in which soldiers encounter the 
strange dichotomy of needing to humanize the populace in order to “win hearts and minds” and 
simultaneously to dehumanize the enemy in order to psychologically be able to kill him or her. 
This chapter not only informs our understanding of what the experience of killing while at high 
perceived personal risk can be like, but also how young military leaders can help influence that 
experience by approaching the topic aware of the ethical traps of dehumanization. Actively dehumanizing 
the enemy is enticing because it renders the enemy “more killable” and thus protects the soldier against 
immediate trauma and/or moral injury. But it can also dehumanize the soldier and opens the door for 
unethical action. Further, prolonged passive self-dehumanization of “acting like a machine” or becoming 
“numb” likewise only delays the confrontation with the actualities of one’s actions. If a soldier is 
momentarily “machine-like,” then the military leader must encourage immediate “rehumanization” 
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afterwards.16 Indeed, striving to uphold the enemy’s humanity and the soldier’s own humanity – while 
difficult to accomplish – is the task set before young military leaders. It may not always be 
accomplishable, but it must be the goal. This is particularly the case in counterinsurgency, asymmetric 
warfare, and the greater “global war on terror” where more killing does not equate to more success, and 
unnecessary killing often results in tactical and strategic setbacks, not to mention potential prolonged 
moral injury to the soldier. I begin with “Here, Bullet” by Brian Turner:   
“Here, Bullet” 
If a body is what you want,  
then here is bone and gristle and flesh.  
Here is the clavicle-snapped wish,  
the aorta’s opened valves, the leap 
thought makes at the synaptic gap.  
Here is the adrenaline rush you crave,  
the inexorable flight, that insane puncture  
into heat and blood. And I dare you to finish  
what you’ve started. Because here, Bullet,  
here is where I complete the word you bring  
hissing through the air, here is where I moan  
the barrel’s cold esophagus, triggering  
my tongue’s explosives for the rifling I have  
inside of me, each twist of the round  
spun deeper, because, here, Bullet,  
here is where the world ends, every time. 
 
For the combat service member exposed to the highest level of personal risk, face-to-face with the 
enemy or “out of the wire,” killing can be intimate or detached, premeditated and self-conscious 
throughout or simply a reflexive, machine-like act. In the poetic landscape of Brian Turner, killing is at 
times embodied by the speaker-soldier and at other times disembodied, alienated and detached by means 
of the poetic language employed. In Turner’s poem “Here, Bullet” the speaker-soldier (who in this case is 
the victim) attempts to disembody the act of killing by occluding the would-be human assailant and 
assigning agency to the material bullet instead. In the poem, the speaker-soldier addresses not simply the 
weapon of war, but the ammunition itself, moving the agency and desire to kill away from the abstract 
                                                          
16 This is Edward Tick’s term (Warrior’s Return 227). 
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human who fires it and assigning that agency and desire to the machinery and material of war, or the 
singular “Bullet.” In personifying the bullet, the poem transforms the bullet into the subject and 
dehumanizes the targeted soldier into the object. This construct presents the bullet as the actor and the 
human as only a body to be acted upon, to be punctured. Even so, the poem’s texture complicates this 
reversal of traditional human-nonhuman roles, and, ultimately, the poem’s ending questions whether such 
a reversal ever takes place.  
In the poem, the weapon undergoes an anthropomorphosis; the barrel becomes an esophagus, 
which utters a word – the bullet – into the air, causing the speaker-soldier to moan and “complete the 
word” (11-12). The speaker, too, begins a figurative metamorphosis into a non-human object whose 
tongue is “triggered” by the bullet, revealing the “rifling I have / inside of me” (12, 13). In this moment, 
the inside of the speaker-soldier is as the inside of the barrel: rifled (7). Here, the rifle and speaker’s roles 
are inverted: the human body is transformed into a mechanical prosthesis of the speech-endowed rifle. 
Furthermore, the momentum and rhythm of the poem advance the act of assembling the many body parts, 
the rifle, the bullet, the hissing and the word into a single “war assemblage” in which the inert speaker-
soldier is less endowed with agency than the speech, desire, and intention-invested rifle and bullet. During 
this assembling, the poem’s catalogue of body parts reinforces the body’s status as an object to be 
punctured, a machine to be triggered and nothing more. In this figurative poetic landscape, the speaker 
assigns the emotions of desiring a body and craving the adrenaline rush of killing to the “Bullet,” 
deflecting such emotions away from the human enemy and also him/herself. By removing the human 
enemy from the poem’s narrative altogether, the poem insists on a totally abstract, yet implicitly present, 
enemy. Disregarding the enemy altogether, the speaker-soldier merges into a rifle and beckons the 
coming bullet only for the poem – mimicking the discharge of a round from a barrel – to end abruptly: 
“the world ends” (16). This ending undoes the subject-object reversal employed throughout the poem: 
surely the world does not end with the wounding or death of the speaker-soldier. Thus the poem 
constructs a disembodied experience for a detached, objectified speaker-soldier and abstract (absent even) 
enemy only to undo itself, to end the detached, disembodied world with the restored, embodied 
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experience. The speaker insists on his or her own distinct, embodied consciousness, even as the poem 
denies the individuality of his or her enemy: if the speaker’s life ends, then the whole world ends with it. 
The poem’s final turn back to the significance of the speaker-soldier’s own embodied 
consciousness reflects the embodied humanism in the poem’s texture which throughout resists the total 
convergence of soldier, weapon, and ammunition into a unified war assemblage. The poem ends just as 
the “world ends, every time” precisely at the moment this burgeoning assemblage’s motion towards unity 
would be made complete by the act of killing, the puncture of flesh by bullet. Notably, after having 
written the poem, poet-warrior Brian Turner carried it with him in his breast pocket for the remainder of 
his deployment. Literally, “here” is the location where the poem and his life end when the paper is 
perforated and his flesh punctured by the “Bullet.” Yet the phrase “every time” indicates that this 
phenomenon is never completed, in fact is repeated throughout the war for the speaker-soldier. The body 
is not punctured and the poem actually ends with the extra two words “every time.” Thus, the poem and 
speaker taunt both bullet and death. Ultimately, the bullet, then, is forever an other to the human speaker-
soldier: an unwanted, even if necessary, part of the speaker’s intimate combat experience. The speaker-
soldier, in taunting the bullet, resists any final unification with the war assemblage and insists on his/her 
own separate, individual existence. The undercurrent of taunting death and its instruments reveals the 
speaker-soldier’s concern for his or her own body, which problematizes the image of machine-like 
integration with the anthropomorphic rifle.  
Thus, despite the speaker’s abstraction of the physically removed enemy, he or she still 
experiences intimacy, only not with the human other, but instead with the material other, the rifle and 
bullet. Instead of creating a war assemblage then, the poem more accurately displays the one-sided nature 
of intimacy resulting from non-face-to-face, impersonal killing. For the victim, the encounter remains 
both intimate and personal. This one-sided encounter with killing lacks human interchange and mutual 
recognition, yet the experience is still intimate, the language of the poem full of moaning and craving and 
gristle and flesh. The poem positions the event of being killing in on-the-ground combat as wholly 
embodied even as it disembodies the act by eliding its human origin. The poem is in fact highly focused 
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on the human body: the “bone and gristle and flesh” (2), the clavicle (3), the aorta (4), the “leap / thought 
makes at the synaptic gap” (4-5), the adrenaline rush (6), esophagus and tongue (12, 13), and, ultimately, 
the puncture of the body, comprised of “heat and blood” (8). The speaker is clearly aware of his or her 
own body, even while he or she detaches the bodily existence of his or her enemy from the event 
altogether. 
Yet, for Turner, the objects at the far end of the instruments of war are not always abstract and the 
preservation of the self as human is not always directly related to moments of anticipated killing. In fact, 
through the act of “remote narrativization,” most of Turner’s speaker-soldiers humanize and experience 
intimacy with the humans they observe. While Gusterson links this phenomenon to the act of voyeurism 
that accompanies remote observation through Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Gusterson 63), as I will show, 
it clearly occurs in Turner’s “observation poems” as well. Turner’s speakers fill in the blanks, as Virilio 
explains, to create mental images based on their memories. In these “observation poems,” while the 
technology of war optics allows for a measure of physical distance, through “remote narrativization” and 
the manufacture of mental images, the speaker-soldiers create emotional proximity, or what Gusterson 
terms “remote intimacy” with the humanized, observed other (47). In humanizing the others, the speaker-
soldiers, as Samina Najmi notes, attempt to see themselves as human also (70). Importantly, these poems 
act as an observation technology as well: they provide for the reader an intimate understanding of the war 
experience built upon language and narrative. 
In “Observation Post #71” the speaker-soldier observes an owl resting in wild grape vines. The 
poem positions the speaker as having “seen him in the shadows. / I have watched him in the circle of light 
/ my rifle brings to me” (7-9). The instrument of war, the rifle with its circular-lensed optic, is a medium 
through which the speaker-soldier experiences not just the enemy in Balad, but also his environment. 
Additionally, in both “Observation Post #798” and “In the Leupold Scope” both speakers experience an 
intimacy with other humans despite being physically distanced from the Iraqis whom they observe. In the 
former, the speaker-soldier searches for a brothel through binoculars, hoping to see a woman emerge at 
dusk. When a woman finally does appear on the rooftop “smoking a cigarette and shaking loose her long 
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hair” the speaker is “stilled by her” and “transported 7,600 miles / away” (12, 14-15). Here, the speaker-
soldier turns the observed, visual image of the woman into a mental image by filling in the blanks with 
memories of his or her own home. Seeing the woman through the binoculars, the speaker feels “as a ghost 
might” when gazing “upon the one he loves” (15). In her reading of Turner’s poems, Najmi notes that the 
poems demonstrate “the mutuality and interdependence of identity construction” which is precluded for 
Turner’s speakers in Iraq because to the “Iraqi civilian, what that person beheld in [the speaker] was not 
another individual but an armed and uniformed American” (56). Throughout Turner’s war poems, she 
explains that each speaker attempts to “preserve a self-identity in the face of his paradoxically 
empowering and obliterating” role as a soldier (57). Thus, in this poem, she reads the speaker gazing on 
the prostitute like a ghost as an attempt “to feel his humanity again” (70). For Turner, humanizing the 
other is also a means of humanizing the self. Interestingly, as Najmi notes, this cannot happen face-to-
face because the Iraqis cannot see Turner’s speaker as an individual; therefore the speaker’s identity is 
“paradoxically empowering and obliterating” (57). As Najmi reads Turner, this humanizing moment can 
only occur remotely, and, I would add, through the medium of the optic. 
The act of remote narrativization is even more prominent in Turner’s “In the Leupold Scope,” in 
which the speaker-soldier from “two thousand meters out” observes a city skyline through a “40x60mm 
spotting scope” (3, 1). The speaker finds a woman “hanging laundry on an invisible line” on a rooftop (6). 
Despite the distance of two kilometers, throughout the rest of the poem, the speaker interpolates the 
woman’s life and circumstance, believing her to be “dressing the dead, clothing them / as they wait in 
silence” (7-8), to be “welcoming them back to the dry earth” (10), and waiting for the dead to “return to 
the bodies they once had” (15). In this act of narrativization, the spotting scope is again more than an 
optic; it is the medium through which the speaker-soldier experiences “remote intimacy” with the 
woman.17 In actuality, as far as Turner’s speaker-soldier can know, the woman may not be waiting for 
                                                          
17 Yusef Komunyakaa’s Vietnam War poem “Starlight Scope Myopia” presents a similar scenario to Turner’s 
“observation poems” in which the speaker experiences remote intimacy with a male “VC” whom – presumably – the 
speaker will have to kill with his M-16.  
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dead family members, but the lack of narrative and the compelling need to create a narrative in that void 
is profoundly echoed by the humanistic texture of the final stanza. The remote intimacy is so intense for 
the speaker that the speaker pictures the imagined dead – for whom he believes the woman is waiting – to 
be “women with breasts swollen with milk, / men with shepherd-thin bodies, children / running hard into 
the horizon’s curving lens” (16-18). The unseen men and women are not abstract and formless: they have 
distinct, concrete personal characteristics. Through this narrative infilling, the observed woman is no 
longer only an object of observation, but, importantly, the subject of a humanizing narrative created by 
the speaker-soldier. This speaker, as in the other “observation” poems, humanizes the human other in 
contrast to the speaker in “Here, Bullet.” In so doing, the human others become concrete figures, 
complete with narratives, rather than the abstract enemy of “Here, Bullet.” This narrativization occurs at 
the intersection of the curving lens of the speaker-soldier’s eye looking through the curving lens of the 
spotting scope at the “horizon’s curving lens” (18). As the three curving lenses fold into one, physical 
distance disappears into one-sided intimacy. A key difference between the speaker of “Here, Bullet” and 
those of the “observation” poems, however, is that the speaker is now the potential killer, rather than the 
victim, yet the one-sided intimacy remains the same. 
These four poems also establish the importance of personal risk in speaker-soldiers’ choice to 
dehumanize or humanize the human other in close combat. In “Here, Bullet” the speaker-soldier perceives 
his or her own death to be potentially imminent at every moment, and the poem avoids the enemy’s 
human status by excluding him from the poem altogether. In “Here, Bullet” whatever agency the enemy 
holds is stripped from him/her and given to the bullet instead in part because the enemy is unseen, but 
also because the enemy is or will be a threat to the speaker and thus may require the speaker to kill 
him/her. Conversely, the speakers in the “observation” poems are still vulnerable to enemy attack, but the 
women – at least as narrativized – do not present that risk. Therefore, the speaker-soldiers are not 
compelled to remove the women’s humanity, but rather in both cases through narrative infilling the 
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speaker-soldiers create remote intimacy with the women they observe.18 Put another way, they empathize 
with the women. As Susan Sontag discusses in the context of viewing the pain of others through war 
photographs, this is a problematic form of empathy, a one-sided intimacy which cannot match empathy 
resulting from face-to-face human interchange (Sontag 61), but it nonetheless draws the soldier closer to a 
mental image of the human other as an individual rather than an abstraction – as similarly human rather 
than different kind of beings.  
This humanized view of the enemy amongst noncombatants complicates the soldier’s 
requirement to kill in war. To avoid this internal contradiction, soldiers instead frequently dehumanize the 
enemy they might have to kill by creating negative narratives of the enemy (seen or unseen) in order to 
reduce that enemy to the subhuman status of savage or the nonhuman status of animal or even to an 
abstract object, making the act of killing less psychologically jarring and more justifiable (Grossman, On 
Killing 161). However, in asymmetric and counterinsurgency warfare the erasure of delineated war zones 
separated from civilian spaces complicates this effort to create separate narratives for the human civilian 
“on the battlefield” and the sub/nonhuman enemy. The soldier is compelled to “win the hearts and minds” 
of the civilian populace from which he or she must also separate (and, at times, kill) the enemy. Therein is 
one of the soldier’s great paradoxes: to be successful in counterinsurgency the soldier must create a 
narrative of fraternal kinship with the larger civilian body of which the enemy is a part. In most cases, this 
is not a preexisting narrative; the typical American soldier has not for years felt neighborly love towards 
the Iraqi or Afghan populace. This dichotomy of intentionally humanizing the civilian population while 
also intentionally or subconsciously dehumanizing the (often unidentifiable) enemy within that population 
problematizes the soldier’s effort to prepare for and recover from killing in combat.  
                                                          
18 One might wonder if Turner’s speakers would feel the same way while gazing upon men and if this is not 
scopophilia. Najmi notes that “the objectified female not only does not gaze back but remains unaware of the male 
gaze focused on her. The power dynamic between active gazer and passive object of gaze reveals itself explicitly 
here, and to this extent the poems fall into a recognizable genre in cultural representations of race and gender 
relations” (63). Yet in Komunyakaa’s Vietnam poetry, the observed are often males and the effect is similar to 
Turner’s poetry. 
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Phil Klay’s short story “After Action Report” explores the complexities of this dialectic within 
the soldier through the character of Timhead. This story, as do many of Klay’s other stories, emphasizes 
training as a mechanism through which soldiers are able to kill in close combat when required despite the 
“humanizing-dehumanizing dichotomy” of asymmetric warfare. Furthermore, the story reveals that after 
killing soldiers are presented with the problem of establishing their own narrative of the event in order to 
justify the act to themselves – a narrative which is not so easily built for Timhead, who is caught between 
this humanizing-dehumanizing dichotomy of contemporary counterinsurgency and the contemporary 
narrative of the “warrior.” The story thus probes the creation of such a narrative or “report” to oneself. 
The short story “After Action Report” is a first-person narrative account which opens with 
Timhead killing a 13 or 14 year old Iraqi boy. The story is told from the perspective of Lance Corporal 
Ozzie Suba, Timhead’s roommate and a turret gunner in a Mine Resistant Armor-Protected (MRAP) 
vehicle. While on patrol, the vehicle is ambushed by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). After the 
IED blast, Suba, Timhead and the rest of the crew climb out of the vehicle. Suba, narrating the events, 
explains that “I wasn’t quite steady on my feet, but training kicked in” (Klay 30). Moments later there 
“was a crack of rounds” aimed at two exposed Marines – Suba and Timhead (31). Despite not being able 
to see the attacker, Suba “snapped back to training” (31). Noting that Timhead was firing, Suba “fired 
where he was firing” and only stops firing after Timhead does (31). Timhead kills the attacker, the 13 or 
14 year old “kid.” Suba, explaining Timhead’s actions, says that “Timhead, like the rest of us, had 
actually been trained to fire a rifle, and he’d been trained on man-shaped targets. Only difference between 
those and the kid’s silhouette would have been the kid was smaller. Instinct took over” (Klay 32). In this 
killing event, Klay problematizes the humanity of all three involved: Timhead, Suba and the kid.  
First, Suba insists that Timhead’s stimulus-response training equips him to kill the attacker. In 
Dave Grossman’s terms, Timhead responds as he was conditioned to act (Grossman 253), which is to say 
that Timhead does not choose to act, does not act consciously as a human, but as something less, 
something more akin to a machine which performs instinctively, as it was programed, or a Pavlovian dog. 
Second, Suba acknowledges that he, too, is machine-like rather than a conscious human. For a moment 
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after the blast, his war-machine status is in question: Suba malfunctions while disoriented. Yet his system 
reboots, he “snaps back” to training, training “kicks in” and he fires as he was trained to fire. Third, Klay 
also reduces the “kid’s” humanity to his bodily form, his silhouette, which normally would be entirely de-
individuated, but in this particular case is somewhat distinct because “the kid was smaller” than normal 
silhouettes (32). In this killing event, for Timhead there is no flesh and gristle as in “Here, Bullet” but 
instead only the silhouette. The kid is an object which looks like a man-shaped target, not an embodied 
human. Thus the text reveals that instinctively firing at a silhouette rather than an embodied human is an 
emotionally distancing method of abstraction and dehumanization for the soldier which is predicated on 
the technology of military training. Importantly, this dehumanization works both ways: Timhead himself 
is reduced to a machine while the kid is objectified as a silhouette and abstracted into a target. The 
technology of training creates emotional distance for Timhead which supersedes physical proximity with 
the enemy. Importantly, Timhead can justify the act to himself because the “kid” posed an immediate risk 
to his life. The boy was the enemy. Still, Timhead’s efforts to create a post-killing narrative with which he 
is comfortable are complicated by the presence of other children who presented no risk to him. 
Immediately after the mission, Timhead asks Suba to lie for him and tell the rest of the platoon 
that Suba, not Timhead, killed the boy.19 That the two choose to lie about what happened and an “after 
action report” is actually an official military document meant to relay the truth about what happened on a 
mission creates a pervasive irony in the story. After action reports are meant to improve the unit from one 
mission to the next – if you lie in the report, the unit ends up in the potentially damaging cycle of 
repeating mistakes. Creating false narratives are not only personally problematic, but also hinder military 
effectiveness. Yet Timhead and Suba do just that. They perpetuate this false narrative of the event 
because Timhead struggles with guilt. Not guilt for killing the boy, as one might expect, but guilt because 
the boy’s family was present. Timhead explains: “it’s not that I killed a guy” but rather “his family was 
                                                          
19 A similar event occurs in David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers, in which a young soldier, Marsh, kills an insurgent 
with an eight year old girl in the room watching. Afterwards, Marsh asks his squad leader to take credit for the 
action (130). Describing his memory of the event, Marsh says: “It’s photographs” and that “I see myself shooting 
the guy. I see a still frame” along with “I can see the little girl, the face of the little girl” (134).  
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there. Right there […] Brothers and sisters in the window” (48). He remembers that there “was a little 
girl, like nine years old” (48). This girl prevents Timhead from creating a mental image, or memory, of 
the event that is exclusively one of combat. Instead, the girl’s presence links this respatialized battlefield 
with “home” for Timhead, and he fills in the blanks of her visual image based on his personal memories 
when he transforms her visual image into a mental image and memory. “I got a kid sister” he says (48). 
Much as the woman on the rooftop transports Turner’s speaker-soldier 7,600 miles to his lover, this nine 
year old girl disrupts Timhead’s efforts to create an acceptable narrative of the event. Suba, who 
throughout the story pretends to be the one who shot the boy, seeks help for Timhead by falsely confiding 
to “Staff Sergeant” that he, Suba, is troubled by the girl. Staff Sergeant reminds Suba that the girl had 
probably seen worse since she lived in Iraq. The conversation ends as follows: 
“Shit. There’s explosions in this city every fucking day. There’s firefights in this city 
every fucking day. That’s her home. That’s in the streets where she plays. This girl is 
probably fucked up in ways we can’t even imagine. She’s not your sister. She’s just not. 
She’s seen it before.” 
 
“Still,” I said. “It’s her brother. And every little bit hurts.” 
 
He shrugged. “Until you’re numb.” (50) 
The nameless “Staff Sergeant” creates a counter-narrative to Timhead’s narrative infilling of the girl’s 
life. “Staff Sergeant” categorically dehumanizes the girl and denies her the capacity of feeling emotions. 
By denying the humanity of the girl, Suba (in reality, Timhead) can emotionally distance himself from the 
guilt or trauma of having killed her brother. “Staff Sergeant’s” argument is that the girl must be numb to 
violence because she experiences it every day. By implication, “Staff Sergeant” argues that the girl 
experiences less human emotion and therefore is less human than an American girl because she lives in 
abjection. Importantly, the story never establishes that the young Iraqi boy was in fact the girl’s brother – 
he very well may not have been – but that does not matter for Timhead: the perceived reality and the 
ensuing narrative are a reality for Timhead. By connecting the girl to his sister, Timhead Americanizes 
and humanizes the girl. The girl in the window frame becomes freeze-framed as a photographic mental 
image which haunts Timhead – which Sontag would argue is the appropriate response to viewing 
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another’s agony (Sontag 115). In so doing, Timhead resists his own total transformation into an 
unthinking war-machine – he insists on a self-awareness which can experience empathy. Again, as in 
Turner’s “observation poems,” this empathy and humanization is only a projection onto the girl, not an 
actual understanding of her individual, nuanced humanity, but it is still an effort to view her as human and 
not something less. Should Timhead deny her humanity as “Staff Sergeant” suggests, he would also 
surrender part of his own humanity by reducing himself to an unfeeling, “numb” machine. Cleverly, Klay 
constructs the character of “Staff Sergeant” in precisely this way. “Staff Sergeant” has given himself over 
to being “numb” and for that “Staff Sergeant” has no proper name. He is an interchangeable, nameless, 
emotionless cog known only by his rank. He is a war-machine. 
 As I have already discussed, I believe the discerning contemporary soldier in asymmetric war is 
today positioned in this paradox of “deep contradictions” concerning his view of the enemy amidst the 
civilian population. Timhead certainly occupies this space: the concrete humanity of the girl results in 
“deep contradictions” which wreak havoc on Timhead’s psychological processing of the event, or his 
ability to narrate the event acceptably. Here the importance of leadership and a strong moral climate 
within a unit should be noted. Had “Staff Sergeant” been a good leader, he might have helped Timhead 
cope with the aftermath of killing. Instead, he makes matters worse, and Timhead does what many 
veterans do, which is deny the emotions of the experience. This does not help the much longer narrative 
process of making sense of and coming to terms with one’s experiences. On one level, the story 
substitutes itself for the sergeant’s failure of leadership and narrative inadequacy.  
While Timhead wrestles with creating an acceptable post-killing narrative, “After Action Report” 
also insists on another form of narrative: bravado, or the stories soldiers tell themselves about themselves 
before and after killing. Of such forms of narrative, Klay said in an interview that they are “the stories we 
tell ourselves so we don’t have to examine what we think about war too closely” (Anderson 7). “After 
Action Report” presents a joke Marines tell each other in which a journalist asks a sniper what he feels 
when he kills someone; the sniper replies with only one word: “Recoil” (Klay 47). Even armed with the 
confidence of training, the text time and again displays Marines engaging in such hyper-masculine 
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exchanges of bravado and dehumanization of the enemy and themselves during and in preparation for 
combat. Timhead, however, avoids bravado publicly. He convinces his roommate Suba to tell his platoon 
that Suba killed the insurgent, not Timhead. Suba, then, runs with the opportunity to increase his own 
standing within the platoon: “me and Timhead see hajji with an AK and that was it. Box drill. Like 
training” (35).20 Talking about the killing, Harvey, another Marine, tells Timhead that he, Timhead, “just 
ain’t quick enough on the draw” before bragging that he would have “been up there so fast, bam bam, 
shot his fuckin’ hajji mom, too” (38). Here, Suba and Harvey embrace the image of a “warrior” as an 
emotionless killing machine who feels only the rifle’s recoil. However, Timhead neatly demonstrates the 
irony of the “recoil myth” in that he experiences moral recoil as well. 
The lies Suba and Timhead circulate eventually wear on them both. Suba seeks out help from his 
squad leader and the unit’s chaplain. Timhead, while publicly hiding the fact that he killed the insurgent, 
emotionally distances himself from Suba. When Suba tries to get Timhead to open up to him, Timhead 
dismisses his efforts. He says: “I’m fine […] I signed up to kill hajjis” (40). Suba, however, knows this is 
not true. Timhead’s older brother had been badly injured in 2005 and “Timhead joined to take his place” 
(40). So while Timhead publicly eschews bravado, when he is emotionally vulnerable – alone with Suba 
who knows the truth – he turns to it as a defense mechanism. Here, it is important to note Gray’s 
insistence on the difference between friendship and comradeship. “Suffering and danger,” he writes, 
“cannot create friendship, but they can make a difference in comradeship” (89). Friends, according to 
Gray, experience a “heightened awareness of the self” whereas comrades suppress self-awareness (90). 
Suba and Timhead provide a striking example of this: they do not confide in one another, they do not seek 
to expand the walls of the self into one another, rather to each other and their platoon they suppress self-
awareness. Thus Timhead deals with the emotions of killing, the “recoil” on his own. 
In this next killing event, Klay probes the influence of optics on the soldier’s experience. In 
Klay’s short story “Psychological Operations” the narrator, Waguih, describes watching an insurgent die 
                                                          
20 In Arabic, “hajji” denotes a Muslim who has completed the pilgrimage to Mecca – it is a term of respect. In this 
instance, however, it is used pejoratively by American soldiers as a way to denigrate Muslim men. 
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through a thermal optic.21 Waguih explains that the squad “had been using thermal scopes because the 
heat signatures made it easier to tell the thin shadows of dogs from the bright white heat of humans” 
(186). In the medium of thermal imagery, what distinguishes human from non-human is the body 
temperature, the “heat signature.” Thus, the dying or dead insurgent is but a “bright jumble of limbs lying 
twenty feet out from the nearest building” distinguishable from his weapon because the weapon is a 
different temperature, a “black strip” (186). The insurgent is dying or dead because in the medium of 
thermal imagery it is impossible to distinguish alive from dead until body heat dissipates: the difference 
between living and dead is a distinction of temperature. Waguih is told by a corporal to “watch for the 
heat signature dying, the hot spot fading to the ambient temperature. He told me, ‘That’s when we’ll 
officially call in the kill’” (187). The insurgent is only “officially dead” when his heat image fades into 
the heat image of his surroundings and the two become indistinguishable. When that occurs, in the 
medium of the thermal image, the body literally disappears; it dissolves away. But bodies lose heat 
slowly, and in the aftermath of the gun battle, adrenaline wears off quickly for Waguih as he observes the 
uncertain status of the insurgent/corpse. “I’d look up for a second and then back, to try and catch a 
change” Waguih says (188). He cannot tell if the insurgent is alive or dead. One Marine keeps repeating 
“He’s dead. He’ll fade for sure,” but Waguih “couldn’t tell, so I held my fingers out in front of the optic” 
(188). Here, in order to assess the aliveness of the enemy, Waguih compares his own body temperature’s 
reproduced image to that of the insurgent. His fingers make a “searing hot spot” but in the thermal scope 
“everything, the shadings, the contrasts, they’re off in this weird way” (188). So the spectacle goes on. 
And it is a spectacle – Waguih acknowledges the “voyeurism” of “looking through the scope” (187). Yet 
this is not an intimate experience; the insurgent’s death is a technologically mediated, emotionally 
distanced event to be watched. Notably, the exact moment of passage between life and death, between 
human and no-longer-human, mediated through the thermal optic is impossible to discern. Waguih 
                                                          
21 Thermal optics detect the heat (thermal energy) emitted by objects, amplify that invisible (to the human eye) part 
of the electromagnetic spectrum through image enhancement, and reproduce it in a form visible to the human eye. 
Because thermal sights detect heat and not light, they can be used both during the day and at night. 
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“stared into the scope and tried to see the life going out of him. Or the heat, I guess. It happens so slow” 
(189). In this killing event, for Waguih, the enemy never achieves a human status. The enemy is a heat-
producing object in a digital image of heat signatures. Thus, Waguih is ambivalent about watching the 
insurgent die. In fact, he recalls this incident in conversation with a college peer after redeploying. “You 
watched him die” she says – to which he retorts: “Just the heat signature” (189). Not even his heat 
signature, but the heat signature. Again, this is close combat, building-to-building fighting, but the 
thermal technology creates emotional distance for Waguih. Only after the fact, upon redeployment, does 
he experience remorse. This is the opposite effect of remote intimacy: this technology distances Waguih 
from the human other. 
Near the end of “After Action Report,” Suba experiences his own killing event, also mediated by 
technology – the night vision infrared optic.22 In this instance, again contrary to Turner’s “observation 
poems,” the technology creates emotional distance from the human enemy. While on a convoy, Suba 
spots through his night vision device “two hajjis” evidently emplacing an IED in the road. Garza, his 
vehicle commander, tells him to “Light ’em up” (47). The two men run. Suba narrates: “I fired. They 
were on the edge of the field by then, and it was dark. The flash of the .50 going off killed my night 
vision. I couldn’t see anything, and we kept driving” (47). Describing the “wild thrill” of killing, Suba 
places limited agency in the .50 caliber machine gun, deflecting responsibility for the act of killing to the 
material weapon, just as the speaker-soldier in “Here, Bullet” does: “The trigger was there, aching to be 
pushed” (48). Further, Suba benefits psychologically from several factors: the enemy is not intermingled 
with civilians, the enemy poses a high threat to his life, and Suba actually engages the digital image of the 
men reproduced by his night vision device, not the men themselves. This, I argue, is the crucial element in 
Suba’s successful detachment from the act of killing and his ability to create a post-killing narrative with 
which he can be comfortable. 
                                                          
22 This more common form of night vision is also known as image intensification. It detects the light that objects 
reflect from starlight, moonlight and artificial light, amplifies that light through image enhancement, and digitally 
reproduces that light information to the viewer in a form bright enough for the human eye to detect.  
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The night vision device, with its single green lens, acts as a medium through which Suba engages 
not only the enemy, but, on this patrol, the world also. His visual sensorial experience is reduced to one 
eye’s intake of a green, digital reproduction of ambient light less than an inch from his face. Through this 
technology, which enhances ambient light and is capable of zooming in and out and focusing on different 
objects, Suba is able to see through the dark the “two hajjis” evidently arming an IED.23 Suba racially 
dehumanizes the enemy as subhuman “hajjis,” but he also, because of the medium of the night vision, 
emotionally conceives of this particular enemy as nonhuman objects. The enemy are in fact only 
presented to Suba because of the night vision technology. While they exist outside of it, Suba is only 
made aware of their existence through the medium of the night vision. Importantly, in viewing a human 
through night vision – especially one at any remove – the viewer recognizes the form of a body, but the 
digital image in no way resembles what the viewer is accustomed to associating with “human.” When 
Suba fires, he fires at the digital reproduction of the “two hajjis’” bodily form, not their actual bodies of 
flesh and bone. He even refers to the “two hajjis” afterwards as “only shadows” (48). Shadows, of course, 
are only less distinct silhouettes. This, then, is never a concrete, human enemy, only abstract figures 
displayed in a monocle, only blurry silhouettes of the human form. Further, when Suba engages, the 
muzzle flash of the .50 caliber machine gun causes his night vision device to “white out” from the bright 
light and air pressure and then immediately turn off – a common occurrence for heavy machine gunners. 
In effect, when this happens the enemy ceases to exist in the medium of the night vision; the narrative is 
interrupted. The medium, in fact, is removed altogether and in its place is simply darkness: “I couldn’t see 
anything” (47). Emotionally, the enemy disappears with the removal of the medium. Suba does not see 
the bodies or the results of his actions: “Maybe they were body parts at the edge of the field,” he says, but 
he may also tell himself “maybe they got away” even though, intellectually, he knows “the .50 punches 
holes in humans you could put your fist through” (47). Throughout contemporary war literature, concern 
                                                          
23 It should be noted that to arrive at the conclusion that the two “hajjis” were arming an IED requires that Suba 
make an “interpretive leap” and create that narrative. As readers, we, cannot know what the two were actually doing 
because the narrative does not divulge it; yet in this, we are much like the character of Suba, who likewise cannot 
know for sure. 
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for dead bodies, especially those which the soldier personally has killed, resounds as crucial element in 
the psychological aftermath of killing and creation of a post-killing narrative. Suba, because of the 
personal threat, the medium of the night vision (and its sudden removal), and the fact that the patrol does 
not stop driving to search and identify the bodies (an unwise tactic), detaches himself from this close 
proximity killing, which, in Grossman’s model should have been precipitated by resistance and 
afterwards caused great psychological trouble for him (98). Instead, Suba simply says: “So that happened. 
It wasn’t that bad, though. Not like the kid” (Klay 48). Suba distinguishes between his experience and 
Timhead’s. 
These three instances of on-the-ground, close proximity killing within the same compilation of 
short stories create problems for Grossman’s model of resistance to killing and physical proximity, while 
also corroborating his emphasis on training as conditioning. In Redeployment the technologies of training 
and optics mediate perceived proximity with and humanity of the enemy, rendering physical distance less 
meaningful. Grossman actually terms the “psychological buffer” afforded by infrared and thermal optics 
“mechanical distance,” which he acknowledges contributes to “emotional distance” (On Killing 169), but 
he nonetheless insists on the “link between distance and ease of aggression” (On Killing 97). 
Redeployment and Here, Bullet demonstrate that this relationship does not directly exist in a technology-
mediated world. In fact, Redeployment and Here, Bullet demand a different assessment about killing: that 
the perceived humanity of the other, in part determined by his or her possession of a distinct “human” 
face, is most critical. Neither silhouettes, shadows, nor heat signatures have a human face, nor does the 
absent enemy of “Here, Bullet,” but the women in Turner’s “observation poems” and Timhead’s little girl 
do. These texts then point away from Grossman towards the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, who describes 
the encounter with the other’s face as the beginning of ethics. For Levinas, the face of the other 
“commands” the viewer and reveals the commandment “Thou shall not kill” (Entre Nos 104). Timhead’s 
encounter with the little girl certainly affirms Levinas’ theory. Yet I would also offer that Turner’s 
“observation poem” speakers corroborate Levinas as well. Taken together, distance from the other does 
not seem to matter so long as one can encounter the face. Interestingly, Virilio insists that in 
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contemporary war and society “all distances are reduced to zero” (Desert Screen 43), because of the 
“phenomenon of acceleration” of information in which the optic and eye become indistinguishable, 
“obliterating” distance (Vision Machine 4). While in this argument Virilio is interested in the camera and 
television, I offer that the distance between Turner and Klay’s characters’ eyes, their optics, and the 
human other also become indistinguishable and present the same obliteration of distance for the 
technology-equipped soldier during the encounter with the enemy (and that enemy’s face).  
Yet, for the soldier, the technology itself is ambivalent. In truth, when presented with a visual 
image of a human figure at any distance through any (or no) medium, the soldier chooses to fill in the 
blanks, as Virilio explains, to create a mental image of that figure which either can or cannot be killed. 
War demands that soldiers sometimes kill individuated enemies, often face-to-face in events of mutual 
recognition. In these situations, the soldier must choose to bestow or remove humanity in the other he or 
she perceives. When the soldier deliberately dehumanizes the enemy in order to distance him/herself 
psychologically from the act of killing, then that form of dehumanization is very different than the 
passive, abstracting technology-mediated dehumanization discussed so far. It requires a constructed 
narrative. It inherently involves distinguishing between the enemy’s humanity and the soldier’s own 
humanity; it inherently involves active denial of humanity. Yet it also requires, or results in, the soldier’s 
self-dehumanization into an unfeeling machine, or something worse.  
Kevin Power’s novel The Yellow Birds explores this problematic approach to killing along with 
the dangers of subscribing to a narrative of the contemporary warrior as an unfeeling being. Yellow Birds 
traces the 2004 – 2005 deployment to Al Tafar, Iraq of Private John Bartle, 21, and his battle buddy 
Private Daniel Murphy, “Murph,” 18, both from Virginia. The two new recruits are led by their battle-
hardened team leader, Sergeant Sterling, 24, who has been deployed before. Both privates are unsure of 
their abilities to perform in combat – something Sterling tirelessly works against by advancing a 
contemporary warrior narrative of a detached, emotionless killer. Before deploying, he explains to the two 
junior soldiers that the enemy will not act like pop-up targets on a shooting range: 
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“They aren’t gonna pop up and wait for you to shoot them. Remember your fundamentals 
and you’ll be able to do what needs to be done. It’s hard at first, but it’s simple. Anybody 
can do it. Get a steady position and a good sight picture, control your breathing and 
squeeze. For some people, it’s tough after. But most people want to do it when the time 
comes.” (41-42) 
This advice echoes Suba’s emphasis on training on pop-up silhouettes as a mechanism to kill in combat. 
As with Suba, the enemy is notably absent for Sterling: with a proper sight picture, the sights should be in 
focus and the target (the human enemy) blurred. This technique of firing inherently blurs the human 
figure of the enemy into a less concrete visual image, a silhouette. Yet for Sterling, killing is not only a 
matter of doing what the soldier has been trained to do, it is also a matter of hatred “without limits” (Gray 
132). Sterling’s approach to combat is entirely different than Turner’s speakers and Suba and Timhead’s. 
As the platoon anticipates an attack, Sterling cannot wait to “fucking kill the hajji fucks” (17). He later 
spends time salting dead insurgent bodies in order to desecrate them (94). Sterling does not differentiate 
between civilian and combatant; he responds to the humanizing-dehumanizing dichotomy of 
contemporary counterinsurgency by simply dehumanizing everyone not in an American uniform. He 
subscribes to a contemporary narrative of the warrior as unfeeling and, worse, “deviant” or savage. This is 
a different form of self-dehumanization than in Turner’s “Here, Bullet” and Klay’s stories, where the 
soldiers become momentarily machine-like in battle. In Sterling’s words, the young soldiers must “find 
that nasty streak” and “stay deviant” (42, 156). Both young soldiers initially resist this influence. In fact, 
they hate Sterling, even as Bartle recognizes he is necessary for their survival: “I hated him. I hated the 
way he excelled in death and brutality and domination. But more than that, I hated the way he was 
necessary, how I needed him to jar me into action” (19). Eventually, the two young privates must choose 
to become like Sterling and be “deviants” or to refuse and bear the moral weight and personal risk of war 
fought humanely. 
In the first battle of the book, Bartle sees an armed enemy running for cover who is “astonished to 
be alive” (19). Bartle’s “first instinct was to yell out to him, ‘You made it, buddy, keep going’” (20). 
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Despite Sergeant Sterling’s influence, at this point in the novel, Bartle still views the enemy as human. 
Further, Bartle attempts to maintain his own consciousness and humanity during the gunfight. As the 
armed Iraqi continues to run for cover, Bartle narrates:  
I wanted to tell everyone to stop shooting at him, to ask, “What kind of men are we?” An 
odd sensation came over me, as if I had been saved, for I was not a man, but a boy, and 
that he may have been frightened, but I didn’t mind that so much, because I was 
frightened too, and I realized with a great shock that I was shooting at him and that I 
wouldn’t stop until I was sure that he was dead. (21) 
Here, Bartle’s view of the enemy is similar to that of Turner’s “observation poems” speakers – he 
experiences empathy for the man, imagining him to be frightened, and then connects the enemy’s 
humanity to his own because he is frightened too. He even roots for the man to make it to safety. 
Simultaneously, Bartle attempts to cling to his own consciousness – asking “what kind of men are we?” 
and senses that he is not a man, but a boy. In imagining himself a boy, Bartle invokes his innocence in the 
war, his own reluctance to kill this concrete human enemy. Yet through all these thoughts, he is shooting 
at the man. He fires both because Sterling tells him to and because he has been trained to, and he knows 
that he will continue to shoot until the threat is gone, the enemy is dead. In this gunfight, Bartle is 
simultaneously a self-aware conscience who sees the enemy as human and, separately, a bodily war-
machine which performs indifferently to the enemy’s humanity. He kills the insurgent. Sterling kills 
several others, including a woman driving a car, which shocks Bartle. Bartle still differentiates between 
combatant and civilian; he has not yet subscribed wholly to Sterling’s image of the enemy as subhuman, 
or, in Gray’s words, “a creature who is not human at all” but something to be “sought out to be 
exterminated, not subdued” (149). Gray warns that soldiers who hold this view are “subject to rapid 
brutalization” because the “lack of compunction in such taking of life deprives the destroyer of any 
emotional purgation” (151).  
In the next battle in the book, Bartle and Murph appear more like Sterling and begin to forfeit that 
“emotional purgation” and move from semi-conscious machines to savages and eventually deviants. Later 
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in the deployment, after the platoon has battled through an orchard and back into Al Tafar, losing a 
soldier in the process, Bartle “disowns the waters of my youth” and gives up the reflexive part of himself 
(126). He encounters the “deep contradictions” Gray describes in the soldier who views the enemy as “a 
human being like yourself, the victim of forces above him” (159), and chooses to become the “deviant” 
Sterling has asked him to be rather than maintain a human view of the enemy. He accepts Sterling’s 
warrior narrative. Temporarily, this is psychologically easier for Bartle; he feels nothing. He “moves to 
the edge of the bridge and begins firing at anything moving” (125). His mind wanders from what he is 
doing, it drifts to his home on the Chesapeake, the “fleeting thought of a young girl sitting beside me on a 
dock” as he “shot and shot again” a “man crawling from his weapon” (126). He no longer empathizes 
with the enemy; he kills without emotion, mechanically firing into the body. Sterling and Murph arrive 
and the three soldiers together fire fresh magazines into the body. This is, without question, a war crime. 
The men are no longer machine-like in the heat of battle, but “deviants.” Sterling tells the soldiers: “Now 
you’ve got it, Privates. Thorough, thorough is the way home” (126). Bartle now sees the enemy dead as 
“part of the landscape, as if something had sown seeds in that city that made bodies rise from the earth” 
(124). He no longer sees the enemy as human; rather they are inhuman, just abstract forms amongst other 
objects that make up an environment. Narrating, Bartle says “I had taken it as far as I could” before 
wondering “what could I do beyond this? Where would he take us?” (126).  
Yet Bartle goes “beyond this.” He is in the midst of the process which Gusterson calls “ethical 
slippage” in which organizational pressures change individual tolerance for ethically questionable actions 
(105). Bartle tells Sterling that Murph has become emotionally removed; Sterling replies that Bartle has 
forgotten “the edge you’ve got, because the edge is normal now” (156). Sterling tells Bartle that there is 
only one way home: “to stay deviant” (156). Although in the moment of narration Bartle is aware of his 
deviancy, at the time he became “unaware of even our own savagery now: the beatings and the kicked 
dogs, the searches and the sheer brutality of our presence. Each action was a page in an exercise book 
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performed by rote” (159).24 Bartle’s transformation from a conscientious human wondering “what kind of 
men are we?” into an unfeeling “brute” or “savage” who performs his duties by “rote” is startling. His 
metamorphosis from “human” to “savage” is a function of leadership, choice, and narrative 
representation. The negative influence of Sergeant Sterling goes unchecked by the platoon leader. As with 
Klay’s “Staff Sergeant” in “After Action Report,” the platoon leader is unnamed, is only “LT” – an 
interchangeable type which should have exerted positive leadership to prevent Sterling and Bartle’s 
descent into savagery, but did not. Bartle’s transformation into “savage” rather than “machine” echoes the 
distinction between active, prolonged dehumanization of the other in combat and passive, temporary 
dehumanization mediated by technology and training. 
Murph is repulsed by his transformation into an unfeeling savage – he “wants to replace the 
dullness growing inside him with anything else” (165). He walks off the base naked into Al Tafar and is 
tortured, mutilated, and killed. Bartle and Sterling find his body, and Bartle talks Sterling into not 
returning the mutilated corpse to their base, from where it would be sent home to Murph’s mother. 
Ironically, Bartle defies his earlier logic that he would “never have to make a decision again” to arrive at 
this incredible decision to commit another war crime. Bartle and Sterling enlist the help of an Iraqi man, a 
hermit with a cart who had led them to the body. Together, they dump Murph’s body into the Tigris. 
Sterling then murders the hermit, and the two lie about finding Murph. Somehow the murder seems 
logical within the construct of the novel – it is an appropriate conclusion to the “deviation” of Bartle and 
Sterling from humans to savages. It seems, in fact, almost unavoidable.  
On his redeployment questionnaire, Bartle pauses on the question “After a murder-death-kill, rate 
your emotional state” (184). He chooses “Delight” (185). Yet, as Gray explains, the attitude towards 
                                                          
24 In a non-fiction account of a similar “deviation,” in 2006 four soldiers in the 101st Airborne Division (specifically, 
the heralded 502nd Infantry Regiment) intricately planned and then carried out the rape of a fourteen-year-old girl 
and the murder of her and her family (Frederick 260). Jim Frederick chronicles their unit’s decline in his 2010 book 
Black Hearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death. Members of the unit report that the 
platoon “became something monstrous. It was not even aware of what it was doing” (241). Frederick summarizes 
the problem: “Iraqis were not seen as humans. Many soldiers actively cultivated the dehumanization of locals as a 
secret to survival” (242). 
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killing which Bartle embraces is only temporarily easier than bearing the moral weight of killing in 
combat. Bartle’s descent from an empathetic human to an unfeeling “deviant” or “savage” is interrupted 
by his redeployment. Throughout the novel, the location switches between Bartle at war and Bartle 
redeployed in Virginia afterwards, where he is “afraid of nothing in the world more than having to show 
myself for what I had become” (132). He experiences an acute sense of shame and guilt, describing the 
feeling as “like there was acid seeping down into your soul and then your soul is gone” (145).25 In his 
construct of the human as ensouled, he renders himself as inhuman as those he killed.  
Concluding a chapter on technology’s influence on the soldier’s experience of high-risk killing 
with an example of killing without a “modern” medium of technology accomplishes several things. 
Importantly, it reminds us that technology itself is ambivalent. It is possible for the soldier to humanize or 
dehumanize both the self and the other without it, particularly through created narratives, and the choice 
to do so is not linked to physical distance. Military optics can “obliterate” distance – optics can both allow 
for emotional proximity from great physical distances (as Turner’s “observation poems” demonstrate) and 
allow for emotional detachment despite physical proximity (as Klay’s short stories show). It is to the 
soldier to determine whether or not to conceive of the technology-mediated human other as human or not, 
and I have argued that this is more closely related to perceived threat and created narratives than physical 
proximity. I have also proposed that for the contemporary soldier deployed in a counterinsurgency, 
working through the requirement to humanize the populace and the urge to dehumanize the enemy is 
nearly impossible. It places the soldier within the “deep contradictions” of seeing the enemy as human – a 
position Bartle attempts but ultimately abandons in favor of dehumanizing both civilians and combatants. 
As Yellow Birds illustrates, the perception of the enemy that the soldier takes to the technology of war is 
profoundly affected by the unit and particularly leadership which creates an organizational narrative. A 
tangible take-away regarding the ambivalence of technology and the soldier’s perceived humanity of the 
other is the vital importance of strong, moral leadership in creating an organizational climate in which the 
                                                          
25 Here, one should remember Edward Tick’s argument about the “soul” at war and his definition of moral injury as 
a “soul wound” (Warrior’s Return 151). Additionally, Jonathan Shay’s “betrayal of what’s right” applies to Bartle. 
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soldier can cling to his or her own humanity and bear the terrible responsibility of killing other humans 
without resorting to bravado and intentional, prolonged dehumanization of others.  
What this chapter further reveals is that soldiers may naturally slip into machine-like behavior 
when presented with a requirement to kill a perceived enemy threat. Timhead, Suba, and Bartle each 
demonstrate this movement towards mechanical detachment, this suppression of self-awareness as reflex 
and training momentarily take over the body. This is part of what effective training does – it prepares the 
soldier to perform and to kill when required, and, as importantly, only when required. Yet Bartle chooses 
to suppress his conscience beyond what is required. Soldiers should emulate the early Bartle – both 
responding bodily in combat as they have been trained and simultaneously mentally clinging to an image 
of themselves and the enemy as human. For young military leaders, the task is to create an environment 
where that is possible, which means dealing with negative actors like Sergeant Sterling. 
In combat it is much better to wonder “what kind of men are we?” – both in the moment and 
perhaps for years thereafter – than to intentionally dehumanize the other; much better to wrestle with the 
“deep contradictions” than to become “deviant;” much better to be momentarily a “machine” than a 
prolonged “savage.” The mechanics of shooting, the technology of optics and the technology of training 
already incline the soldier, when threatened, to move towards machine-like behavior and to transform the 
human enemy into an abstract object. To intentionally conceive of the enemy as sub or inhuman risks 
injury to the soldier’s long-term self-conception as an ethical human (moral injury) and is a movement 
beyond a momentary machine and into self-identification as “savage” or “deviant.” Such extended 
dehumanization opens the movement towards “delight” in killing rather than remorse. Further, it 
precludes the humanizing tendency towards civilians in Turner’s “observation poems” and creates a 
tolerance for (unethical) violence even when no threat exists, as demonstrated by Yellow Birds. The 
weight of killing in combat is (or ought to be) heavy enough without the extra burden of such a loss of 
morality. Thus I agree with Jonathan Shay that war will always be traumatic but need not always include 
a “betrayal of what’s right.” The latter leads to moral injury, which Shay correlates with “lifelong 
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psychological injury” (20). In this chapter, I have argued for a view of the enemy which might help 
prevent such injury. 
This is a different warrior narrative than I believe the military, the media, and our culture are 
advancing. This is not simply the creed-chanting recruit in basic training, nor the unfeeling soldier of so 
many war movies, nor the kill-with-abandon first-person video game. The portion of combat in which the 
soldier is a “killing machine” ought to be but a small fraction (if any part) of his or her combat experience 
directly linked to the event of killing and then rejected as Turner’s speaker ultimately rejects 
transformation into a war machine in “Here, Bullet.” This nuanced warrior narrative allows for movement 
into and out of machine-likeness but is foundationally focused on an embodied and reflective self-
awareness which respects the enemy and oneself as similarly human.  
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CHAPTER 2 
MEDIUM AND LOW PERCEIVED THREAT TO SELF 
 
Next he walked past the mooring site for a bright white blimp called an aerostat, which 
floated high above the FOB with a remote-controlled camera that could be focused on 
whatever might be happening a thousand feet below. Day or night, the aerostat was up 
there, looking down and around, as were pole-mounted cameras, pilotless drones, high-
flying jets, and satellites, making the sky feel at times as if it were stitched all the way up 
to the heavens with eyes. David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (32) 
 
“It happened soon after sunrise on a quiet Sunday morning and shook every building on 
the FOB. Doors bowed from the concussion. Windows broke and blew out. It wasn’t the 
usual rocket or mortar, but something louder and scarier. There’d been no siren, no 
warning at all, just a sudden explosion that felt like the end of the world had arrived, and 
before anyone had a chance to do anything, such as run for a bunker or crawl under a bed, 
there was a second explosion, and a third. David Finkel, The Good Soldiers (193) 
 
The soldier’s perceived risk while on a combat outpost (COP), forward operating base (FOB) or 
patrol base (PB) varies.26 Ordinarily this perceived risk is less than while “out of the wire,” but, 
depending on the base and the enemy’s tactics, that may not always be the case. In the instances I 
examine in this chapter, however, the soldiers perceive the risk to self to be present but not immediately 
or extraordinarily so, as in the first chapter. For these characters, the base provides a measure of security, 
but the soldiers nonetheless understand that they might at any time be seriously injured or killed by 
enemy attack – the second excerpt from The Good Soldiers above is but one example of how a “quiet 
Sunday morning” can be interrupted “with no warning at all, just a sudden explosion that felt like the end 
of the world” (198). In many cases when an attack such as this does materialize, the soldier never sees the 
enemy at all and yet engages that enemy with mortars or artillery or some other indirect weapon system. 
If the soldier does see an image of the enemy, it is almost always through a television, computer, or some 
other form of technological, digital screen – typically presenting an overhead image looking down on the 
                                                          
26 The difference between these doctrinal terms matters militarily, but not for this study. I examine the bases not 
according to their doctrinal function, but rather according to the sense of security they provide. 
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earth, as Finkel describes in the first excerpt above.27 These soldiers are commonly in operations centers 
or fire control centers, coordinating the battle and directing different weapon systems to fire at the enemy 
– for instance, calling for fire from the mortars or artillery, helicopters or bombers onto an enemy they 
observe through remote observation. 
Traditionally, this type of killing – artillery, mortars, bombers, etc. – has been conceived of as 
“easier” and “less personal” because the combatants are farther apart. In Dave Grossman’s resistance to 
killing and distance model, these killing events constitute “Maximum Range” and should be accompanied 
by no resistance to killing beforehand or psychiatric trauma afterwards (On Killing 98, 108). For 
Grossman, group absolution (or diffusion of responsibility) and the “anonymity created in a crowd” 
characteristic of this kind of killing also lessen the individual psychological burden of killing (On Killing 
152). This chapter shows, however, that while group absolution does sometimes occur, it only does so 
insofar as the soldier considers him/herself to be a machine-like or interconnected being and not a discrete 
human. Further, a study of contemporary war literature reveals that, as in the previous chapter, it is not the 
physical distance between combatants which directly affects the soldier’s experience of killing, but the 
soldier’s view of him/herself and the enemy as similarly human. While distance may factor into the 
encounter with the other as human, the soldier can nonetheless insist on the enemy’s human status despite 
not even being able to see that enemy. Conversely, while technology may present a “close up” image of 
the human other through digital screens, the soldier may still conceive of that enemy as less than human 
and specifically less human than him/herself. As in the previous chapter, how one conceives of the self 
and the other is greatly influenced by the narratives one creates both before and after a killing event. Once 
again, to dehumanize the other is also to dehumanize the self. Ultimately, then, I argue that upholding 
one’s own humanity and respecting the humanity of the enemy is – while profoundly difficult – the goal 
towards which soldiers and leaders must aim, while relying on training and discipline to equip themselves 
                                                          
27 In this chapter, I do not consider the soldiers in the guard towers or “on the perimeter”: in my perceived risk 
consideration, their experience is more akin to that found in the first chapter. 
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to kill when necessary. After the fact, however, soldiers must communicate constructively – that is they 
must build a narrative with which they can be at peace. Frequently, that is not what happens in the texts. 
J. Glenn Gray also advocated a view of the other as human, even as he acknowledged the 
difficulty of doing so. Writing about his experiences in World War II, Gray explains that most of war is 
carried out by soldiers who “act as automatons, behaving almost as mechanically as the machines they 
operate” (102). Such soldiers do not consider the results of their actions because “machines cannot 
respond; they can only perform” (180). In response to this observation, Gray advocates for a “reflective” 
soldier who “sees the enemy as essentially a decent man who is a human being like yourself” (158). Gray 
himself struggled with such a concept: describing himself during a low point in the war, he writes that “I 
regarded myself then, insofar as I was a soldier, as less than a man” (26). Nonetheless, throughout the 
war, Gray consistently returned to an insistence on his own humanity. He also insisted that distance 
played an important role in war, writing that “destroying is easier done with a little remove” because 
soldiers can “not guess what havoc their powerful weapons were occasioning” (178). Yet from a distance, 
for Gray, “war as a spectacle, as something to see, ought never to be underestimated” because “human 
beings possess as a primitive urge this love of watching” (29). He explains that the experience of flying in 
a plane over combat “provides opportunity for aesthetic satisfaction” (32). Further, he argues that “war 
yields delight in aesthetic contemplation” for many soldiers who are fascinated by the “manifestations of 
power” demonstrated in battle (33). For Gray this comes from “the delight in destruction slumbering in 
most of us” (52). Gray’s insights into war as spectacle remain true even as his understanding of distance 
or “remove” may not – the introduction of remote camera feed via digital screens to the operations centers 
results in the proliferation of terms like “kill tv” and “war porn” as soldiers gravitate to watch both near 
and far killing or the “havoc” of their weapons. 
The rise of remote cameras in warfare capable of presenting the enemy to the soldier changes the 
experience of distance in battle and in many cases renders physical distance less of a factor for the soldier. 
This affirms Paul Virilio’s argument that technology has “obliterated distance” in society and war in 
deference to “instantaneous time” (Vision Machine 4). For Virilio “the very notion of ‘physical 
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proximity’ is in danger of finding itself radically changed” (Open Sky 43). Finkel’s observation that the 
sky above his base in Iraq felt like it was “stitched all the way up to the heavens with eyes” is but one 
example of the mechanism by which distance can be obliterated (32). On that base, as predicted by 
Virilio, the moment an enemy is seen, that enemy can be engaged – war is in part teletopological, or 
centered on the ability to “see” the enemy first and strike instantly (Vision Machine 6). In this 
environment, one’s geographic location loses importance; “real space” gives way to “real time” as 
“instantaneity makes up for loss of geophysical distance” (Open Sky 9, 63). When destroying an enemy is 
a matter of seeing first and acting instantly, “the image prevails over the object” (Vision Machine 73). 
This effect is not limited to warfare; societal interactions with computer and television screens have 
similarly “obliterated distance” and proximity and created a “square horizon” in which the real and virtual 
become indistinguishable (Open Sky 45). In this chapter, the “square horizons” or screens in the 
operations center present images which prevail over objects but also present human enemies which the 
soldiers actively dehumanize through their narratives. Like screens, narratives also mediate the experience 
of combat. Yet when the screens display the death of their comrades, the opposite effect occurs and the 
soldiers struggle to reconcile what they have witnessed. Clearly the technology allows the soldier to 
choose what he or she will see – it presents both friend and foe in the same medium. Thus the role of 
narratives increases in importance in making sense of killing as bodily danger decreases. 
Hugh Gusterson is likewise much interested in the effect of screens on the observer. In his book 
Drone: Remote Control Warfare (2016), he argues that technology has “respatialized” war, explaining 
that “drones have disarticulated the spatial relationship between weapon and warrior” and have 
“scrambled the relationship of distance” (45, 48). Gusterson notes that many drone pilots experience a 
sense of proximity with the human other, a “remote intimacy” (72). This results from “remote 
narrativization” in which the observers “create mental stories” and make “interpretive leaps, fill in 
informational gaps” in order to help “make sense of the people they watch” (66). For Gusterson, “remote 
narrativization” often leads to “overnarrativization” because the drone pilot lacks cultural context and 
thus assumes things incorrectly (66). He concludes that when drone pilots kill, it can be “more 
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psychologically proximate than [in the case] of other soldiers, who are physically closer to the enemy” 
(73). This chapter will add to Gusterson’s analysis of drone warfare by considering the aerostat blimp 
camera feed and asking what happens to Gusterson’s “remote intimacy” and “remote narrativization” 
when the soldiers observing the feed and directing lethal action are exposed to some level, if only limited, 
of reciprocal violence. Such an inquiry reveals that perceived risk does affect the perception of the other. 
Furthermore, this analysis complicates Gusterson’s concept of “overnarrativization”: even when soldiers 
are in the same city as the enemy they remotely observe, they still must make interpretive leaps, leaps 
which turn out to be just as difficult of an interpretation as the drone pilot’s from thousands of miles 
away. 
This chapter examines several such killing events, beginning with two non-fictional excerpts 
from David Finkel’s The Good Soldiers (2009). In The Good Soldiers, the Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist chronicles the 2007 deployment to Baghdad of the “Rangers,” or the 2-16 Infantry Battalion. 
The two killing events reiterate that, when operating within an atmosphere of violence or threat of bodily 
harm, the tendency is to dehumanize the enemy and allow what Vietnam veteran and author Karl 
Marlantes describes as “that mad primitive chimpanzee part of us” to take over (30). In these events, 
soldiers within the operations center direct fire onto enemy outside of the base and watch the effects of 
their actions through television screens, responding with elation. Later, however, they witness the death of 
their comrades through the same screens – and the experience obviously differs. Such distinction reveals 
that when a human is “in the loop” the technology itself is not what prioritizes the image over the object, 
as Virilio explains, but the viewer. After these close readings, I examine Phil Klay’s short story “10 Kliks 
South” in which an artillery crew fires on “the enemy” without a visual image of that enemy. The crew 
then must hypothesize the results of their action and use mathematics to create a narrative which makes 
sense of their actions. In this math narrative, the crew members probe their individual responsibility 
within the organization and ponder the human status of the enemy. Again, this analysis demonstrates the 
fluidity with which soldiers conceive of themselves and the enemy as “human” and how common it is for 
soldiers to act, in Gray’s words, as automatons or “as mechanically as the machines they operate” (102). 
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In order to understand killing in a counterinsurgency, one must first comprehend the effort 
undertaken by some counterinsurgency units and individuals to make life better for the local population 
and the exasperation which comes when that effort is violently rejected. Throughout The Good Soldiers, 
Finkel notes the efforts made by the soldiers of 2-16 on behalf of the locals of eastern Baghdad: efforts to 
increase adult literacy, build functional sewage and potable water systems, establish security, allow for 
democratic voting, and so on. Yet, time and again the insurgents upset progress and the locals reject the 
soldiers’ presence and thus their (however limited) goodwill. After having worked to “win the hearts and 
minds” of the locals of eastern Baghdad for over a year, “everything fell apart” in March 2008 for the 
soldiers of 2-16 when Muqtada al-Sadr’s militia, Jaish al Mahdi (JAM) began an offensive (Finkel 268). 
When he had first deployed, the battalion’s executive officer, Major Cummings, had spoken of the 
“goodness” of Iraqis and the “need to act morally” because “otherwise we’re not humans” (273). 
However, after a year in combat, watching the destruction inflicted by the insurgents not only against his 
unit but the local infrastructure and population, Cummings reverses course and exclaims: “stupid people. I 
hate ’em. Stupid fucking scumbags” (273). While it is understandable for Cummings to be frustrated, his 
reaction fails to acknowledge the complexities of human nature – it fails to understand why the 
inhabitants of eastern Baghdad rejected American aid and security. It also highlights that the enemy’s 
actions do in part affect the way in which the soldier perceives that enemy: if the enemy acts as a soldier 
believes a soldier should then it is easier for the soldier to respect that enemy. The opposite also appears 
to be true, as the soldiers of 2-16 ask: what kind of human would reject such goodwill? Cummings 
determines that the answer to that question is “stupid fucking scumbags” (273). I argue that the language 
soldiers employ and the narratives soldiers create to make sense of war affect their experience of it – it is 
hard to be respectful of stupid scumbags. Once a soldier has given up respect for the enemy and/or 
civilians, further slippage into dehumanization is likely. 
As I argued in the first chapter, the soldier deployed to a counterinsurgency is inevitably 
presented with a dichotomy of needing intentionally to humanize the civilian population while 
simultaneously facing the subconscious tendency to dehumanize the enemy. When counterinsurgency 
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does not go well, it often leads to the soldier hating or dehumanizing – as Major Cummings does – both 
civilians and insurgents (of note, Cummings does not say “stupid insurgents” but instead “stupid 
people”). The same thing occurs for Sergeant Sterling and Bartle in Yellow Birds, as previously discussed. 
Yet by dehumanizing the civilians, by conceiving of their humanity as different from his own, by his own 
reasoning Major Cummings dehumanizes himself also. This occurs for several reasons but principally 
emerges out of the implication that if the soldier no longer experiences empathy towards others and 
instead becomes “numb” or emotionless or – worse – enjoys killing, then that soldier is likewise less than 
fully human. This is the environment in which Finkel writes towards the end of 2-16’s deployment. 
In March 2008, after several months of relative stability, the 2-16 soldiers find themselves 
fighting the enemy on “every convoy and at every COP. Gunfire. Mortars. RPGs. EFPs” (275).28 Major 
Cummings and his operations center “track the battle” and direct different weapon systems and military 
assets to different locations to engage the enemy. The intense fighting extends for days. Finally, after 
having killed more than one hundred twenty-five suspected insurgents in five days, 2-16 loses two 
soldiers. Inside the operations center, the soldiers pan the overhead cameras to the area: “the camera on 
the aerostat balloon pivoted and found the war’s newest column of rising smoke, and there, beneath it, 
was Nate Showman’s platoon” (281). The battalion commander orders a guided bomb be dropped on the 
building from which the attack continues. The operations center coordinates the attack. Before long the 
soldiers in the operations center hear “the scream of a low jet, followed by the satisfying sight on the 
video monitor of an exploding black blossom, somewhere inside of which was a building” (283). 
Following the explosion, the battalion commander says “enjoy your seventy-two virgins” and Finkel 
explains that “his soldiers, virgins, too, once, hollered and clapped” (283). 
Several distinctions should be made here: the first being between blowing up a building with 
enemy inside it and blowing up or killing a visible human. In blowing up a building, soldiers can 
emotionally detach themselves from the reality of killing even as they understand the results of their 
                                                          
28 RPG: Rocket Propelled Grenade. EFP: Explosively Formed Projectile, a weapon designed to pierce armored 
vehicles. 
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actions intellectually. Secondly, the soldiers in the operation center are directing the attack, not 
individually pulling a trigger. Nonetheless, the soldiers in the operation center are an essential part of this 
event – without them the bombing run could not have been coordinated. In many ways, they act as both 
participants and spectators. Indeed, Finkel’s own journalistic dissociation is called into question in that he 
uses the phrase “the satisfying sight” which, at the very least, draws him into a form of limited 
participation in the event by hinting that he, too, enjoys what he observes aesthetically and perhaps even 
ethically. The explosion is a blossom – it is beautiful. Yet it is a black blossom – it is the visible display 
of justice and death. Here one must recall Gray’s insistence that “human beings possess as a primitive 
urge this love of watching” and that there exists a “delight in destruction slumbering in most of us” (29, 
52). In this, Gray presents a very different view of the human than Grossman does. Grossman’s argument 
that humans are innately resistant to killing one another seems overly optimistic in light of the soldiers’ 
satisfaction, hollering and clapping at the visible destruction of others. Even Finkel seems to find 
satisfaction in the act, although as he acknowledges the shared humanity of those being sent to “enjoy” 
virgins and the soldiers who themselves were once virgins also. Perhaps one could argue that for the 
soldiers this is satisfaction in the aesthetic display of power, not killing in particular. Such an argument is 
undone by the next killing event, in which a human is involved, not a building. 
The following month, the soldiers in the operation center continue to track the battle as the 
battalion prepares to redeploy to the U.S. The attacks continue, even though Muqtada al-Sadr has 
reinstated a cease-fire. The soldiers monitor unit movements via the aerostat blimp and other cameras: 
At one point, in the operations center, where the movements were being coordinated, 
several soldiers watched incredulously on a video monitor as an Iraqi with an AK-47 
jumped out from behind a building and began firing Rambo-style on a convoy. “Die, 
monkey, die!” Brent Cummings hollered for some reason, and the others began hollering 
it, too, laughing and chanting right up until the moment an Apache helicopter swooped in 
and blasted the monkey to smithereens, at which point they broke into cheers. (295) 
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Here Cummings’ view of Iraqis has entirely transformed. In 2007, at the beginning of the deployment, he 
insisted it was imperative to view the Iraqis as good people, because if the soldiers could not then they 
would not be human either. During the intense fighting of March 2008, that image of Iraqis regressed to 
“stupid people” or “scumbags” which occupy a lower human status (273). In the finals days of the 
deployment, quoted above, however, Cummings animalizes this particular Iraqi into a “monkey,” which 
is to say he creates an image of an entirely inhuman being (295). He no longer sees any human likeness in 
the other. This is despite the fact that the image of the enemy displayed in the operations center is 
obviously clear enough to determine that this particular enemy is firing “Rambo-style” which means that 
the enemy is individuated, is more than a “silhouette” and instead is a distinct being presenting a distinct 
image. So this is active dehumanization. This is a choice made after months of combat, after months of 
trying to do “good” but not meeting with success. It is a choice influenced by the progression of language 
from “good” to “stupid” and “scumbags” to finally “monkeys.”  
Yet in dehumanizing the Iraqi, Cummings and the other soldiers in the operations center – true to 
Cummings’ warning – likewise transform themselves. Remembering Gray’s insistence that humans 
possess as a “primitive urge” a “love of watching,” it is interesting that Finkel presents these soldiers as 
primate-like beings who create a jungle-like cacophony of noises by “hollering,” “laughing,” and 
“chanting” out loud. Ironically, Karl Marlantes uses the same metaphor when he warns that the “killer” 
inside of humans is contained in “that mad chimpanzee part of us” (30). After Cummings hollers “die, 
monkey, die” the others begin to holler and chant “die, monkey, die” as well as they wait for the 
inevitable, reminding us that one synonym for “imitate” is “to ape.” Having imagined the enemy as a 
monkey, the soldiers too are presented as chimpanzee-like. This metaphorical transformation of the 
soldiers into also less-than-human results in their experience not of empathy for the insurgent but of 
elation. These soldiers have moved away from an emotional detachment which avoids the enemy’s status 
as human and into an active dehumanization of the enemy which allows them to enjoy the killing 
spectacle. This presents an essential problem in all dehumanization of the enemy: most “humans” would 
feel empathy for an actual monkey being “blasted to smithereens,” but these soldiers do not. Their 
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capacity to experience a full range of human emotions is limited by the construct they create of the enemy 
and thereby also of themselves – Finkel’s language insists that dehumanization cuts both ways. What 
Finkel portrays as a primitive or primal exuberance crescendos at the death of the insurgent, shown to the 
operations center by the screens as only a caricature – “Rambo” – blasted “to smithereens.”  
Yet the screens are not what create this affect in the soldiers. The soldiers themselves create the 
narrative in order to make sense of what they see. This is powerfully demonstrated by Finkel within the 
same paragraph as he describes the death of Americans portrayed on the same screens: 
At another point, they were monitoring a route-clearance team from another battalion that 
was moving up Predators toward some 2-16 soldiers at an abandoned Iraqi checkpoint. 
All of a sudden the screen went black, and when it cleared, the lead vehicle was curving 
off the road and accelerating through a field, the result of an EFP explosion that had 
decapitated the driver but left his foot in place on the gas pedal. All night long, 
Cummings continued to see that vehicle curving ever so gracefully into the field. (295) 
Here, as in the bombing of the building, the human is not presented by the screen. Instead, the soldiers are 
watching vehicles in a route-clearance convoy moving along the road known as “Predators” when “all of 
a sudden the screen went black” (295). Finkel employs similar language in describing the previous 
bombing of the building: an “exploding black blossom, somewhere inside of which was a building” (283). 
Similarly, only after the blackness of the explosion clears can the vehicles be seen again. Rather than 
elation, Finkel’s language reflects grief. Finkel writes that Cummings will continue to see that vehicle 
“curving ever so gracefully” all night long (295). By evoking “grace” Finkel emphasizes the spiritual 
nature of this loss – the Christian concept of salvation by grace cannot be missed. In contrast to the bomb 
which delivered the “black blossom” of beautiful justice, this explosion results in a graceful deliverance. 
This attempt to aestheticize loss reveals that the technology is not what determines the emotional response 
to killing or how the soldier will view the other. To Cummings, the unseen comrade is more human than 
the seen enemy. Even though the same screens present similar explosions, the experience is entirely 
different. In the case of the route clearance platoon, the object prevails over the image. 
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 I want to be clear that I am not advocating that soldiers view the death of an enemy and a 
comrade equally. Clearly a soldier will and must be more affected by the death of a comrade. Nor am I 
proposing that in either of these scenarios there was not a moral imperative or justification to kill the 
enemy. However, I am advocating that soldiers must strive to view the humans themselves as humans. By 
that I do not mean identical humans, but I do insist we should respect our enemy as human beings, 
however different we are. Not doing so creates room for unethical action in the short term and presents 
long-term problems for the soldier’s recovery from combat. It saddles the soldier with the same 
predicament as Marlantes 40 years after Vietnam: “I now think of what was ‘the enemy’ as human 
beings” (41). He proposes that the “ideal response to killing in war should be […] sadness mingled with 
respect” (42). Respecting the enemy is different than caring about the enemy in the same way as one cares 
about his or her comrades. Respecting the enemy helps ensure ethical conduct in war. Finkel makes this 
point clearly through his subtle use of language. The destruction of the building is “satisfying”; the chant 
“die, monkey, die” is troubling; and the vehicle curves “ever so gracefully,” implying the intimacy and 
sadness in the death of a comrade and the terrible irony of that moment of aesthetic beauty. Still, Finkel is 
adamant that these are good soldiers. One never gets the sense that he is judging the soldiers; in fact his 
affinity for the soldiers is obvious. So, for the soldier and leader preparing for war, the task is to 
understand the tendency to dehumanize the enemy and resist it. War is full of enough “inhumane” and 
terrible events without the added burden of deliberately making it more “inhuman” by actively 
dehumanizing oneself and the enemy. Again, I agree with Jonathan Shay that war is inherently traumatic, 
but does not inherently “betray what’s right” and result in moral injury (20). In these “operations center” 
killing events, it is not the actual killing which betrays what’s right, but the response to and representation 
of it. The same killing could have been done without dehumanizing and mocking the enemy. 
 I will now shift away from the digital screens of the operations center while remaining “on base” 
to explore Phil Klay’s short story “Ten Kliks South.” In the story, told through first-person narration, an 
artillery crew discusses the results of its first combat mission. The story raises the same issues of whether 
or not the soldiers and enemy are portrayed as human with the added complexity that this time the enemy 
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is not even visible. The enemy is only a “target description” - something to be imagined. Here the soldiers 
are situated in what Gray describes as the inability to “guess what havoc their powerful weapons were 
occasioning” (178). Without a visible enemy or visible effects of their artillery rounds, the soldiers must 
construct a narrative to make sense of their actions. In so doing, the soldiers probe their own individuality 
and responsibility within the crew’s collective action. After collectively creating a math narrative for their 
actions, the narrator goes to the morgue in search of the enemies’ bodies, which is to say he attempts to 
restore the humanity of the enemy to the abstract event (and narrative) of killing. In so doing, he reasserts 
his own humanity. 
In “Ten Kliks South” the human enemy never appears; the enemy is, for the artillerymen in the 
story, only a “target” consisting of a “quadrant and deflection” given to Gun Six by the Fire Direction 
Center, or FDC (Klay 277). While the target is a definite geographic coordinate, “the enemy” remains 
abstract in that the artillerymen do not know how many insurgents they engage or kill. The artillerymen 
simply “send” destructive power, killing power, to a point in space. Thus enemy never appears as human, 
never presents a face or even a bodily form to the artillerymen. The gun crew is told that it fired upon a 
“platoon-sized element” but one of the members of Gun Six, Bolander, reminds his crewmates that “AQI 
don’t have platoons” (272).29 The only way the nine Marines even know that they in fact hit their target, 
or killed any enemy, is that “the lieutenant told us so” (271). For the artillerymen, “the enemy” remains 
an abstract idea conceivable only by the inappropriate – at least according to Bolander – description 
“platoon-sized element.”  
Because of this ambiguity, the Marines of Gun Six attempt to answer “how many” – or create a 
narrative for the results of their actions – through mathematics. Killing is for them, in fact, a matter of 
calculations – degrees of elevation and deflection, number of charges, number of rounds, properly aligned 
aiming poles and precisely calculated routines executed by a trained crew to achieve an accurate result. 
So to calculate how many insurgents they have killed, the crew does the math. The narrator assumes 
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“platoon-sized” means forty insurgents and does simple division from that figure: “six guns, so divide and 
you got, six, I don’t know, six point six people per gun” (272). Bolander, despite his assertion that AQI 
does not have platoons, agrees: “we killed exactly 6.6 people” (272). Their crewmate Sanchez, however, 
goes one step further: “divide it by nine Marines on the gun, and you, personally, you’ve killed zero point 
seven something people today. That’s like a torso and a head. Or maybe a torso and a leg” (272). Sergeant 
Deetz, their leader, tells the artillerymen “we definitely got more […] we’re the best shots in the battery” 
(273). Being the best shot in the battery would change the equation somewhat – their gun, Gun Six, would 
be weighted more heavily in the computations – but nonetheless, for the crew, this killing event remains a 
matter of calculations. 
In this fascinating discussion of tallying unseen dead bodies, the Marines must imagine the results 
of their actions through such calculations because they cannot experience them firsthand – there is no 
encounter with the human other. This is inherently a form of creating narrative, only it is different than 
the forms of narratives discussed in the first chapter in that this constructed narrative is purely conjecture 
and involves group responsibility. Each Marine is responsible for “a torso and a head. Or maybe a torso 
and a leg” (emphasis mine, 272). In this math-narrative “the enemy” is only the sum of a “platoon-size” 
collection of body parts. As such, this enemy is divisible beyond the whole units of individual humans: 
the gun crew has killed “6.6 people” which equates to each Marine having killed “zero point seven 
something” enemy (272). Incredibly, the Marines create an absurdly precise narrative out of total 
ambiguity. In order to do this, the Marines must conceive of the human enemy as a divisible integer 
which may be killed in parts, not as a whole, although that is certainly not true: you can blow off an arm, 
but that does not necessarily kill the person. The implication is that human recognition demands a base 
level of imprecision which the artillerymen exceed through mathematics. 
Not all the Marines agree with the concept that the actions of the whole should be equally 
dispersed among each of the individuals. The question of individual responsibility becomes a point of 
disagreement. Jewett in particular complicates the concept that each of them has killed “zero point seven 
something people” by stating that he doesn’t “feel like I killed anybody. I think I’d know if I killed 
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somebody” (emphasis original, 273). Voorstadt likewise claims different responsibility for himself when 
he tells Jewett that “I’m the one that pulled the lanyard […] I fired the thing. You just loaded it” (274).  
To insist on individual responsibility in this scenario is to insist on one’s own individual humanity by 
resisting absorption into the collective. Voorstadt does this to claim credit for himself. Yet the issues of 
responsibility and credit are complicated further in that five other gun crews fired and the Marines of Gun 
Six cannot be entirely certain that the enemy was not already dead by the time their first round landed on 
target. Jewett again asks the contrarian question about the other guns in the battery and if “their rounds 
could have hit first. Maybe everybody was already dead” (273). Pressing the issue of responsibility 
further, the crew then debates what crimes each person would be charged with had they “used a howitzer 
to kill somebody back in the States” and conclude that it would be murder. Yet the narrator asks: “but for 
each of us? In what degree? […] If I loaded an M16 and handed it to Voorstadt and he shot somebody, I 
wouldn’t say I’d killed anyone” (274). He explicitly states that his actions as a member of the crew would 
not constitute murder, and that if he is guilty of murder, then so are the ammunition handlers at the 
ammunition supply point.  
Sergeant Deetz, their leader, disagrees, asking sarcastically: “why not the factory workers who 
made the ammo” (274).30 Instead, Deetz insists that, as a crew, the members act in unison to form a 
machine-like organization. Deetz denies individuality to the crewmembers, saying that “we’re Gun Six. 
We’re responsible for that gun. We just killed some bad guys. With our gun. All of us” (275). He does not 
allow the Marines to distinguish among their individual actions and thus to distinguish individual 
responsibility. Furthermore, he instrumentalizes all of the Marines by conceiving of them as parts of the 
cannon. Within his math narrative, the Marines are not only a crew, but they also equate to the gun itself. 
In his construct, the Marines are a collective in which the individual disappears into a role. Gun Six is a 
machine, and in Deetz’s proclamation it is indivisible, and the responsibility for its actions rests with the 
collective. If each Marine does not perform his function perfectly, then the system fails. Thus the narrator 
                                                          
30 Deetz reminds us that nations and societies go to war, not just armies. Klay makes this point more emphatically in 
his New York Times essay “After War, a Failure of Imagination.” 
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explains that “putting those rounds downrange takes nine men moving in perfect unison. It takes an FDC, 
and a good spotter, and math and physics and art and skill and experience” (279). He furthermore 
describes the crew’s actions matter-of-factly, with terse prose: “we got round and time and Jackson had 
gotten powder and we moved smooth, like we trained to” (277). Again, as in the previous chapter, 
training creates machine-like “smoothness” or performance from the Marines: “I had trained to load those 
rounds. Trained so much I had scars on my hands” (277). With so much movement in unison and training, 
Deetz’s argument against individual responsibility seems natural – the cannon cannot be fired without a 
crew moving in “unison,” therefore no individual is more or less responsible than another. 
The Marines’ debate about individual responsibility within the crew evokes and problematizes 
Grossman’s notion of group absolution during killing. This killing event, for Grossman, constitutes 
“maximum range” killing, and the Marines should be “protected by the […] powerful combination of 
group absolution, mechanical distance, and, most pertinent […], physical distance” (On Killing 108). The 
individuals on the crew, according to Grossman, should experience both a sense of accountability and 
anonymity (On Killing 150). Sergeant Deetz argues this point, emphasizing over and over again for a 
“we” which is not only a collective (a crew) but also an inanimate object (Gun Six). This, too, is how the 
Marines arrived at “zero point seven something” enemies apiece. Yet when the Marines begin discussing 
what crimes they individually would be charged with in the U.S., the text challenges the notion that group 
absolution works cleanly. The narrator creates a hypothetical parallel narrative – what if he loaded a gun 
and gave it to Voorstadt to kill someone? That would not be murder. Likewise, when Jewett argues that 
he does not feel like he has killed anyone, it is less an argument of group absolution than a matter of 
individuation within the group: Voorstadt perhaps has killed someone, but he, Jewett, has not. In the 
narrator, Jewett and Voorstadt’s construct, there is not anonymity but varying degrees of individual action 
and therefore different amounts of responsibility. Group absolution does not occur.  
Of importance to this study, when the narrator and Jewett deny anonymity and insist on their own 
limited participation, they do so to distance themselves intellectually from the responsibility of killing. 
Furthermore, the crew members’ reworking of the killing event into a question of crime deflects the 
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ethical issue of responsibility into a legal issue of lawbreaking. Jewett explains that he does not feel like 
he killed anybody – and indeed the crew’s conversation reveals that the event was devoid of emotional 
intimacy with the enemy for all the crew members, not just him. They performed, machine-like, the 
execution of their duties. Without a presented enemy and given the calculated and routinized nature of 
artillery firing, a certain amount of emotional detachment seems unavoidable. Yet the crew members 
intellectually still understand that their collective actions resulted in death – thus the narrator and Jewett’s 
effort towards a rationalization that their particular actions did not directly result in killing. Already 
emotionally distanced from the responsibility of killing, they attempt to create intellectual distance as well 
through a constructed narrative which absolves them of responsibility for killing any enemy. This 
constructed narrative is not group absolution founded on anonymity but rather self-absolution centered on 
the individual’s limited role in the action. Whereas Voorstadt seeks credit, the narrator and Jewett seek 
pardons. 
Yet the narrator is uncomfortable with this abstract view of the enemy; he searches for a different 
narrative. Hypothetically calculating the number of unseen dead is not sufficient for him – the event 
seems unreal. He leaves his crew in order to sort through the day’s events on his own. First, he returns to 
his crew’s howitzer. There, recalling the events of that morning, “it didn’t seem as though any of it could 
have happened” (280) because  
there’s no indication here of what happened, though I know ten kliks south of us is a 
cratered area riddled with shrapnel and ruined buildings, burned-out vehicles and twisted 
corpses. The bodies. Sergeant Deetz had seen them on his first deployment, during the 
initial invasion. None of the rest of us have. 
 I turn sharply away from the gun line. It’s too pristine. And maybe this is the 
wrong way to think about it. Somewhere, there’s a corpse lying out, bleaching in the sun. 
Before it was a corpse, it was a man who lived and breathed and maybe murdered and 
maybe tortured, the kind of man I’d always wanted to kill. Whatever the case, a man 
definitely dead. (280) 
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The “pristine” gun line affronts the narrator’s sensibility that someone – perhaps a great many 
somebodies – has been killed, and thus there should be some “indication” of it. The cleanliness, the 
unchanged state of the cannons offends and repulses the narrator who is seeking to discover the human 
toll of his actions: he turns sharply away from the gun line. He is no longer “Gun Six.” What he seeks, he 
cannot find there. Instead, he must imagine. The narrator imagines not just the bodies but a singular 
corpse and the “man” who lived “before it was a corpse.” This created narrative is an attempt to remove 
the mathematics and instead to restore the humanity of both the enemy and himself. Importantly, in 
creating this image of the enemy, the narrator makes several “interpretive leaps.” This is an even more 
remote form of “narrativization” than that of the drone pilots Gusterson describes. It is in effect, a blind 
leap. The man maybe murdered and maybe tortured, in which case he would be the “kind of man I’d 
always wanted to kill” (280). Yet the narrator cannot know – his interpretive leap is purely a guess which 
he must fit within his own narrative to make sense of the event. He just as easily might have killed some 
other “kind of man.” 
His crew and leadership rebuff him for this line of thought when he returns, insisting that their job 
is to provide bodies, not care about the humans associated with them. Back with his crew, the narrator 
asks Sergeant Deetz “don’t you think, maybe, we should have a patrol out, to see if there were any 
survivors?” (281). Deetz and Voorstadt ridicule him: “there weren’t any survivors” (281). The narrator, 
however, persists: “what about the bodies? Doesn’t somebody have to clean up the bodies?” (281). 
Sergeant Deetz again rebukes him: “I’m an artilleryman. We provide the bodies. We don’t clean ’em up” 
(emphasis original, 282). The conversation ends: 
“And what are you Lance Corporal?” 
“An artilleryman, Sergeant.” 
“And what do you do?” 
“Provide the bodies, Sergeant.” 
“You’re goddamn right, killer. You’re goddamn right.” (282) 
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“Providing a body” is essentially a way of thinking about killing which avoids the living status of the 
enemy: it conceives of killing as a production or service rather than destruction. By avoiding the once-
alive enemy and instead focusing on the dead bodies, Sergeant Deetz demonstrates how to dissociate 
oneself from the reality of killing, which is to take life, or make dead. “Providing a body” allows for a 
mental picture of something which was already or perhaps was always dead because it elides the alive 
status of the human body altogether. This narrative is the opposite approach to the one attempted by the 
narrator at the gun line when he seeks to imagine the “man” before it is a “corpse.” This narrative aims to 
suppress the emotions of killing – to remain numb or stoic in the face of battle: to simply provide bodies 
is to perform a function without feeling. Searching for survivors and bodies risks undoing this abstraction; 
it is therefore someone else’s job. 
Yet that is exactly what the narrator does. Instead of an abstract narrative, the narrator searches 
for a concrete narrative, one with a human face: he goes to the morgue in search of the bodies. There, he 
is disappointed to learn that insurgent bodies are not brought to the American base. While talking to the 
Mortuary Affairs “gunny,” the narrator confides that “I just never killed anybody before” (284).31 Despite 
previously arguing that he would not be charged with murder for loading a weapon, the narrator has 
accepted responsibility for his actions and is attempting to work through his emotions. Importantly, I 
would add, in so doing he reasserts his own humanity. He sorts through his emotions with “gunny” 
because his own crew and leadership rejected his attempts to do the same with them. As a result, he is not 
just a non-individuated member of a crew who accepts the math-narrative of group absolution but rather 
an individual who resists total transformation into a machine-like being by maintaining or reasserting his 
own capacity to feel and empathize. 
Here it is important to note the opportunity missed by Sergeant Deetz to facilitate an open and 
mature discussion within his crew – to allow emotions and affect back into the equation. The Army now 
calls this failed collective discussion “Battlemind Debriefing” which has been clinically shown to reduce 
                                                          
31 Gunny is short for the Marine Corps rank of Gunnery Sergeant, the rank above Staff Sergeant. 
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post-traumatic stress symptoms in soldiers when properly conducted (Love 15). Previously, when the 
crew spoke flippantly about “how many” they may have killed and their individual responsibility, 
Sergeant Deetz took that as an opportunity to reiterate their unit cohesiveness. However, here, when the 
narrator approaches Sergeant Deetz this second time, Sergeant Deetz is in a position to lead the more 
serious discussion about how his soldiers are responding to having killed. In fact, when the narrator 
earlier goes to the gun line and imagines the results of his actions he thinks of the bodies and then 
immediately of Sergeant Deetz: “The bodies. Sergeant Deetz had seen them on his first deployment, 
during the initial invasion. None of the rest of us have” (280). Fittingly, then, the narrator tries to make 
sense of things by approaching his experienced leader – but, unfortunately, that effort is stymied and his 
effort to voice his emotions is cut off. Sergeant Deetz chooses bravado instead. For all the characters 
except Sergeant Deetz, this is their first experience with killing in combat: it is not an overestimation to 
infer that the characters are looking to Sergeant Deetz for an example of how to respond. Klay presents 
this important chance to integrate feelings with action as a missed opportunity which sends the narrator on 
a long, unresolved journey through the base, back to the site of the incident and ultimately to the morgue. 
Taken symbolically, this short physical journey around the base is but a small one compared to the much 
longer psychological journey awaiting the narrator if he cannot make sense of his experience. 
After the exchange with “gunny,” the story ends with the narrator remembering corpsmen 
carrying an American flag-covered stretcher. In that instance, all the Marines in the area stood in rigid 
silence and saluted as the corpsmen passed: “there was no sound or movement except for the slow steps 
of the Corpsmen and the steady progress of the corpse” (287). The narrator imagines Marines standing in 
similar silence as the corpse travels through Kuwait and then Germany and finally to Dover Air Force 
Base. The juxtaposition of the total disregard for the enemies’ bodies which he and his crew have just 
created and the paramount respect for their own dead could not be more clearly made. It is the same 
paradox highlighted in Yellow Birds, in which Sergeant Sterling desecrates insurgent bodies after battle 
and Bartle empties magazines of bullets into another dead insurgent. Yet when they discover the body of 
Murph, they choose not to recover it, because it has been desecrated by the insurgents. Better to discard 
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the body into the Tigris, they determine, than for Murph’s mother to see his mangled body and disfigured 
face. They commit this war crime out of concern for Murph’s mother, to keep her from “in a moment of 
weakness [turning] up the lid of the casket and seeing her son, Daniel Murphy, seeing what had been done 
to him” (207). Their decision demonstrates their diminished capacity for moral reasoning, or moral 
inversion, which denies Murph’s body the same respectful journey through Kuwait and Germany to 
Dover (207). 
Jess Goodell writes extensively about caring for American bodies in her compelling 2011 memoir 
Shade It Black. Having spent a deployment as a mortuary affairs specialist, she explains how hard she and 
her platoon worked to align body parts with their proper bodies (108). Contrary to Sterling and Bartle’s 
decision, she writes that “we wanted to send every piece home” no matter how disfigured (52). To her, 
the body parts were not indiscriminate heads and torsos, but essential parts of the humanity of the fallen. 
On more than one occasion, she details how she and others “tried to sort out and organize the body parts 
and bits and pieces into coherent wholes” (108). Further, she explains that she and others avoided looking 
at the faces and eyes of the dead because “our minds would play tricks on us when we looked at the 
faces” (71). To overcome this, they would cover the face “so we didn’t have to see the eyes” (71). Here 
one might remember Levinas’ ethics of the face-to-face encounter with the other, which demands 
responsibility in the self. In covering the face, Goodell and her comrades might symbolically and literally 
have been attempting to refrain from taking on the responsibility of the death and absorption of the loss of 
another Marine. I take from Goodell’s insistence on the importance of bodies (and particularly faces) and 
both Powers’ and Klay’s similar portrayal of respect given by soldiers to corpses en route to Dover Air 
Force Base that when the narrator of “Ten Kliks South” goes to the morgue in hopes of seeing the bodies 
of the dead insurgents, it is an effort to see or feel the humanity of those he has participated in killing. In 
seeking the face of the other, he is seeking to feel the responsibility for the other’s death. It is an effort to 
piece back together the torso, head, and leg into a whole human and to thereby piece himself back 
together in the process. While unconventional, it is a much better approach than not reflecting on one’s 
actions at all. 
  
67 
 
Comparing these two very different forms of killing from similar bases reveals a distinction 
between the narrator of “Ten Kliks South” and the soldiers in the operations center in The Good Soldiers: 
that of perceived risk.  In The Good Soldiers, as I have already discussed, the soldiers of 2-16 perceive 
risk to self and their comrades and identify that risk to be located in the individuals they kill: insurgents in 
a building firing at US soldiers and an insurgent firing “Rambo-style” at a convoy. Not only is their base 
consistently being attacked, but the insurgents they kill are actively attacking other soldiers. Not so for the 
narrator in “Ten Kliks South.” Talking with Jewett about their first killing experience, the narrator asks 
what he is supposed to tell his new wife about the day’s events, explaining that “she thinks I’m a badass. 
She thinks I’m in danger” (276). Jewett reminds him that “we get mortared from time to time” but the 
narrator only responds by giving Jewett “a flat look” (276). Clearly, while he perceives some risk, the 
narrator does not perceive the same kind of risk to himself as the soldiers of 2-16. Just as importantly, he 
does not associate the “target” with an immediate risk to others in the same way the soldiers in the 
operations center view the enemy they kill: this enemy only “might have” been a murderer or torturer. 
This difference, I argue, is a factor in the narrator’s ability to conceive of the enemy as human even as he 
cannot see that enemy. Conversely, the atmosphere of continual violence surrounding the soldiers in the 
operations center acts as an obstacle to viewing the enemy as human, even though that enemy is presented 
to them via television screens.  
What this chapter reinforces is that the perceived threat of the other – to either the soldier or 
his/her comrades – affects the encounter with that other and the decision to humanize or dehumanize. In 
both texts, technology affects the encounter with or presentation of the enemy, yet the soldiers themselves 
determine how to respond to that information. These texts likewise demonstrate again that physical 
distance is not directly correlated to the difficulty or ease of killing: “Ten Kliks South” is so titled 
precisely because “the enemy” is ten kilometers to the south, yet its narrator is the one who sorts through 
the emotions of killing while the soldiers in the operations center celebrate death at an unknown, though 
conceivably similar, distance portrayed on television screens. Finally, both of these texts portray soldiers 
within complex crews and organizations, but group absolution only occurs when those soldiers choose not 
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to reflect as individuals on their actions or to view their actions as affecting individuals or persons. 
Recalling that Brian Turner’s speakers humanize the women they observe while eliding the humanity of 
the enemy who fires the round at him in “Here, Bullet,” we begin to see the extension of two trends across 
chapters: first, that one is much more likely to intentionally humanize the other when that other does not 
present perceived direct threats, and, second, that passive dehumanization in the moment of killing can be 
just that – a momentary thing. However, Yellow Birds, The Good Soldiers, “Ten Kliks South,” and “After 
Action Report” all demonstrate the ethical trap of intentionally dehumanizing both the self and the enemy. 
Whereas Sergeant Sterling and Bartle in Yellow Birds become incapable of moral reasoning and commit 
war crimes as a result, similar movement away from ethical conduct occurs in The Good Soldiers as the 
narrative for conceiving of Iraqis degrades from “good” to “scumbags” and finally to “monkey.” Soldiers 
and leaders preparing for war must confront the similarity between Bartle’s choice of “delight” as the 
adjective to describe his emotions upon killing on his redeployment questionnaire and the euphoria within 
the operations center portrayed by Finkel when the “monkey” is “blasted to smithereens.” While I cannot 
say whether or not some movement towards passive dehumanization of the soldier or the enemy in the 
moment of killing is inherent in killing, I do know that intentional, active dehumanization is not 
necessary. It is in fact doubly harmful both to the conduct of war and for the soldier’s recovery from it as 
it adds to the trauma of war an increased possibility for moral injury. 
What I have advocated across two chapters now is that, for the soldier, attempting to hold an 
image of him or herself and the enemy as similarly human is an essential part of successfully and ethically 
conducting a counterinsurgency. Such a mindset respects the enemy. It is the best way for the soldier to 
approach killing in that it resists the soldier’s total transformation into a machine-like or numb being for 
the duration of the war. It is a way of countering the description Gray gives of most soldiers at war “as 
automatons, behaving almost as mechanically as the machines they operate” (102). Such soldiers 
experience an “absence of feeling” because “machines cannot respond; they can only perform” (180). 
Gray himself experienced low points, but was able, through reflection, to overcome them and restore his 
capacity for feelings and observation. That the artillery crew of Gun Six in “Ten Kliks South” performs 
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cohesively and smoothly because it had trained to do so, should be an encouragement for soldiers and 
leaders preparing for combat. This is an appropriate “machine-likeness” resulting from proper military 
training. Yet “Ten Kliks South” is more concerned with how one should respond after the fact, not in the 
actual moment of killing. The narrator of “Ten Kliks South” responds and also performs his function at 
war. He does not remain an automaton. While I don’t advocate that soldiers go searching through 
morgues, the urge to reflect on one’s actions and to make sense of them in a way that respects oneself and 
the other is precisely what I think is needed in today’s soldier. 
I conclude with veteran author Karl Marlantes’ description of a killing event in Vietnam, when he 
similarly dehumanized the enemy upon whom he was directing napalm fire as “Crispy Critters” (40). He 
writes: “the advancing enemy was no longer human. I didn’t kill people, sons, brothers, fathers. I killed 
‘Crispy Critters.’ It could have been krauts, nips, huns, boche, gooks, infidels, towel heads, imperialist 
pigs, yankee pigs …” (40). In reflecting on his actions, he concludes that he would do the same thing 
again if placed in that situation because the Vietcong were attacking American soldiers, but “I’d hope that 
I’d remember to respect my enemy’s pain and agony” (42). The impetus for this study is the desire to help 
future soldiers anticipate such moments, that they might not look back in retrospect and wish they had 
respected their enemy’s agony instead of mocked it. While the insurgent shooting at the convoy no doubt 
was justifiably killed, chanting in anticipation of and celebrating his death in an operations center will 
likely present the same problems for the soldiers Finkel observed as Marlantes experienced for decades 
after Vietnam. Respecting the enemy and oneself requires that different metaphors and narratives be 
employed to reinforce that one should sort through emotions and make sense of one’s actions. Such 
narratives require that leaders do a better job than Sergeant Deetz at facilitating that communal 
conversation. 
The military leaders in this chapter – Sergeant Deetz, Major Cummings, and the battalion 
commander of 2-16 – are portrayed as having a firm grasp on building or insisting upon unit cohesion yet 
also as failing to intentionally address underlying psychological and representational issues in their 
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soldiers and themselves.32 Deetz insists that each of the individuals is a member of the crew, that they are 
all “Gun Six.” He refuses to allow any one individual to feel responsible for the actions of the whole. In 
this, he does what he should by reinforcing to his soldiers that they are part of a team. Yet Sergeant Deetz 
fails to engage in dialogue with his subordinates after this traumatic event, even when those subordinates 
reach out to him for counsel. Instead, he relies on bravado and detachment to avoid an uncomfortable 
conversation. So “Gun Six” is a team, but not one that encourages communication. Similarly, the 
atmosphere within the operations center is certainly united. Yet Finkel chronicles the slowly changing 
attitude towards Iraqis of Cummings and the battalion commander in The Good Soldiers. It is not that 
they intend to hate Iraqis; to the contrary Cummings at first insists that they are “good people.” Yet with 
time and frustration, they do develop a hatred. Left unchecked, Finkel portrays that hatred or indifference 
as directly linked to the two instances in which the battalion commander and Cummings mock those they 
kill. Unfortunately, these officers are leaders and they say these things publicly. By every indication, as 
Finkel portrays these men, they are good leaders and “good soldiers.” Yet in these instances, their soldiers 
mimic them, and conform to their examples. One cannot help but wonder if those soldiers and officers 
could go back and participate in these events again if they would not, like Marlantes with his “Crispy 
Critters,” wish to “respect [their] enemy’s pain and agony” (42). That these leaders are not presented 
overtly negatively (like Sergeant Sterling in Yellow Birds) offers a stark warning to military leaders: the 
tendency to dehumanize the enemy and oneself is pervasive even in those who set out to see others as 
“good.” It may well be the default setting of the soldier. To resist this, to be reflective warriors, leaders 
must be intentional about the narratives they create and tolerate in their units. 
  
                                                          
32 Sebastian Junger has written an excellent book on the importance of community and cohesion in war: Tribe: on 
Homecoming and Belonging (2016). 
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CHAPTER 3 
NO PERCEIVED THREAT TO SELF 
 
The previous two chapters examine killing events in which the soldiers involved perceive a risk 
of bodily harm against themselves, beginning with high risk and then looking at instances of less risk. In 
those chapters, I argue that the perceived threat from an enemy to oneself and others affects the soldier’s 
encounter with that enemy. I note that conceptualizing the enemy during a counterinsurgency is 
particularly difficult because that enemy can be indistinguishable from civilians, and that constructed 
narratives perform an important role in that process. In this chapter I turn to a new experience in the 
history of warfare: that of no perceived risk to the soldier during a killing event. In these instances, the 
soldier is physically located outside of the traditional “combat zone” yet participates in combat through 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs), more commonly referred to as drones.33 While other forms of remote 
combat exist, drone warfare has particularly captured public imagination and debate. This is in part 
because there is no physical risk to the drone-operating soldier, so he or she is presumed to be safely and 
thus mechanically killing others without cost or emotion, and because there are serious concerns about 
how to distinguish enemy from civilian without being physically present.  
Again, in this project, I am primarily interested in the soldier’s experience of war; this chapter 
will not engage with the larger debates surrounding the existence or effectiveness of drone warfare. 
However, I do note that, beyond the major concerns raised about civilian casualties, much of the moral 
and ethical criticism of drone warfare centers on the lack of risk to the soldier: the non-reciprocal nature 
of remotely inflicted violence. Drone warfare is too much like a video game, critics observe; it makes 
killing “too easy” and is perpetrated by “cowards.” The military itself expressed a similar sentiment in 
2013 when it overturned its decision to create a Distinguished Warfare Medal for soldiers who made 
                                                          
33 “Combat zone” is one of the terms which, I argue, in a respatialized war, or network-centric war, is rapidly losing 
meaning. 
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“extraordinary achievements […] that do not involve valor or physical risk” (Shanker). The medal was 
nixed only two months after it was introduced in part because of “outraged reactions among many 
military veterans” (Gusterson 53). Yet the literature offers a different perspective than this stereotype of 
an emotionally-detached and unaffected drone pilot. In this chapter I ask, “what is the experience of the 
soldier involved in drone warfare and how is it portrayed in film?” Such a line of inquiry reveals just how 
easily the humanity of the soldiers engaged in this new kind of warfare is forgotten in the debates 
surrounding the use of drones in war. It also raises the question of what distinguishes a warrior: 
contribution to military effectiveness or physical bravery in the face of danger? 
Not surprisingly, then, the two films I discuss in this chapter engage this stereotype of a detached 
and inhuman soldier killing from afar, but both do so only to challenge that image. Instead, the films offer 
emotional portrayals of drone pilots and sensor operators, who watch safely and yet intimately as they kill 
from thousands of miles away.34 The films clearly show that the soldiers are troubled by their 
participation in killing. I argue these portrayals, supported by Air Force studies, upend Grossman’s 
distance and resistance to killing analysis and instead demand a new way of conceiving of the experience 
of killing. In its place, I continue to argue that one’s perception of the self and the other as human or 
sub/inhuman is the far more influential factor, which is consistent with the previous two chapters. Yet, in 
this chapter, because there is no risk to the soldiers, the soldiers are always confronted by the idea of their 
own “cowardliness.” Soldiers perceive cowards to be dishonorable and thus less than the military ideal, so 
the soldiers in this chapter are always at risk of perceiving themselves as being or becoming lesser 
humans. Further, the lack of risk can complicate the soldiers’ ability to create narratives about their killing 
experiences which validate their actions. So I continue to argue that perceived risk is an instrumental part 
of the soldier’s experience of killing, and that narratives continue to play an essential role in making sense 
of killing in combat, even when mediated by screens and remotely-controlled technology.  
                                                          
34 The pilot flies the Remotely Piloted Aircraft, the sensor operator controls the “sensor” or camera and other aiming 
and detection equipment. 
  
73 
 
It is important to note, too, that killing by remote control will increasingly be a part of the future 
of warfare.35 In his 2009 book Wired for War: the Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century, P. 
W. Singer chronicles the rise of robotics in the military, including drones. Singer calculates that in 2008 
there were 5,331 drones in the US military, but claims that in future conflicts there will be “tens of 
thousands” of drones (37). He concludes that “man’s monopoly of warfare is being broken. We are 
entering the era of robots at war” (41). Singer notes that this is especially true of asymmetric war in which 
exists “a huge intellectual battle […] between US technology and the insurgents” to develop a 
technological upper hand (218). Further, in January 2017, Islamic State fighters “crossed a threshold” and 
used small aerial drones not only to kill Iraqi Army soldiers, but also to film the attack (Warrick). 
Separately, in Winning the War on War (2011), Joshua Goldstein argues that small, asymmetric wars will 
be the most common wars of the future (6). So, while this chapter may seem limited in scope and 
application, it may well be the most forward-looking of the three. The way the world – not just the US – 
wages war is changing; our understanding of war as a “human endeavor” ought to be changing too. 
Based on Dave Grossman’s method of thinking about killing, drone warfare should be the least 
traumatic and least difficult form of killing for the soldier. Because 168 people are required to operate a 
single drone in the air and the killing happens at great distance, no one person should feel individually 
responsible (Gusterson 30). The military’s reaction to the introduction of an award for drone operators 
certainly echoes this line of thinking. I have argued in previous chapters and continue to argue in this 
chapter that neither of Grossman’s claims about distance and group absolution is actually true. This is in 
part due to technology, but more importantly reflects the fact that perceived risk and the soldier’s mental 
narrative regarding his or her humanity and the humanity of the enemy are far more influential than 
physical proximity in the experience of killing in combat. Yet, because we have wrongly correlated 
physical proximity and the psychological trauma and/or moral injury associated with killing, drone 
                                                          
35 Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley testified to the Senate Armed Forces Committee early 2016 that “I do 
see a very, very significant increase in the use of robotics, both manually controlled and autonomous, in ground 
warfare over the coming years” (Association of the United States Army). 
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operators must contend against years of entrenched attitudes to validate their experiences and emotions to 
themselves and others.  
As discussed on page 13, Paul Virilio argues for a different conception of distance. For him, 
military technology has “obliterated distance” in war in deference to “instantaneous time” (Vision 
Machine 4). In this chapter, drone pilots in Nevada enter doors marked “you are now leaving the United 
States” to fly drones thousands of miles away, reinforcing this loss of “real space.” Yet the drone feeds 
are only near-instantaneous; their two-second lag hinders their effectiveness, reiterating Virilio’s 
emphasis on the importance of instantaneous time over physical location. As also discussed, for Virilio, 
“the image prevails over the object” (Vision Machine 73). In this chapter, the drone pilots’ “square 
horizons” present such images, yet the pilots choose whether or not to “see” the object behind the image. 
This complicates Virilio, demonstrating that a human’s moral judgement is not instantaneous and that 
while machines may not “see” the “object” behind the “image,” humans certainly still might. In light of 
this, one might critique Virilio by stating that he may accurately describe the radical new realities of 
technologically advanced war, but he underestimates the persisting realities of the “human dimension” of 
war. 
Hugh Gusterson offers a more nuanced explanation of military technology’s effect on distance, 
space and the human than Virilio’s term “obliterated.” He argues that technology has “scrambled” and 
“respatialized” war because “drones have disarticulated the spatial relationship between weapon and 
warrior,” allowing the soldier to “be at home” and yet “at war” (48, 45). While pilots watch a suspected 
enemy from 8,000 miles away, Gusterson notes that many experience a sense of proximity with the 
human other, an effect he terms “remote intimacy” (72). This results from “remote narrativization” in 
which the observers make “interpretive leaps, fill in informational gaps” in order to help “make sense of 
the people they watch” (66). Gusterson notes that the “remote intimacy of drone operations plays havoc 
with Grossman’s model” by taking “the straight line in Grossman’s graph and twisting it into a Mobius 
strip where beginning and end, although still separate, cross” (72). According to Gusterson, when drone 
pilots kill, it can be “more psychologically proximate than that of other soldiers, who are physically closer 
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to the enemy” (73). In this chapter, Gusterson’s terms “scrambled” and “respatialized” more accurately 
describe the effect of technology on distance and space as it relates to humans than does Virilio’s 
“obliterated.” Since the American soldiers are invulnerable to reciprocal violence, one might also argue 
that the experience of distance is as “asymmetric” as the type of war being waged: drone pilots may 
experience a “remote intimacy” but this is always a one-sided emotional proximity.  
In this chapter, how the drone-operating soldier conceives of him/herself and the “enemy” is 
greatly influenced by representative language and the narratives created both before and after a killing 
event; both greatly influence the soldier’s experience of and recovery from the trauma of war. The 
importance of narratives is only amplified by the lack of risk to the remote soldier, because the soldier 
does not act reflexively to a direct threat, but rather intentionally to an indirect threat. The soldier has time 
to think. In this chapter I again argue that upholding one’s own humanity and respecting the humanity of 
the enemy is – while difficult – the goal towards which soldiers and leaders must aspire, while relying on 
training and discipline to equip themselves to kill when necessary. In other words, it is possible to 
maintain one’s individuality while also subordinating one’s individual action to military requirements. 
Both before and after killing, soldiers must communicate constructively – that is they must build a 
narrative with which they can be at peace.36 This chapter reveals how difficult building such a narrative 
can be when the soldier does not perceive risk to him/herself or immediate risk to others. 
This chapter examines several killing events in film while also relying on a biography of a former 
drone pilot, Matt Martin, to link the films to a combat veteran’s experiences. This chapter builds on the 
previous two in that it will ask how the experiences differ and why. I propose that the experiences 
principally differ because of risk perceived by the soldier, but this study also reveals that one of the 
greatest differences is that “combat” for these soldiers enters into their “home” in a very new way. 
Whereas Elizabeth Samet describes soldiers returned to America for good or in-between deployments as 
                                                          
36 On the importance of narrative or simply being able to share one’s experience in recovering from traumatic events 
and moral injury see Edward Tick’s Warrior’s Return and Jonathan Shay’s Achilles in Vietnam and Robert Jay 
Lifton’s Home From the War. 
  
76 
 
in a “no man’s land” psychologically, the soldiers in this chapter literally drive home from war every day 
(No Man’s Land 36-9). Thus their attempts to make sense of their combat experiences are complicated by 
the confrontation of “normal” life at “home” clashing with “combat” in a daily intersection of seemingly 
incompatible worlds separated only by a drive to work. I will begin with Good Kill, a 2014 film by 
Andrew Niccol starring Ethan Hawke. After that, I will examine Eye in the Sky, a 2016 film starring 
Helen Mirrin. Both present the issue of remote killing, but do so very differently. I argue that Eye in the 
Sky exemplifies the right way for the reflective soldier to think about taking life: concern for the life of 
the other, wrestling with the ethics and morality of one’s action and inaction, concern for the greater good 
of humanity and the accomplishment of military objectives, and sadness at the loss of life. 
In Good Kill, Hawke plays the character of Air Force Major Tom Egan, who, after six combat 
tours as a jet pilot, now flies RPAs out of Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. Throughout the film Egan and 
his crew observe a little boy and a female housekeeper while waiting for a “high value target” (HVT) to 
show up at the compound. Over the course of the observation, they develop an intimacy with the two: 
noting that the boy improves at soccer and watching in horror as the woman is repeatedly raped by an 
armed intruder. The first killing event is the opening scene of the movie, in which Egan conducts a 
daytime attack against six armed men in Pakistan. The second event is a night-time attack mediated 
through the infrared drone camera: Egan engages a moving truck with a heavy machine gun in the back 
along with armed men. The third killing event presents two children running into the frame after Egan has 
fired his missiles at an improvised explosive device factory and its armed guards in Afghanistan. These 
three instances demonstrate that Egan’s ability to “make sense of what he is doing” is predicated on his 
ability to construct a narrative which justifies the killing. Not being exposed to risk complicates this 
effort; he even says he feels like a “coward.” In several of the ensuing killing events, he is ordered to kill 
what appear to him to be civilians along with the HVTs. Finally, he refuses. Demoted, he takes justice 
into his own hands and kills the rapist. In this interesting twist, Egan does what he believes is ethically 
right, even though it is clearly a war crime. 
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Good Kill begins with an establishing shot from an overhead camera angle of a Pakistani village. 
Moments later, however, the shot cuts to Nevada, thus introducing the central tension of the film: the 
problem of establishing where Major Tom Egan (Hawke) is psychologically will be represented by the 
repeated straight cuts from an overhead camera angle shot in Afghanistan or Pakistan to an eye-level, 
close-up shot of Egan in Nevada. The film employs similar montage techniques throughout to collapse 
time, space and distance. Overlaid on the overhead image of the arid, dusty village is a replication of a 
drone camera’s feed as seen by a drone pilot: cross hairs in the center of the frame, GPS coordinates in 
the bottom-right of the frame, and flight data in the top right and left of the frame. Egan flies the drone 
from inside a Ground Control Station (GCS) – or a small metal container designed to control RPAs. Egan 
is only a foot and a half away from the same image the viewers see, only it is presented to him by his 
computer screen. He is directed to fly to another target; the camera cuts back to the overhead angle 
presenting Pakistan, which is also Egan’s screen, as the frame again duplicates a drone’s feed to its pilot.  
This first killing event is presented as the emotionally detached experience many associate with 
drone warfare. The crosshairs center on a group of six armed men, standing in a dirt street. In a 
monotonous voice Egan states “eyes on the objective” (0:02:20). The men appear to be armed with rocket 
propelled grenades and AK-47s. Egan is ordered by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Johns to engage. Egan scans 
the street, evidently checking to be sure no civilians are on their way to the group of armed men. A bus in 
fact is, but it is “one klik” away (0:02:30). Egan again mechanically remarks “I can get it” (0:02:35). 
Suspense builds as Egan methodically “lines up” the shot – the camera shot viewed by the audience and 
the Hellfire shot by Egan are one and the same. The no-longer-visible bus is still approaching. Seconds 
tick by. The camera shot focusses on the technical aspects of launching the missile: the checks, the 
switches, the toggles – the human soldiers appear as mechanical extensions of the distributed drone 
network. Finally Egan fires, saying “Rifle, rifle, rifle. Missile away. Time of flight: ten seconds” 
(0:02:56). Film time and narrative time converge – ten tense seconds tick by before an orange burst fills 
the frame (and thus also Egan’s screen), consumed almost immediately by a grey then brown dust cloud 
which “browns out” the screen just as the bus enters the frame. Moments later the dust dissipates and 
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Egan, again without emotion, states “good kill” (0:03:25). Egan’s facial expression does not change, nor 
does the tone of his voice. The film demands viewers recognize that Egan is droning as much as he is 
piloting a drone.37 
The shot cuts back and forth between the overhead angle of burning bodies and the eye-level 
close-up of the inside of the GCS, suggesting that the effects of the drone attack and those who conduct it 
are inextricably linked. Still, Egan’s face is expressionless. The attack is in daylight, so the drone feed 
presents the burning bodies in full color, yet the experience is only visual: there is no sound, smell, taste, 
or feeling. The on-screen experience for the viewer and the drone pilot is in effect the same, only the 
viewer is privileged in that he or she also observes the pilot. The viewer is asked to reflect on the pilot’s 
experience, but in this instance, the film itself does not portray the pilot doing so. Watching the burning 
bodies, Lieutenant Colonel Johns quips “they don’t call it a Hellfire for nothing” (0:03:40). He orders a 
damage assessment and the airmen count the burning bodies: six. Within a minute, Egan’s shift is over 
and he steps out into the Nevada desert. Another pilot flies the still airborne drone. On Egan’s way home, 
he stops by the gas station to buy charcoal and milk. Responding to the cashier’s question if he has ever 
flown in war, Egan cavalierly says: “blew away six Taliban in Pakistan today. Now I’m going home to 
barbeque” (0:05:37). Egan appears to feel nothing, to be as robotic as the machine he flies. 
The second killing event occurs at night in Afghanistan. Egan and his new sensor operator, Vera 
Suarez (Zoe Kravitz), follow a moving truck with at least five armed men and a large caliber machine gun 
mounted in the back.38 In the black and white infrared image, the truck appears chalky, the road beneath it 
is a slightly different shade of black than the ground, the armed men appear as off-white, ghostly forms, 
and their weapons appear as only slightly greyer than the metal bed of the truck.39 The Hellfire shot is 
difficult because the drone feed actually lags “real time” by a little over two seconds – requiring Egan and 
Suarez to fire two seconds in advance of the image in order to hit the actual object. Because of this 
                                                          
37 To “read” Egan this way, viewers must interpret Egan’s face. 
38 Martin recounts following a similar “technical” in Iraq in his book Predator (42). 
39 Infrared cameras detect radiation in the infrared light spectrum and reproduce that in a digital form to make the 
“image” visible to the human eye. These images often appear as outlines of objects, as infrared stresses distinction.  
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latency, instantaneous time does not occur, and they must see beyond the image to understand where the 
moving object really is. Without instantaneous time, geospatial location returns to the foreground, and 
Egan directs Suarez to aim in front of the image of the moving truck. Writing about a similar Hellfire 
engagement, Martin explains that he thought only about “the shot and its technical aspects. Right range, 
right speed, locked in. The man wasn’t really a human being. He was so far away and only a high-tech 
image on a computer screen” (44). The same thing occurs here, as the technical demands of “getting the 
shot right” overwhelm any image of the human forms in the frame; the viewer’s eyes are drawn to the 
moving truck and the cross hairs leading it, not the non-individuated white forms of humans.40 The 
missile strikes on target; the screen “whites out” because of the infrared light created by the explosion; 
Suarez remarks “good splash.”41 Again, the film displays Egan – and Suarez – as devoid of emotion. 
Here Egan has destroyed a vehicle with humans in it, but the experience is mediated by the black 
and white infrared image which presents “silhouettes” or “forms” or, as I characterized them, “ghosts” 
rather than “humans.” Additionally, he may conceive of firing at the truck, not even the individuals – it is 
a ballistic problem rather than an ethical one. This is a very different event than the opening, full-color 
scene which displayed very detailed human bodies burning. Of course, the infrared-mediated forms still 
“burn,” but the image of them burning is not visceral, but blurred, as the emitted infrared light of the fire 
appears to be radiating out of the forms, rather than fire consuming them. There are no flames, only 
different amounts of infrared light: the bodies glow a brighter white on screen than before. Lieutenant 
Colonel Johns declares “TARFU” which he explains to Suarez means “totally and royally fucked up. I 
believe those gentlemen qualify” (0:14:55). This second engagement is reminiscent of both Suba’s 
experience through the night vision goggles and Waguih watching the “heat signature dying” through 
thermal imagery in that advanced optics technologies mediate all three experiences (Klay 187). However, 
contrary to Waguih’s experience of watching heat dissipate, when killing with a Hellfire, to kill is not 
                                                          
40 Here, viewers are also invited, or tempted, to make abstract the act of killing by conceiving of it as a technical 
problem, not a moral one. 
41 “Splash” is a military term for an observed impact from an indirectly fired munition. 
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simply to take away the body’s heat, but rather to first apply a large amount of additional heat to it, 
although through the infrared medium this is manifested through the appearance or application of 
additional infrared light. The missile’s explosive light and the body’s reflection of ambient light conjoin 
into one light, and this new infrared light eventually dissipates, obscuring any clear moment of death. 
Nonetheless, Johns still calls the enemy “gentlemen”: he understands the images to be human even as 
they do not fully appear to be. 
In both of these instances, however, neither the viewer nor Egan views the face of the killed. Here 
it is important to remember Emmanuel Levinas’ insistence that ethics originate in the encounter with the 
other’s face. For Levinas, that encounter compels the “taking upon oneself of the fate of the other. That is 
the ‘vision’ of the Face” (Entre Nos 103). This vision of the face of the other reveals the commandment 
“Thou shalt not kill” (Entre Nos 104). In Good Kill, the overhead camera angle offers glimpses of the face 
– but in these first two engagements certainly not an encounter with it, not a Levinasian vision of it. This 
occlusion of the human face renders the enemy less personalized even though their individual forms are 
presented. In the opening scene, each enemy is presented in distinctly colored clothing, carrying distinct 
weapons. Yet the camera shot does not offer distinct faces. Likewise, in the truck engagement, the 
infrared black and white picture blurs the image of the human, certainly making opaque the faces, 
presenting them as off-white spaces. Without a presented face, Egan must fill in the blanks to create a 
narrative about who they were. In these instances, that, evidently, was not so difficult. 
Interestingly, the film withholds from the plot any backstory on these two drone strikes. The 
attacks just occur. This is true of eight out of the film’s eleven drone strikes. The film presents only 
drone-mediated violence, which hinders the viewer’s ability to process the events. Likewise, the 
characters also are presented as mostly uninformed about their “targets.” Why these particular “enemies” 
are killed is never divulged. Thus, viewers must conduct the same “narrativization” that Gusterson assigns 
to drone pilots – the images in both of these scenes appear to be armed, so they also appear to be “enemy” 
and therefore are likely legitimate military targets. Yet for a viewer to conclude that the images in the 
frame include weapons and therefore the men are “bad” likewise demands an “interpretive leap” which 
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may or may not be true.42 I have argued that these “interpretive leaps” occur at all levels of warfare, from 
the “frontline” soldier, to the soldier in an operations center, to the drone pilot on the technological 
“frontlines,” and now especially even to the viewers of war films who must act as those very same 
soldiers by “filling in informational gaps” (Gusterson 66). The viewer can deduce that these armed men 
mean to harm others, and therefore it is for the greater good or militarily necessary to kill them – but as 
viewers we really have no way of knowing. To propose that “narrativization” is unique to drone pilots is 
simply misleading: in war and life we make similar assumptions all the time. 
Since “narrativization” is not unique to drone warfare, it is worth examining how these two 
killing events compare to those of previous chapters to see what is unique, if anything, to this new mode 
of waging war. Upon examination, several differences can be noted. Having discussed the similarities 
between the portrayals of advanced optic technology’s influence on Klay’s characters Suba and Waguih, 
one should also account for a primary difference in that, for Egan, this is a purely visual experience – 
whereas Suba hears his machine gun fire, smells the gunpowder, feels the concussion in the air, even 
tastes the gunpowder, Egan only sees the images. That full-embodied experiences certainly differ from an 
on-screen experience is evident, but it is unclear to what effect. Passive dehumanization via an obscured 
or elided humanity of the enemy appears to work the same in all three examples. Yet another difference is 
that Egan is presented with the results of his actions. In fact, he must conduct the “battle damage 
assessment” which is to examine and count the dead; here one should remember Suba and the crew of 
Gun Six speculating about the results of their actions because none see the dead bodies. Because Egan 
lingers safely “overhead,” he knows for certain the results of his actions. In this sense, Egan is more 
psychologically proximate to his victims than both Gun Six and Suba, although less proximate than 
Timhead, who kills the young boy in front of the even younger girl. However, Egan insists that he alone 
is the one who kills, despite Johns’ insistence that “we all pull the trigger” (0:30:02). Johns’ argument 
                                                          
42 David Finkel in The Good Soldiers describes at length an AH-64 engagement in which the pilots are convinced 
they see a group of armed men, but at least two of the people they kill turned out to be reporters with video cameras. 
Notably, they viewed and engaged the enemy through infrared screens as well – “narrativization” is not unique to 
drone pilots (113). 
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echoes Sergeant Deetz’s argument to Gun Six – that, as a crew, they all killed. Egan, just as Voorstadt 
and the narrator of “Ten Kliks South” do, rejects this construct. Again, individuation within the crew 
prevents group absolution or diffusion of responsibility. Nonetheless, for Egan, the experience is purely 
visual with no sensation of risk, little to no sense of comradery, and yet he is compelled to view the 
results of his actions. In these examples, drone warfare seems a distinct experience. 
Yet how do these two drone strikes compare to the operations center, where killing is likewise a 
purely visual, on-screen experience enacted by networked and not co-located individuals? Again, Egan 
perceives no risk to self, so, as the film progresses, he becomes more self-reflective rather than less, as 
David Finkel portrays Major Cummings becoming in The Good Soldiers. Secondly, importantly, as I have 
argued that soldiers fight (and kill) for the men and women next to them, Egan is largely denied this 
community by his isolation within the GCS with only the two or three others who are likewise not in 
danger.43 In general, there are more soldiers in an operations center and at the very least there is some 
element of mutual risk. Egan does not experience any risk. He in fact says “I feel like a coward everyday” 
(0:48:30), which is to say that he does not feel like he is killing in order to protect, or “for,” the soldiers 
next to him. In this representation of himself, Egan is a lesser form of human, rather than a fully 
honorable, brave human. Conversely, when Egan does support American soldiers in Afghanistan, even 
though it is only to provide security for them as they sleep, he returns home to tell his wife, almost 
excitedly, “I did something good today” (1:00:02).44 If only for a moment, his warrior identity as 
protector is restored to him. One can infer from this that, on the other days, he does not feel he is doing 
“good,” which is to say he does not feel like a warrior or honorable soldier. The difference then between 
Egan and the operations center is that Egan feels isolated and must confront his feeling of cowardliness.  
Military officers need to be aware of the potential psychological hazards inherent to this 
decentralized form of warfare; one of the main coping mechanisms in war, the team or “unit,” has been 
                                                          
43 Sebastian Junger explains the importance of this community in Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging (2016). 
44 In What It Is Like To Go To War (2011) Karl Marlantes writes that the basic psychology of a warrior is to “feel 
oneself to be the protector of lives in one’s relevant unit” (150). 
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physically broken apart and scattered across the globe, isolating the soldier physically and 
psychologically. Sebastian Junger explores military communities at war in his 2016 book Tribe: On 
Homecoming and Belonging. In it he explains that unit cohesion and communal sleeping at war has been 
clinically correlated to lower rates of psychiatric breakdowns (84, 95). He concludes that soldiers 
“experience this tribal way of thinking at war, but when they come home they realize that the tribe they 
were actually fighting for wasn’t their country, it was their unit” (110). Yet, he also warns that “whatever 
the technological advances of modern society—and they’re nearly miraculous—the individualized 
lifestyles that those technologies spawn seem to be deeply brutalizing to the human spirit” and often lead 
to alienation and higher rates of PTSD (93). These warnings should be ever present in the leaders of units 
conducting the kind of killing that Egan does in Good Kill.45 How to build unit cohesion, trust, and 
camaraderie in a spatially dispersed, virtually connected unit is more than just a unit performance issue, it 
is a personnel health issue as well. 
In the construct of the film, another problem facing Egan is a failure of language. Hawke explains 
that the “ethics behind killing for your country change a little bit when you’re not in danger. I think that’s 
the major ethical conundrum for [Egan …], and he doesn’t have a vocabulary or an understanding to 
make sense out of it” (Extra Scene, 0:04:50). In his in-brief to new recruits, Johns notes how the language 
used to represent drone warfare fails to accurately describe it: “we like to dress it up in fancy language. 
Prosecuting a target. Surgical strike. Neutralizing the threat. Make no fucking mistake about it. We are 
killing people” (0:10:40). Johns attempts to confront this vocabulary deficit in his new recruits by 
admonishing them that “this ain’t Playstation” even as he acknowledges “war is now a first-person 
shooter” (0:10:44). Ironically, emblematic of the limitations of language to conceive of and represent 
drone warfare, rather than “dressing it up in fancy language,” Johns can only employ video game terms to 
insist that drone warfare is not like a video game. He reintroduces the problem he is trying to avert by 
linguistically representing drone warfare as a “first-person shooter.” Even so, he demands that his young 
                                                          
45 It is also a political and social issue as well, as the soldiers involved are citizens at the same time as they are “at 
war.” 
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recruits understand the human cost of what they do: “you pull the trigger here, it’s fucking for real. Ain’t 
a bunch of pixels you’re blowing up; it’s flesh and fucking blood” (10:50).46 Johns pushes back on 
Virilio’s claim that image prevails over the object – it ain’t pixels which are blown up, but “flesh and 
blood.” Even so, he perpetuates the failure of language to represent this new warfare by introducing a 
narrative which can only represent drone killing by contrasting it with video games. Evidently, he has no 
other way to conceive of it. No wonder soldiers engaged in this type of warfare have trouble making 
sense of their actions, and no wonder they are thought of as being emotionally detached.  
Having introduced drone killing as this stereotypically emotionally detached, technologically 
mediated act after which one can simply “go barbecue” – seamlessly transitioning from burning bodies to 
burning charcoal and searing meat – the remainder of the film problematizes the “good kill” through other 
killing events, which increasingly become “less good” with shorter and more problematic transitions. The 
video game fun becomes a horror film. The film’s third killing event is framed much the same as the first: 
an overhead, daytime color shot of an arid village – perhaps Pakistan, maybe Afghanistan, the viewers are 
not oriented; “real space” is lost in the virtual world of the first-person shooter. Egan lines up a Hellfire 
shot against two armed guards sitting outside a garage inside of which is an IED factory (0:26:00). The 
dirt street is otherwise empty. Egan’s digital link to the drone is disrupted; he reestablishes the 
connection, examines the two guards and compound again and fires (0:26:55). Almost instantly, two boys 
enter the left of the frame, rolling a bicycle tire towards the garage. Egan, Suarez, and Johns watch in 
horror, their faces paralyzed. Johns asks for the “time of flight” and Egan responds “seven seconds.” 
Again, narrative time and film time converge. Johns exhorts the boys to hurry: “run, you little shits” 
(0:26:59), but there is nothing to do – after seven seconds the frame is consumed by the full-color 
explosion, just as in the first drone strike. Vera Suarez searches desperately for the boys as the dust 
dissipates, and eventually the drone’s crosshairs linger on their bodies. A nearly identical scene appears in 
Martin’s memoir, only instead of a tire, it is an actual bicycle, and after the dust clears a wheel is still 
                                                          
46 Matt Martin recounts a nearly identical speech given to his class of new recruits in his memoir Predator: The 
Remote-Control Air War Over Iraq and Afghanistan: A Pilot’s Story (18). 
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spinning while the “bodies of the two little boys lay bent and broken among the bodies of the insurgents” 
(212). In another instance, Martin engages an insurgent who had fired several rockets at soldiers and 
civilians, yet at the last moment an elderly man enters the blast area in much the same way. Of that event, 
Martin notes “Rocket Man had it coming. The old man did not” (54).  
Interestingly, both the film and Martin’s memoir indicate that an essential part of justifying 
remote killing is a belief that the other “deserved” to die – the boys do not, neither does the old man, thus 
their deaths are harder to process, harder to conceive of as for the greater good or militarily necessary. I 
have called this the influence of narrative on the soldier. Egan struggles to create a narrative in which it is 
acceptable for the boys to die and for him to kill without “skin in the game.” Which of the two is more 
influential is impossible to tell, but, increasingly, the film portrays him as “miles away.” Johns insists that 
Egan is a uniquely good pilot because “everyone else is trying to act like they’re in a plane in 
Afghanistan. Egan fucking is in a plane in Afghanistan” (0:12:53).47 Those words turn out to be too true – 
when Egan bodily exits the GCS and symbolically returns to America, he does not entirely emerge from 
the container. The drone is an extension of Egan (or Egan of the drone), and although Egan bodily returns 
“home,” an essential part of “Tom Egan” does not. His mind, his soul (here I am referencing Tick’s 
“soul” as a center of identity), he is elsewhere. The effect is the opposite movement of Brian Turner’s 
speaker, who is “transported” from Iraq to the United States by viewing a beautiful woman through his 
lens: Egan is transported from Nevada to Afghanistan via the drone’s lens and the violence he inflicts 
through it. Although physically home, he is not at home. Without the risk, without physically being in the 
plane, Egan struggles to make sense of what he is doing. Contrary to Johns’ assertion, Egan bemoans that 
“I am a pilot and I’m not flying. I don’t know what it is that I am doing, but it’s not flying” (0:24:45). 
This is specifically a narrative breakdown: Egan cannot describe what he is doing. He knows he is killing 
people, but he is not “in combat” which is his main problem; he imagines himself “in the plane” and 
“over there” to cope with this, and yet he is not. His identity is fractured. 
                                                          
47 Likewise, Matt Martin writes that “I was already starting to refer to the Predator and myself as ‘I,’ even though 
the airplane was thousands of miles away” (34). 
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This crisis of identity leads to a dissolution of distinction between home and combat for Egan. On 
multiple occasions, his wife, Molly, comments that he “looks miles away” as his body begins to reflect 
his mind and/or soul. Combat has extended into Nevada. This is Gusterson’s “respatialized” war in which 
there are no clear boundaries (45). The film, too, mimics this respatialization through visual 
representation – slowly raising the camera angle and increasing the camera distance from Egan’s Las 
Vegas neighborhood from one scene to the next until his home is presented through the same extreme 
long, overhead shot as the Afghan villages are – the arid Nevada desert and dusty Afghanistan are at 
times indistinguishable and the comparison certainly unmistakable (1:03:05). In the final scene of Egan in 
his house, Egan stares into a shattered mirror, his own face is doubled and broken, like the bodies of his 
targets and his own fractured identity (1:30:20). Egan is either both “over there” and at “home” at once, or 
nowhere, lost. Either way, his identity is in crisis; it has shattered – a moral injury or “soul wound” which 
Edward Tick directly links to post-traumatic stress disorder (152). Said differently, Egan is betraying 
what he believes to be “what’s right,” which for Jonathan Shay often leads to soldiers “going berserk” 
which is more commonly referred to as a psychiatric breakdown (84). 
Whereas in both of the first two killing events Egan is portrayed as not feeling, as being numb, 
clearly the death of the two boys weighs on Egan.48 Even before their deaths, it becomes evident that 
Egan, contrary to “being numb,” is actually suppressing feelings, in large part through alcohol, but also by 
refusing to speak about or acknowledge them. Despite his wife prodding him to share his experiences 
with her, he refuses: “I don’t want to rehash it” (0:23:45). Even if he did want to “rehash” it, the film 
insists that he does not have a vocabulary to do so. Johns likewise tries to ensure that Egan is 
psychologically well, which Egan brushes aside with bravado (0:29:44). Instead, Egan delays addressing 
his feelings until he is beyond the “breaking point” or Shay’s moment of “going berserk.” Once again 
attempting to be a mechanically numb, emotionless being who refuses to acknowledge, reflect on and talk 
                                                          
48 Importantly, Egan and his wife have two young children of their own. 
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about one’s experiences ultimately only delays the consequences of moral injury to a later time, setting 
the table for a much more dramatic confrontation. 
As the film continues, the pace of drone strikes increases, and thus challenges the viewer to finish 
processing one strike before another occurs. This mimics the soldier’s experience of war. In a montage of 
unexplained violence, the film transitions from one killing event to the next. As a result, the violence 
appears senseless. Of course, at home viewers can pause the film and reflect on it, but soldiers cannot 
pause war, regardless of whether or not they have the vocabulary to make sense of it. Good Kill thus 
reveals that humans cannot always form a moral judgement instantaneously, or even as quickly as events 
unfold – “real time” outpaces moral reflection. When dealing with technology and war, instantaneous 
time may be desirable, but the human soldiers and viewers require much longer to process events and 
actions. While the body’s temporality can be adjusted to technology’s temporality via training, Good Kill 
argues that the “soul’s” temporality is not as adjustable. This divergence between technology’s capability 
to inflict nearly instantaneous death over and over again and the human’s much longer intellectual and 
emotional processing requirements only widens as the film progresses, suggesting that our logistical and 
technological capacity to wage war now exceeds our ability to process it. 
After several drone strikes in which Egan is required knowingly to kill what appear to be civilians 
in addition to “the target,” Egan refuses and sabotages a mission. Demoted, he enacts his own justice, 
using a drone to assassinate the rapist on the latter’s way into the compound, presumably to rape the 
housekeeper again. In this killing event, Egan sends his crew out of the GCS and locks the door from the 
inside. As he operates alone, military police appear at the door, cueing the viewer that he is no longer 
acting legally. In this extraordinary twist, even though viewers may cheer the result, Egan’s ethics have 
become totally twisted – he exacts vigilante-style justice as he sees fit, but he does so illegally and against 
the laws of war. The act is clearly a war crime. Even so, the film presents this act as morally acceptable; 
Egan is presented as finally sober, level-headed, self-aware, no longer emotionless, and finally no longer 
just an extension of his machine. He, at last, exerts his own moral agency and “takes a stand.” He does not 
fit Shay’s “berserk” category perfectly, though one could easily read his actions that way. After choosing 
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not to kill the perhaps morally innocent, Egan chooses instead to kill the still legally innocent rapist, 
turning himself into the compromised instrument of justice he sought not to be in the first place. Egan, 
like Bartle and Sergeant Sterling in Yellow Birds, commits this war crime because his moral compass has 
been so distraught and challenged that he believes this last action to be the “right thing to do.” The viewer 
is drawn into this paradox in that this final killing event is gratifying; the viewer likely celebrates this act 
even if it is illegal. Ironically, in this twist, drone warfare is ethically or morally problematic not because 
it is too impersonal, but rather because it is emphatically too personal.  
The issue of knowingly killing an innocent person in addition to the guilty potentially in order to 
save more lives is also explored by Eye in the Sky (2016), only Eye in the Sky is more concerned with 
presenting both sides of the ethical dilemma than is Good Kill. Eye in the Sky constantly probes how and 
when one can kill – all while holding up an image of the soldier, the enemy, and the civilian as human. 
The film portrays the reflective soldier’s dilemma: to kill requires dealing with the terrible consequences 
of one’s actions, yet not to kill also may require dealing with the terrible consequences of one’s inaction. 
One can never know beforehand which might be worse. In the film, British Colonel Katherine Powell 
(Helen Mirrin) and Lieutenant General Frank Benson (Alan Rickman) attempt to coordinate from 
separate locations in England the capture of a female British citizen, Susan Danford, and her husband – 
both senior leaders in the terrorist group al Shabab – in Nairobi, Kenya in part by using an American 
drone crew operating out of Creech Air Force Base, Nevada and imagery analysts in Pearl Harbor, 
Hawaii. Where the drone is launched from is not disclosed. This is certainly a “respatialized” war.  
Contrary to Good Kill, which disorients the viewer by not locating or explaining scenes of 
violence, Eye in the Sky is very concerned with precisely locating each element of the distributed war 
network, precisely identifying the “targets,” and explaining why they are “enemies.” Eye in the Sky goes 
to great lengths to ensure that the characters and viewer understand all the stakes – that both have as 
complete a narrative as possible from which to make sense of and judge the actions which unfold. This 
distinction is important, especially for military leaders and for my argument that narrative is essential to 
processing killing in war. The violence in Good Kill appears senseless in part because the film makes no 
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effort to explain it. Whether or not one agrees with the decision to kill in Eye in the Sky, the viewer and 
characters are at least equipped to make sense of why it occurs. Military leaders must make the same 
effort to equip their subordinates to make sense of the violence of war; it is an integral part of the soldier’s 
individual narrative. Leaders must endeavor to explain not only what the unit’s mission is but also why it 
is the mission. Yet, to stop there is simply not enough. Leaders also should convey, to the best of their 
knowledge, why the enemy is fighting. Without this narrative, soldiers are presented with only violence 
and threat of violence, which is disorienting, as Good Kill demonstrates. Notably, in Eye in the Sky, this 
narrative is constructed before the violence begins and continues through and after the killing event. The 
same should be true for military war narratives: the more accurate, objective and holistic the information 
before, during and after war, the better one can make sense of it. 
In establishing why she is targeting the two individuals, Powell demonstrates that the personal 
nature of asymmetric war at times complicates Levinas’ argument that the face reveals the commandment 
“thou shall not kill.” Powell supplies close-up photographs of the two individuals and demands that her 
team establish “positive identification” (PID) before they act (0:09:20). The imagery analyst in Pearl 
Harbor “calculates” PID by using facial recognition software. Yet, as with Good Kill, such facial 
recognition is difficult from the overhead shot, so Powell employs Kenyan Special Forces equipped with 
two micro-drones: tiny RPAs built to look like a bird and a beetle.49 A Kenyan Special Forces operative 
flies the “beetle” inside the house in order to identify the people by their faces. Here we see an astounding 
twist in Levinas’ ethics of the face, one common to special operations, asymmetric war and 
counterinsurgency in which particular persons are “targeted”: the face condemns its owner rather than 
commands its observer not to kill. This totally inverts the meaning of “taking upon oneself of the fate of 
the other” (Entre Nos, 103). The Levinasian response to this claim would be that this is not the type of 
face-to-face encounter that Levinas envisions – if it was, then one could not kill. Yet I would contend that 
in a technology-mediated world such face-to-face encounters are under ethical pressure by the 
                                                          
49 While this may seem like science fiction, the US Army intends to field similar micro-drones down to the squad 
level (Jahner). Some of these drones may even be chemically “grown” in labs (Rogers). 
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“obliteration” or “respatialization” of distance, and one can hardly arbitrate between “authentic” 
encounters and “inauthentic” ones on the basis of proximity. Thus, if Brian Turner’s speakers encounter 
the face of the other in his poems, and Timhead encounters the face of the girl in “After Action Report,” 
then one should consider this remote encounter as a recognition of the other as well. The targets in Eye in 
the Sky are totally differentiated, known individuals with identifiable faces – and yet the recognition of 
those faces compels the soldiers to take life rather than preserve it. That soldiers are able to do this leads 
me to conclude that symbolic language is not, as Levinas suggests, secondary to the recognition or 
comprehension of the face, but rather at least simultaneously as important. That is, ethics is not pre-
symbolic but (post)symbolic in that “the face” must be interpreted. In the film, the narrative Powell relays 
is sufficiently convincing that the “targets” deserve to die that this linguistic representation of the two 
individuals is or becomes more influential than the “command” of their faces.50 
When Benson’s team is able to identify the targets’ faces through the remotely-operated “beetle,” 
they also see that the terrorists are arming two suicide bombers with suicide vests. Powell immediately 
lobbies Benson to authorize her to kill them with Hellfires before the suicide bombers can attack. This is a 
“change of mission” from capture to kill. After Benson debates with several members of the British 
government, approval is given, although not without disagreement from Angela, a Cabinet member. By 
this time, however, a nine-year-old girl, Alia, has sat down outside the compound, selling bread. She is 
within the collateral damage estimate, meaning she will likely die. Steve Watts, the American pilot in 
Nevada, asks for clarification on the legality of the strike; he questions the morality of risking the life of 
one to save the life of many. 
Powell and Benson argue that lethal force can still be used since it is for the greater good; they 
are willing to risk the life of one perhaps in order to save many more. Steve is reluctant to do so. The 
                                                          
50 Although this twist of Levinas’ theory did not show up in the texts I examined in the earlier chapters, I would note 
that, in my experience (which would fall into those chapters), it was always easier to kill an individual who we knew 
had killed Americans or our allies than a totally unknown individual. Knowing the terrible things the individual had 
done to others helped me make sense of things – it helped complete the narrative process or “de-ethicize” the “face.” 
Matt Martin similarly explains he “found it easier” when he knew the things that a certain member of al Qaeda had 
done (72). 
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viewer is actually privileged in Eye in the Sky in a way Good Kill does not allow: Eye in the Sky includes 
on-the-ground scenes in Nairobi, not just drone-like overhead footage. The viewer sees the suicide 
bombers donning their vests and yet also knows that Alia’s father (not an insurgent) is teaching her to 
read and allowing her to play without her hijab despite al Shabab’s restrictions on both for girls. It is 
impossible not to encounter her humanity. Even without this information, Watts and his sensor operator, 
Carrie, clearly likewise uphold Alia’s humanity and attempt to preserve her life. Doing so is a gamble, 
however; the bombers could feasibly depart and the opportunity to prevent a mass killing could at any 
moment be missed. Once again the cost of action and inaction confront the soldier; the moral dilemma 
cuts both ways.  
Importantly, within Virilio’s framework, this debate would never occur. The networked coalition 
positively identifies the enemy using the exact kind of software Virilio anticipates. They have the capacity 
to fire quickly, not instantly, but certainly within seconds. Yet they do not. They debate; they question the 
morality of their actions. Here we see that not only has technology’s capability to wage continuous and 
instantaneous war outpaced humans’ ability to process those events, but also that technological advances 
now allow action at a much quicker rate than human capability for moral judgment before an event as 
well. In this case the humans (thankfully, one might note) override the technological imperative and slow 
down the technological process to come to a moral conclusion. When a moral judgment has to be made, 
the problem is not that instantaneous time is not achievable, but that it is not desirable. For this reason, 
when killing with automated and remote technology, most agree that a human should be “in the loop.”51 
A remarkable back-and-forth among the civilian and military leaders follows, as they constantly 
“refer up” for approval rather than making the life-or-death decision themselves and bearing the 
responsibility for the outcome. Powell’s lawyer advises her to “refer up” to the Attorney General in order 
                                                          
51 In Wired For War, P.W. Singer argues that, eventually, humans will be “out of the loop” because warfare will be 
so automated that even a microsecond’s delay will be costly. For example, the best fighter pilots need .3 seconds to 
respond to a simple stimulus, whereas a robotic pilot needs less than a millionth of a second (127). While it is the 
“Issue-That-Must-Not-Be-Discussed” (123), he concludes that “autonomous armed robots are coming to war. They 
simply make too much sense” (128).  
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to protect herself. The Attorney General, who is with Benson, states that because of the girl’s presence 
“there is no law covering a situation quite like this. It’s one thing to release a missile while the street is 
clear in the hope that it will remain so, it is quite another thing knowing that this girl will at worst be 
fatally wounded and at best severely wounded” (1:01:40). The Cabinet members decide to “refer up” to 
the Foreign Secretary, who is in Singapore. In that video conference, Angela, a member of the Cabinet 
argues against the strike: 
Brian Woodale: “As I understand it there is a legal argument that we need not wait and a 
military argument that we should not wait.” 
Lieutenant General Benson: “If we don’t act now we risk losing the lives of up to 80 
people.” 
Angela Northman: “You can only assume those deaths. What is certain is that, if we do 
act now, this one girl will suffer.” 
Foreign Secretary: “You would save her and risk 80 others?” 
Angela Northman: “Yes, I would take that risk.” (1:04:20-40) 
The Foreign Secretary waffles and decides to “refer up” as well, to the Prime Minister. Even the Prime 
Minister refuses to make the call. No one wants to bear the responsibility.52 
I highlight this fascinating ethical debate and unwillingness to bear responsibility one way or the 
other, not to critique the government officials, but because it needs to be pointed out that once the 
decision is made, Steve and Carrie do not have the option to pass the responsibility for killing on to 
someone else, as these civilian leaders do. They cannot “refer up” or defer to someone else to pull the 
trigger. This is true of nearly every soldier presented with a requirement to kill, and ideally every soldier 
will have worked out ahead of time whether or not he or she can live with the requirement to kill, as 
hesitation in the moment may be catastrophic. It is part of the individual’s preparation for war. The cost of 
inaction in war can be as great as or worse than the cost of action. This is the essence of combat service – 
                                                          
52 In Eye in the Sky, the traditional separation of jus ad bellum, or Just Resort, and jus en bellum, or Just Conduct, 
disappears. Here, there is hardly any distinction as the decision for “war” constitutes a single killing event.  
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bearing the responsibility for the conduct of our nation’s wars, which is to bear the responsibility of 
killing in those wars. Yet modern asymmetric wars make this ever more complicated. Eye in the Sky 
presents this complexity. Not only is America not at war with Kenya (and neither is Britain), but British 
officials order an American officer to kill American, British and Kenyan subjects. This opens up an 
entirely different legal and ethical debate which I won’t pursue, but which I feel I must acknowledge 
because soldiers must prepare intellectually and psychologically for this “scrambled” war. This is the 
interconnected world of war with alliances and networked technologies across international borders 
without war zones or declarations of war in which we live, and it is not an easy one for soldiers to 
navigate or make sense of. Still, despite this complicated command structure and the stimulating legal, 
moral and ethical debate throughout the film, no part of the debate questions whether or not the drone 
pilot will shoot as ordered – it is simply assumed. We take for granted that soldiers will kill when told. 
Eventually Powell does order Steve Watts to fire. This is his first Hellfire engagement. The 
camera presents him in an extreme close-up, eye-level shot, inviting “facial recognition” by the viewer. 
He swallows and says “arm weapon” followed by “check” (1:18:55). The scene cuts to the cabinet 
members and Benson watching, then back to Steve and Carrie who complete the pre-attack check list. The 
camera presents an extreme close up of just Steve’s hand gripping the joystick and bright red trigger as he 
says “three, two, one,” and then pulls the trigger (1:19:30). The scene focusses on the mechanics of the 
shot. Immediately after, Steve says “rifle, rifle, rifle, weapon away; time of flight 50 seconds” (1:19:33).  
At this point Eye in the Sky, contrary to Good Kill, slows down narrative time in relation to film 
time; much longer than 50 seconds of action passes before the explosion, as the narrative temporality 
tracks the ethical, not the technological, temporality. In this elongated time, the film details the 
contradictions and complexity of the decision to kill, forcing the viewer to encounter each of the 
participants and the many emotions seemingly suspended in time. This forces the viewer to reflect on and 
process the unfolding event. The viewer encounters fear, dread, anticipation, hope, and suspense in the 
faces of all involved, not to mention the innocence of Alia, which “calls” the viewer into the ethical 
dilemma. When the missile’s impact does finally occur, the camera follows the flight of the Hellfire to the 
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compound and then cuts to a shot from the street level (1:20:48). A tremendously loud explosion sends 
rock and debris rocketing past the camera, and flames consume the frame. The scene straight cuts to the 
drone’s overhead view and the film becomes instantly silent, mimicking Steve Watt’s entirely visual 
experience (1:21:02). Steve swallows again; Carrie cries; Benson and the members of Cabinet watch 
silently. The scene cuts back and forth between the street-level perspective of the destruction and the 
faces of the networked individuals. There is very little, if any, “remove.” It is undeniably an intimate 
experience, aside from Powell’s pacing and apparent callousness.53 Carrie Gershon trembles as she 
identifies Alia and zooms in on the girl; Alia moves her hand (1:21:50).54 Powell orders that the drone 
identify the dead, so Carrie shifts the camera off the girl, and the imagery analyst in Pearl Harbor 
conducts facial recognition of the bodies (1:22:44). This analysis only produces a “probable” and an 
“unknown” as now the faces are unrecognizable, broken, and covered in dust and debris. Yet Danford is 
still clearly alive and attempting to crawl out of the rubble. Powell orders a re-engagement: “target the 
moving body” (1:23:25). Steve appears to be nearly crying – but not – when he fires a second time 
(1:24:13). Alia’s father runs into the frame from the top of the screen followed by her mother, and Steve 
drops his head. Somehow the second explosion does not harm them. Carrie continues to openly cry; the 
shot zooms into an extreme close up of her face (1:26:18), and Steve must jolt her back to work so that 
they can “identify the body” (1:26:40). Carrie searches until at last she zooms in on a fragment of 
Danford’s face; the imagery analyst and computer software PID Danford’s ear as the faces of the dead 
confirm their guilty status, while the faces of the soldiers reveal a different kind of guilt as well (1:27:09).  
This killing event is notably different from those of the last chapter, and even those in Good Kill. 
It is perhaps the most psychologically traumatic and emotionally proximate of all the killing events I have 
                                                          
53 New York Times movie reviewer Stephen Holden labels Mirrin the undisputable villain of the film, yet I think the 
film portrays the Foreign Minister in a far worse light. One can conclude from our different opinions that part of 
viewing a film involves “recognition” of facial expressions conveyed by characters to viewers. This recognition, I 
argue, is actually an interpretation rather than a “command.” 
54 She eventually dies, although this information is presented to the viewer only, not the participants in the killing 
event, who are thus implicitly left with an incomplete narrative which they will have to complete via Gusterson’s 
“interpretive leap.” 
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discussed. Steve and Carrie intimately encounter the costs of their actions before, during, and after killing. 
Neither their faces nor their voices allow an interpretation of either as “droning” through the killing event 
as Egan is portrayed early in Good Kill. The drone allows, and Powell requires, that they zoom in on the 
shattered faces of their victims. These faces are presented in full color: Danford’s struggle to escape the 
rubble is viscerally presented to the man and woman who fire a second time at her “moving body.” Yet 
there is no exhilaration in the spectacle of power, no celebration in the death of others, no dehumanization 
of the enemy, only sadness in all of the characters except Powell, who is the leader of the operation, so 
some level of remove can be expected from her given her position. Even she is not celebratory, simply 
business-like. The government officials, military officers and soldiers involved literally weigh the 
legality, morality and ethics of this killing event before acting. They do so from secure locations, but the 
drone transports Steve and Carrie psychologically and emotionally, providing a more intimate view and 
experience than could be affected “on the ground.” Indeed, because of the “minimum safe distance” 
required for US forces to be away from the impact of a Hellfire, Steve and Carrie are in more ways than 
one significantly closer to this killing event than any American soldier on the ground could be. 
Interestingly, film as a medium requires the viewer to perform acts of facial recognition or 
interpretation of characters. This interpretation of characters’ faces inherently includes a judgment of 
some sort: are the characters good or bad, sad, happy or emotionless, innocent or guilty? This evaluation 
places the viewer in the position of the computer software determining identification, only the viewer 
evaluates subjectively from experiences and memories, by comparing the characters’ faces to faces 
experienced before and stored in his or her memory, as Virilio explains. Viewers must conduct this 
interpretation of films in order to make sense of the film’s actions and words, much as soldiers must 
interpret the faces of others in combat. As such, the face is perhaps the integral part of the visual 
vocabulary and grammar of film. Yet because every viewer’s experience is different, each of these 
interpretations results in a different, although perhaps equally valid reading of a character. The same is 
true of soldiers, which is why in Eye in the Sky it is important that Powell insists that the facial 
recognition software positively identify their targets before they act – Powell is unwilling to kill based on 
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human assumptions, which might lead to Gusterson’s “overnarrativation.” When killing remotely, Eye in 
the Sky argues, even the smallest error of interpretation can be catastrophic. 
It is worth noting that both films employ females in the role of the sensor operator. Both women 
embody sensitivity in their respective films: Carrie and Vera both cry on-screen and in close-up. I think 
this is to the detriment of both film’s messages, which are meant to challenge preconceived ideas of drone 
warfare. Typecasting females in this role reinforces stereotypes that women in combat are too sensitive to 
handle the killing, while men are more capable of suppressing their emotions and thinking clearly. Steve 
has to startle Carrie back into action (1:26:40). This does neither gender benefit. I have been arguing for 
soldiers to be more open about their responses to killing: these films reinforce a masculine ideal which 
suppresses such openness and presumes feminine inadequacy for combat. One could even read Egan’s 
demotion and eventual “berserk” moment as a warning against allowing emotions to surface. If you 
cannot control and contain your emotions, Good Kill warns, you might just go mad. Instead of this 
portrayal, war films should be reinforcing that there is nothing wrong with soldiers crying – indeed one 
might argue that crying at Alia’s death is demanded by the Eye in the Sky. But that both films choose 
exclusively to portray the female characters as crying and not their male counterparts who are sitting right 
next to them is an insightful commentary on our contemporary culture, which influences how American 
soldiers conceive of war. Taken together, war movies create a military ideal, one which many soldiers 
consciously or subconsciously feel they have to live up to. These films, for all their insistence on 
rethinking the complexities of drone warfare, unfortunately fall very short in their portrayal of gender 
roles in military, perpetuating the conventional warrior narrative as the emotionless John Wayne. 
Powell is an exception to this, in that she is direct and calculating throughout and never 
emotional. In fact, for everyone other than Steve and Carrie, this killing event is mostly one of 
calculations first and emotions second. Facial recognition software “calculates” Danford’s identification 
to begin the killing process. Powell calculates the loss of one innocent girl’s life to be worth saving 
perhaps 80 others. In order to legally fire, however, Powell’s targeteer must calculate the collateral 
damage estimate to be “low,” so she has him manipulate the impact point on the drone feed. Still, this 
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does not change the calculation significantly. Angela is worried about political calculations – even stating 
that, politically, it would be better for al Shabab to kill 80 innocents than for England to kill one innocent 
girl and thus lose the propaganda war (1:05:14). Benson, ever the soldier, questions the calculation that 80 
lives are worth a propaganda win. When the calculated chances of the girl’s death are 65 percent, the 
Attorney General will not give definitive legal approval, but at 45 percent he will, even though the film 
makes plain that nothing has changed other than this fictitious number, which Powell has forced her 
targeteer to fudge. In this, Powell makes a second calculation: that it is ethically better to lie about the 
collateral damage estimate than to allow the two suicide bombers and the high value targets to leave the 
building, destroy their unknown targets, and continue to perpetuate terror. Finally, the facial recognition 
software “calculates” positive identifications of the dead bodies to conclude the event (1:27:09). Read this 
way, only Steve and Carrie seem truly empathetic rather than just mathematicians manipulating equations 
to arrive at a desired or acceptable answer. 
In its closing scenes, the film does insist that the soldiers’ calculations differ from their 
government counterparts’. In the second to last scene, Angela and General Benson are the last two to 
leave the conference room from which they have watched and participated in the drone strike. Angela 
criticizes Benson’s actions: “In my opinion that was disgraceful. And all done from the safety of your 
chair” (1:28:40). Benson slowly replies: “I have attended the immediate aftermath of five suicide 
bombings. On the ground. With the bodies. What you witnessed today with your coffee and biscuits is 
terrible. What these men would have done would have been even more terrible” (1:28:48). He pauses 
before finishing his thoughts: “never tell a soldier that he does not know the cost of war” (1:28:55). 
Benson insists that while the killing is terrible, inaction would have been morally worse. Whether or not 
one agrees that it was ethical to risk the girl’s life, Benson insists that the soldier’s experience of 
responsibility for killing is not something to be disregarded, even at a remove. He is aware of the 
consequences of action and inaction, and he implicitly says he is unwilling to have a sixth suicide 
bombing on his conscience. This killing event is not a matter of dehumanizing the enemy, but rather 
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protecting others. For Benson, the burden of inaction outweighs the cost of action; he has done the math 
ahead of time. 
I’ve written this thesis in hopes that not all soldiers will need to experience five killing events in 
order to have an idea of what to think about killing, of how to approach it. In the film, Steve and Vera are 
presented as experiencing their first killing event with little or no pre-thinking. The closing scene cuts to 
Nevada where Steve and Vera leave their GCS. In the film, they do not know whether Alia lives or dies, 
so they will have to complete their own narratives based on assumptions and interpretation. They have 
few words to describe their experience. Yet their commander meets them outside, in the desert. After 
encouraging them, he sends them home “to rest” because he needs them back in twelve hours (1:32:40). 
Surely they will need more time to process this experience, but that is not built into their schedule. The 
demands of the technological temporality trump those of the ethical. For Steve and Vera, the most 
complex calculation of the film might be how to allocate their time in such a way that they can make 
sense of what they have done, rest, and return to potentially do it all over again in twelve hours. Whether 
or not they thought about killing before, that will be a challenge, but I insist that if they did think about it 
before, it might be a more easily approachable and less foreign challenge, more akin to algebra than to 
calculus. What is certain is, if they do not reckon with this experience, if they do not create a narrative 
that makes sense of it but rather become numb, then the fate of Egan – even if not so extreme – lingers in 
the future. Yet Eye in the Sky does not leave that as a lasting impression. One feels that their trajectory is 
different, that these are reflective soldiers who will uphold both their own humanity and that of those they 
kill. The film points towards the conclusion that while the experience was certainly traumatic, Steve and 
Carrie have not been morally injured. Therefore, somehow, one believes that they will be affected, but not 
destroyed. 
These two films both treat preconceived notions of drone warfare, but do so in very different 
manners. The apparent senselessness of the violence in Good Kill, in contrast with the deliberate though 
much more intimate killing in Eye in the Sky, is something I believe must be stressed in the military. The 
technical aspects of killing in the films are the same. The ethics of killing a civilian in addition to a known 
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terrorist or insurgent are the same. The cost of action and inaction are conceivably similar. The difference 
in the films is the narratives surrounding those events. Neither Egan nor the viewer can process the killing 
in Good Kill, but whether or not one agrees with the decision to kill in Eye in the Sky, at least it makes 
sense and is the result of ethical reflection. Unfortunately, because of the classified nature of drone 
warfare, narratives of actual killing events are largely withheld from the public. As a society, as a global 
community, we cannot make sense of them. The same does not need to be true within the military; 
whether killing with “boots on the ground” or remotely, this remains profoundly true. 
In this chapter I have argued that soldiers may view themselves and the other as human and kill if 
they believe the act saves other human lives, accomplishes military objectives, or is for the greater good 
of humanity. I have also agreed with Glenn Gray that most soldiers do not do this, but rather become 
numb or conceive of themselves and/or the enemy as something other than wholly human. Karl Marlantes 
calls this “pseudospeciation” (110). I think this is how war crimes begin. Obviously, not everyone who 
goes to war and holds an image of themselves and/or the enemy as something other than human commits 
a war crime, but it is still the first movement away from ethical action. For many this begins long before 
they even consider joining the military. For others, it is a defense mechanism against the horrors of war. 
At times, even those who strive to see themselves and the enemy as similarly human may find it 
impossible, but I maintain that the effort is vital to protecting one’s moral center, or what Tick would call 
the soul. A tremendous part of that is understanding how the language we use to describe and think about 
killing and the narratives we create to make sense of killing affect our ideas of ourselves and others. We 
must always be on guard about how we make sense of such a profound experience. Sooner or later we 
start to believe the things we tell ourselves, or we certainly behave that way. This is even more important 
in war when there is no risk to self. Egan feels like a coward. Angela makes a similar accusation against 
Benson in that he has killed “from the comfort of his chair.” Some in the military make fun of the Air 
Force as the “chair force.” Egan lacks a narrative that makes sense of his experience. Benson, however, 
can live with the narrative he creates and the choices he makes in the film. This is a fundamental 
difference.  
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Physical distance can no longer be conceived of as coupled to the trauma and/or moral injury of 
killing; the characters in this chapter demonstrate that. The world is so interconnected, or “flat” as Tom 
Friedman is fond of writing, that all boundaries, not just war zones, are becoming more and more 
permeable or “scrambled.” War and society have become “respatialized,” network-centric, and incredibly 
complex. If we are to account for this new world, then soldiers need a new warrior narrative, one that 
accounts for the progress we are making at valuing all life and the advancements of technology. That does 
not mean that there will not be death or killing at war, or a place for warriors in it. Simply put, not 
everyone values all human life. Some oppose the idea. Some oppose it violently and terribly. When that 
happens, it is not philosophers or politicians who fight and kill the enemy, but soldiers, who, as this 
chapter makes plain, cannot defer that responsibility to someone else. There will be debates about the 
ethics and morality of and in war, and those debates are essential and healthy for our democracy. Yet 
when the debates are over and the decision is made, it is the soldier who shoulders the responsibility for 
not just winning the war, but conducting that war justly.55 In war, if our ideology is one of hate, then no 
matter whatever limited objectives we accomplish, we will be losing ground. American soldiers are no 
fools. They understand this, and yet we send them off to war (or, in the case of this chapter, do not send 
them anywhere) with a pop culture-built and military-endorsed image of the soldier as a man (and it is a 
man in these representations) who fights valiantly, feels nothing, and is unchanged by the experience. We 
know better and yet we let soldiers go off to war (or drive to it) as if this were so, as if they can deal with 
the intellectual and psychological aspects of war after the fact and be no worse for the wear. That is a 
great illusion. 
  
                                                          
55 In military ethics, this is known as jus en bellum, or Just Conduct. Again, most agree that it is the soldiers’ 
responsibility to carry out the war justly, that is, they are not responsible for the cause of the war, but rather 
executing it justly (Walzer 21).  
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CONCLUSION 
A “HUMAN ENDEAVOR”: KILLING IN CONTEMPORARY COMBAT 
 
To be effective and moral fighters, we must not lose our individuality, our ability to stand 
alone, and yet, at the same time, we must owe our allegiance not to ourselves alone but to 
an entity so large as to be incomprehensible, namely humanity or God. Karl Marlantes, 
What It Is Like To Go To War (144) 
 
When the Constitutional Congress debated and signed the Declaration of Independence, it also, 
de facto, declared the first U.S. war. Imperfectly applied throughout our history, the founding claim of 
that document is that “all men are created equal.” It was this self-evident truth that compelled the 
congress to war and our nation into existence. I think we, as soldiers and a society, have somehow lost 
sight of this ideal in our vision of war and warriors, whether because of pop culture, violent video games, 
or, worse, prejudices like racism and sexism that limited the phrase’s application even when it was first 
written. Yet I do not know how one can go to war today and kill justly without holding to this ideal. If 
Glenn Gray is correct and in war “the typical image of the enemy is conditioned by the need to hate him 
without limits,” then I think we do ourselves and the world great disservice and harm (132). Gray wrote 
that almost sixty years ago about total war; today one can hardly imagine carpet-bombing entire cities, yet 
Gray’s ideas remain influential. I believe we need an updated “typical image of the enemy” and an 
updated narrative of the contemporary warrior. Hating without limits does not represent the boundless 
ideals of America – and I cannot imagine a time or place in which we should be fighting for anything 
other than our ideals. Soldiers are fond of saying that they fight to “protect the American way of life,” but 
I wonder if we have forgotten that how we fight is part of that “way of life.” The method and the purpose 
must align, especially in wars of competing ideologies. If not, how can we ever expect success beyond 
limited tactical victories? 
In this thesis I have argued that distance should not be thought of as coupled to experience of 
killing in war. This is an important argument, in many ways a counterintuitive and countercultural 
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argument, because soldiers are always quick to doubt that a “FOBBIT” could be struggling 
psychologically with the horrors of war.56 “S/he never even left the wire,” is a common refrain. Soldiers 
also frequently disparage other soldiers who fight remotely, soldiers like drone pilots, as evidenced by the 
backlash against the introduction of a service medal for soldiers like them. Such criticism fails to 
understand that physical distance in war is now either “obliterated,” “respatialized” or “scrambled,” and 
the term “front lines” fails to account for the multi-dimensional and multi-spectral nature of modern war. 
In many cases this extends globally, as network-centric warfare will be the norm, not the exception in the 
future. Yet these criticisms arise because we have mistakenly thought that the experience of emotional or 
psychological proximity is directly linked to physical proximity during killing, an argument championed 
for many years by Dave Grossman. The two are not directly linked.57 I hope this study has convincingly 
uncoupled them. We do a great injustice to the vast majority of our soldiers who comprise the logistical 
and support units of our military when we continue the false narrative that their service is somehow not 
exposed to the psychological trials of war, that killing is or ought to be easy for them. Excluded from the 
“brave warrior narrative,” these soldiers have to contend against a narrative that does not allow them to 
experience the emotions of combat because they are not “close” to the action. This non-factual narrative 
hinders their ability to make sense of their experiences. It forces them into a lesser human and lesser 
soldier category of the “not brave” or “cowardly” which is not inherently true. Confronted by the tension 
between this false, though widely circulated narrative and their experiences, a crisis of identity can arise, 
which is, for Edward Tick, how we should conceive of PTSD. This is, in my opinion, a failure of 
communal representation, a failure of leadership to equip the soldier to make sense of his or her 
experiences. 
                                                          
56 The term “rear echelon” is even under pressure as the derogatory “REMF” of previous wars has been replaced 
with other, more contemporary though equally pejorative terms like “FOBBIT” (a soldier stationed on a FOB, a 
forward operating base)  or “POG” (person other than grunt). 
57 Ironically enough, we acknowledge this in society as we recognize that social media and technological screens are 
creating virtual communities which experience emotional proximity, even though many within these communities 
have never met “in person” and are geographically dispersed. 
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Throughout this thesis, I have argued that narratives matter, that how soldiers conceive of 
themselves and their enemy influences their experience of killing and their ability to make sense of it 
afterwards. Narratives can hurt or help soldiers in and after combat. Depicting war and killing as 
“indescribable” or “beastly,” or advising the soldier to be a “machine” or “numb” does not prepare the 
soldier to make sense of his or her experiences of killing, and can become self-fulfilling prophecies. How 
we conceive of ourselves and the enemy and the experience of killing acts like a feedback loop between 
experience and representation: each influences and reinforces the other. Instead of a negative feedback 
loop, then, we ought to construct a positive one. 
Is asking the soldier to think of the enemy as similarly human a tall order? It is. Can a soldier do 
that and kill? Of course. Soldiers will do what they have been trained to do, so long as they believe it to 
be legally and morally right, for the greater good, for protection of what they hold dear, and for the 
accomplishment of legitimate military objectives. Effective training prepares the soldier to subordinate 
his or her body’s actions during combat to function as necessary. In this, the body may perform like a 
machine, but this does not require that the soldier must likewise subordinate his or her conscience too. As 
Marlantes explains in this chapter’s epigraph, this requires expanding allegiance beyond oneself but does 
not require a loss of individual moral standing. Early in Yellow Birds, Bartle fires at an insurgent 
instinctively, as trained, while comparing himself to the insurgent. Even so, he kills the insurgent. Could 
he have done this for his entire deployment? I argue yes, but he needs a better leader than Sergeant 
Sterling to help him make sense of his experience, to validate and reinforce that narrative. Instead, 
Sterling tells him to be a deviant, and so Bartle deviates from the view of himself and the enemy as 
human. He changes his narrative, which influences his experiences until ultimately he commits several 
war crimes. In Eye in the Sky, Steve and Carrie go through their pre-shot checklist and fire the Hellfire as 
trained, even as they hold an image of Alia as human. How can they do this? Because they value other 
human life. This is true of all soldiers, whether they kill for the people next to them (the unit), people 
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“back home” (the country),58 or, as Marlantes writes, “an entity so large as to be incomprehensible, 
namely humanity or God” (144).  
Viewing the enemy as similarly human does several things for the military. First, it decreases the 
likelihood of unethical action during war. It decreases the likelihood of unnecessary killing because it 
adheres to the law of war principles of military necessity and proportionality. Second, it increases the 
likelihood of success in the “war of ideas” – as soldiers demonstrating that Americans value all human 
life will be more likely to “win hearts and minds” than soldiers who visibly disregard the humanity of 
others. Third, I hypothesize that it will decrease instances of long-term post-traumatic stress disorder 
because it will limit moral injuries incurred by the “betrayal of what’s right,” i.e. transgressions and 
unethical killing. As a result of this, it will, fourth, increase military effectiveness. It does not solve the 
problem of psychological trauma or acute post-traumatic stress (also called short-term post-traumatic 
stress), but I think it does have a role in preventing or limiting the longer-duration disorder because it 
limits unethical and immoral actions which lead to moral injury.59 Why we have decided to describe war 
as a phenomenon with a “different moral code” than peaceful society I do not know. It ought to have the 
same or at least a similar moral code. Soldiers can recover from, endure, and even thrive in war if they are 
equipped with a narrative that translates between both war and peace.  
Perhaps the better question, then, is why this “reflective warrior narrative” is not already the 
“contemporary warrior narrative.” I offer several reasons. First, it is easier on the soldier in the short term 
to avoid the question of his or her own humanity and the question of the humanity of the enemy. Many 
simply ignore this looming and complex problem. Most of us do this in our day-to-day lives as well. Yet 
doing this, not insisting on the humanity of oneself and the enemy, opens the door for the movement 
towards unethical action and dehumanization either of the self or the enemy or both. Doing this defers the 
problem of psychological trauma and moral injury until later. So why would a military officer or teacher 
                                                          
58 Although as Chapter 3 reveals, today and in the future, not all soldiers will leave “home” to fight in war. 
59 In this, I apply Jonathan Shay’s argument in Achilles in Vietnam that moral injury is an “essential part of combat 
trauma that leads to lifelong psychological injury” but that horror and grief are separate problems (20). 
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not confront this? Well, I think it is far easier to allow soldiers to self-motivate by hatred of the enemy 
than for an officer to motivate his or her soldiers to act out of concern for others. That is, it is easier to be 
motivated by self-interest than selflessness or concern for others, even if in the long term the self-interest 
option turns out to be against one’s own interests. It takes time and deliberate effort to conceive of an 
enemy you might kill (or be killed by) as a human being like yourself. Time and energy are hard to come 
by when preparing for war. So this is not an argument many officers will make because, lacking the time 
and energy to complete this argument, they are worried their soldiers will be “soft” and not perform in 
combat. This worry stems in large part from the unsubstantiated claims of S. L. A. Marshall that 85 
percent of soldiers did not fire their weapons during World War II and the equally unsubstantiated claims 
of Dave Grossman that all humans resist killing other humans, even in war. I disagree with Grossman. I 
spent far more time in combat trying to talk my soldiers out of killing when it was not necessary than into 
killing when it was necessary. In fact, I never did the latter, and I led four different platoons from four 
different companies and two different battalions over a span of five years in war, so I find it hard to 
believe that this was an organizational or periodic anomaly. The problem is not (and likely never was) 
that soldiers will not fire their weapons or kill humans in combat. The greater problem as I see it is that 
soldiers do not view the enemy as human in the first place. 
This is a problem that is reinforced by Grossman’s “Bulletproof Mind” training sessions given to 
the military and police forces around the U.S. today. Because Grossman believes humans are “innately” 
resistant to killing or harming other humans, he has to present a framework in which soldiers (and police 
officers) can conceive of how to overcome this human trait, which he terms “the Universal Phobia” (On 
Combat 273). Naturally, getting around this “universal” and “innately human” trait requires an inhuman 
turn. Although he makes many other great and compelling points, such as seeking “justice not vengeance” 
and confronting the requirement to kill ahead of time in order to prevent or limit psychological injury (On 
Combat 358, 148), he ultimately proposes that soldiers should view civilians as sheep, the enemy as 
wolves, and themselves as sheepdogs (On Combat 181). In my view, this creates an enormous amount of 
unnecessary representational problems for the soldier. It insists on an animalized narrative of killing, not a 
  
106 
 
human one: to kill in war is to be a dog of war, not a human soldier.60 It creates a huge unnecessary and 
unbridgeable divide between the soldier and society, and an even larger and equally unbridgeable divide 
between the soldier and the enemy.61 The first divide leads to problems of reintegration back into society 
after war (indeed, in Grossman’s model soldiers remain sheepdogs), and the second opens the door to 
unethical action and moral injury during war, as it is only one conceptual linguistic or metaphorical step 
past sheepdog to wolf or beast. 
So it is time we update the warrior and the enemy narrative. I have advocated that literature has a 
role to play in that effort, an essential role in helping soldiers understand themselves and what it is to be a 
warrior and kill. Today, our military and society should no longer allow a narrative of the soldier as 
unfeeling, unthinking and unchanged by war. We should not encourage hatred or dehumanization of the 
enemy, but rather respect for the enemy. The image of the warrior must not exclusively be a square-
jawed, brawny man. As importantly, we should no longer conceive of the psychological experience of 
killing as directly linked to physical proximity. Instead, we need to recognize that the experience of 
killing is profoundly linked to the perception of the other as similarly human and that narratives are how 
we make sense of the traumatic experience of war. Since that is the case, we must carefully represent the 
warrior through a new narrative. While this narrative may be immediately harder for the soldier to 
construct since it is more complex, once built, it will help limit unethical action and moral injury, 
although the soldier will remain exposed to psychological trauma. This is the narrative needed today: a 
reflective warrior is aware of him or herself as an individual moral agent and gives his or her allegiance to 
something greater than him or herself and therefore is willing to bear the responsibility of killing other 
humans (or being killed by other humans) for his or her country in order to achieve military objectives 
and protect country and comrades. This warrior understands that moral courage and emotional maturity 
                                                          
60 I recognize that the distinction between human and animal is under pressure in the current academia. Grossman 
does not employ the distinction in this way, but rather pejoratively uses “sheep” and “wolf.” For example, he “baas” 
during his presentation to mock civilians. 
61 Grossman in fact writes that the “sheep,” or nearly all of humanity, “live in denial” and “generally do not like the 
sheepdog” (182). Further, he writes that the “sheep pretend the wolf will never come, but the sheepdog lives for that 
day” (183). 
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are as (perhaps even more) important as the capacity to inflict violence. Confident in this narrative, the 
warrior displays strength by communicating his or her experiences and emotions in his or her own 
narrative, and through that communication is able to heal from the trauma of war and help others heal as 
well. Call him or her a reflective warrior, a modern or contemporary warrior, or even a warrior-poet, but 
do not call him or her John Wayne or a sheepdog. 
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